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You make me complete.

Judge me not harshly, O thou who hast never known
sickness -- ay, and for a while partial blindness -- in a
strange land, if in my pain and my wakefulness I at length
yielded to the voice of the tempter, and fled for refuge to
that most potent, most sovereign, most seductive, and most
enthralling of masters, opium.

E. G. Browne, A Year Amongst the Persians, p. 476
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ABSTRACT

THE MOST SOVEREIGN OF MASTERS:
THE HISTORY OF OPIUM IN MODERN IRAN, 1850-1955

Ram Baruch Regavim

Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet.

This study surveys a century of commercial opium production in Iran, from 1850
to 1955. From an insignificant contributor to the global opium market, Iran became
within a few decades an important exporter, turning to the market between 5-10% of the
entire global production of opium. Opium-poppy cultivation and opium production
formed part of a larger process of transition within the agricultural sector to cash-crop
production. Under the growing pressure of increasing imports of European manufactured
goods and the collapse of the local manual industries, the production of cash-crops, and
particularly opium, was intended to balance Iran’s trade deficit. The combination of
timely political changes in China, technological improvements in steamboat navigation
and a high-quality product, enabled the successful integration of Iranian opium within the
global opium market. This success stands in contrast to the usual negative evaluation of
Iran’s social and economic reforms during the later 19th-century.
Parallel to the rise of opium production, opium consumption -- particularly opium
smoking -- became very popular in Iran. The extent of this phenomenon caused concern
among the country’s political and cultural leadership, but the proponents of the antiopium cause in Iran were never zealots, nor did they wield the sort of political power that
matched the influence of anti-opium organizations in the US, Europe and China. Iran was
early to join the diplomatic efforts to end the opium trade in the 20th century, but it did so
mostly in order to reject or postpone resolutions that would harm the Government’s
substantial opium revenues. In the end, the economic compensation that came with the
larger share in the oil revenues, which Iran negotiated in 1954, and not internal political
pressure by anti-opium groups, enabled Iran to forego its opium trade altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
Guillaume-Antoine Olivier, who travelled in the Middle East at the turn of the
19th century, noted that “opium in Iran was like wine in (southern) Europe: although it
was abundantly available, few drunks were seen in public.”1 A British Foreign Office
report from the end of the 19th-century recounts: “A large proportion of the population
use opium as a drug. They are divided into two classes: the smokers and the eaters. The
former may be classed with habitual drunkards who are past redemption.”2 In a booklong report on the opium problem of Iran published in the 1920s, Dr. A. R. Neligan
recounts that Iranians are among the first to lament the backwards condition of their
country and discuss its various problems. But above all, “people of all classes, will assert
that the habit [of opium] is a national disaster, a cause of deterioration and economic
loss.”3Opium in its various forms had long been present in Iran. Stone-age societies who
lived in the area that is now modern Iran had known about the wonderful virtues of the
juice collected from the ripen pod of the poppy flower. Today, more than a century after
the first international treaty for fighting against the production, trade and consumption of
opium was signed at The Hague in January 1912, opium and its derivatives remain
widely used in Iran, which faces one of the largest concentrations of opiate consumers in
the world.

1

Rudi Matthee, The Pursuit of Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500-1900 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 208.
2
3

"Opium in Persia," The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 23 (1894).

Anthony Richard Neligan, The Opium Question, with Special Reference to Persia (London: J. Bale Sons
& Danielsson Ltd., 1927), 30-31.
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The cultivation of poppies for the purpose of opium production was not a modern
phenomenon in Iran, but rather an industry with a significant history. To trace the
prevalence of the opium industry, this dissertation follows the production of opium
roughly from 1850 and 1955. During this exciting period, opium production became one
of the most important, if controversial, industries of Iran, responsible at times for 10% of
the entire annual revenues of the Iranian government. This industry directly employed
tens of thousands of Iranians, and hundreds of thousands more benefitted from it
indirectly. For many peasants, the success of the opium industry brought a stable source
of income on which they could count from year to year. Many of the big merchants,
landowners and industrialists in Iran made their initial fortune by trading opium.
The rise of large-scale commercial opium production in Iran from the 1850s to the
1880s coincided with the historical peak of global opium production. No other period in
human history saw the production and consumption of so much opium for both medicinal
and leisure purposes. The presiding global drug prohibition regime under which we live
since the beginning of the 20th century is partly a reaction to that period of excess. In
1955, decades after it had nominally agreed to be part of the international struggle against
opium, Iran enacted a standard opium prohibition regime of her own.
Shifting the conventional focus of historiography from the political and the social
has some notable scholarly advantages. Whereas political, social, cultural and economic
historians who study the same period produce historical narratives that only vaguely
interact to create a multi-layered consensus, a product as an object of historical study
serves as a much better connection between the sub-disciplines of historical research.
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Cultural historians may produce legitimate works of history while merely giving lip
service to the work of political and social historians who studied the overlapping period.
This is not possible when writing the history of a product. The economic history of opium
is not possible without the political and diplomatic history of Iran, and certainly cannot
be understood without the social history of opium smoking and the attempts to suppress
it. Another value of product history is its ability to provide a stronger connection of
continuity between the arbitrarily defined historical periods.
The history of opium in modern Iran has been studied before; however, the
existing research is lacking in at least one of several ways. First, there is not a single
narrative which describes the entire century of large-scale production of opium in Iran,
but merely several separate narratives focused on the history of opium during specific
periods, such as the late Qajar period or the early Pahlavi period, thus shifting the focus
from opium to the political and the social. Second, most of the published works on the
subject deal with only one or two aspects of the history of opium: The economic impact
of opium but also the history of opium addiction and treatment in Iran. Third, as shall be
seen, the existing historiography is ridden by mistakes and some factual errors, and it is
prejudiced by a narcophobic discourse. The following dissertation attempts to overcome
these lacunae and to tell the multi-faceted history of modern opium production in Iran as
a multi-layered, harmonious and continuous narrative.
This work suggests that the surveyed period may be divided into four, mostly
distinctive, phases. (I) The first phase, roughly between the years 1850-1880, consider the
years during which opium production in Iran expanded rapidly and quickly established
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itself as an important factor in the East-Asian markets. The flooding of the Iranian market
with cheap industrial goods imported from Europe resulted in the dramatic decline of
Iran’s manual industries and the creation of a trade deficit, which was balanced by a noless dramatic rise in the production of cash crops during the second half of the 19th
century. New opportunities for trade in the East Asian markets, together with unique
conditions for cultivation in Iran, made opium the most important and most successful of
all cash crops during this era.
(II) During the second phase, from 1880 until after World War I, the production
of opium reached a certain plateau and its expansion slowed down significantly. The rise
of opium consumption in Iran itself and the dramatic increase in the political power of
international anti-opium movements were the most important factors that shaped Iran’s
opium policy vis-à-vis the international effort to control and limit the production, trade
and consumption of opium around the world, an effort of which Iran was a part of.
(III) The third phase parallels the rise to power and the monarchic rule of Reza
Shah. Since the coup d’état of 1921 that first brought him to power until his forced
abdication in 1941, Reza Shah’s regime gradually consolidated its control over the opium
sector in the state’s hands and eventually monopolized it completely. Despite growing
international pressure and the government’s own concern over the high rates of opium
consumption in the country, opium production, its export and internal trade did not
decrease during this period, and only superficial measures were undertaken to treat what
the government itself perceived as an opium problem. The contraction of the international
markets for legal opium products alongside the economic pressures created by the
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government’s ambitious plans of reform in a time of global economic depression,
motivated Iran to turn a blind eye to – and sometimes even to actively assist – large-scale
illegal trade in Iranian opium.
(IV) The last phase coincided with the accession to power of Mohammad Reza
Shah by the occupying Allied Forces during the early stages of World War II. Despite
initial doubts by foreign observers, the governments that came to power during this
period were much more serious in their intention to end excessive opium production in
Iran and to align its opium policy with the international standards set by the international
opium treaties. Only the ongoing economic pressures and the chronic instability of the
political system prevented the implementation of a prohibition regime over opium. These
obstacles were removed after the overthrowing of Mohammad Mosaddegh’s government
in August of 1953, as Iran re-negotiated the terms of its oil concessions to receive 50% of
the oil profits. American funding for building up the Iranian armed forces and the
construction of large infrastructure facilities flowed into Iran, as it became an important
Cold War ally of the US. Under these new conditions, the continuation of opium
production and trade became an unnecessary embarrassment for the Iranian government,
and in 1955 the Iranian government declared a complete prohibition on the production,
trade and consumption of opium and opium products..
For students of the history of modern Iran, I hope this work will contribute
important insights to the ongoing debate over the evaluation of Iran’s economic
development during the modern period. Often scholars are quick to make over-arching
assessments about what they perceive as either the failure or the success of Iran during
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this turbulent time of change and reform. Closely examining the development of the
opium industry reveals that a nuanced approach to what is considered “success” or
“failure” is necessary in order to reach a balanced evaluation of this period. Whereas the
existing literature provides only sporadic discussion of opium during detached periods of
time, my work will offer a coherent narrative of opium and its impact on Iran throughout
an entire century, a history that strives to change the focus from the occasional political
turmoil to the long term social and economic developments.
Furthermore, this dissertation is one of the few scholarly works in the field of
Qajar history that attempts to understand social and economic change in Iran within an
eye toward parallel developments in East Asia, mainly India and China. Historians of the
Middle East are well versed in the body of research describing the impact of political and
economic development in Europe on Iran and the rest of the Middle East. However, little
research exists about the impact of developments in East Asia on the Middle East. My
dissertation shows that without understanding the history and the structure of the
manufacture and trade of Indian opium, and the relations between this economy and the
Chinese opium markets, it is impossible to understand the development of Iran’s opium
business during the second half of the 19th century.
Drug historians are familiar with narratives that describe the path of a given
society to modern drug prohibition, a process that more or less traverses similar stages:
The consumption of a certain drug becomes popular among a certain group within a
given society; the consumption of that drug is perceived by another group within that
society as a problem; the latter group launches a campaign against the drug, recruiting
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supporters from various segments of the society; the government is either apathetic to the
problem of the drug or invested politically or economically in the trade of that drug;
depending on the nature of the political system of the given society, the anti-drug group
uses its base of support to pressure the government to change its position towards the
drug issue. This narrative varies significantly, but at its base it is always an ideologically
motivated grass-roots movement that uses its political influence to nudge the government
towards a prohibition regime. The research bellow presents quite a different sequence of
events.
Throughout the century of commercial opium production in Iran, there was some
disapproval and even opposition to the growing rate of opium consumption in the
country, but this dissent never amounted to anything that resembled the anti-opium
movements in Europe, North America and China. Officially, Iran joined the diplomatic
initiatives against the global opium trade and was among the signatories of the first
Opium Convention signed at The Hague in 1912. However, Iran refused to accept the
terms dictated by the Opium Convention, and throughout the first half of the 20th century
it did not limit its production of opium in any significant way and did not undertake any
serious move to reduce the number of addicts or prevent new smokers from joining the
ranks of the habitual users. In the face of international pressure Iran indirectly assisted the
smuggling of enormous amounts of opium, and its opium production did not stop even
under foreign occupation during World War II. This research will present a new variant
of the path to prohibition, one that goes through the government’s economic and
diplomatic calculations, without political pressure from a grass-root movement.
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The dissertation itself is divided into three sections, including a total of seven
chapters. The first chapter begins by a presentation of the basic biological facts about
opium and the history of its production and trade from antiquity to the modern period. It
then continues to survey the specific history of opium production, trade and consumption
in Iran since antiquity until the first half of the 19th century, and explains the principles of
the political and economic conditions in Iran prior to its transition into a cash crop
producer during the second half of the 19th century. This period is then contrasted with
the modernization of opium production in Iran since the second half of the 19th century,
explained as a period of immense and rapid increase in the acreage devoted for poppy
cultivation; a re-organization of labor and the production process in general; application
of new methods of cultivation, collection and processing; application of new funding
systems, and; the integration of Iran’s opium business to the global opium market.
Chapter Two examines the historiography of this period and the various reasons,
explanations and analyses suggested by scholars and other writers who have discussed
the rise of opium production in Iran, its origins and its impact on Iran. A survey of the
more anecdotal information about the origins of opium production in Iran, particularly
the credit ascribed to personalities for “bringing opium to Iran,” reveals that most of it is
unreasonable and probably even incorrect given the historical context. A more in-depth
analysis is devoted to the writing of scholars who studied the broader context of opium
production in the late Qajar period. While placing the rise of opium production within the
larger context of the transition to cash crops, different scholars offered quite different
evaluations of the historical role of opium production in late Qajar history. Some view
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opium as a positive economic force, viewing it as a successful venture that improved the
living conditions of many and one that brought investment in infrastructure and early
industrialization. Others suggested opium was a debilitating venture forced upon Iran as a
result of conditions dictated by the imperialist West. The massive revenues of this
industry strengthened the rule of those who were already in power and allowed them to
avoid real reform and tightened their oppressive control over the population, which in
turn did not benefit from the opium revenues at all.
The analysis goes on to discuss two major problems in both these approaches:
First, the insufficient reference to the larger context of the global opium markets,
particularly those of East Asia, within which the Iranian opium market operated. Second,
the anti-opium bias present in both of the approaches that not only distorts the
understanding of the historical role of opium but also prevents important questions from
being asked. The chapter ends with an analysis of the great famine of 1871-1872, that for
many years was considered a result of unrestrained opium production that came at the
expense of wheat. Although scholarly study had already shown that this accusation is
most probably wrong, this view appears to retain an ongoing hold in late Qajar
historiography, and this study suggests some context to help understand the origins of this
accusation.
Chapter Three offers a thematic analysis of the fundamental concepts of drug
scholarship designed to bring to light the harmful impact of the narcophobic discourse on
historical research. The chapter begins with an examination of the basic concept of drug,
followed by a description of the various sub-fields of drug scholarship and the often
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sordid inter-relations between them. It continues with an attempt to disprove many of the
narcophobic myths and expose the way those erroneous concepts shape not only
contemporary drug policy, but also our understanding of the past. The main goal of this
chapter is to present the subjective and culturally-dependent nature of the concept
“addiction” and the surprising lack of strong scientific evidence which supports the
general perception of this concept as a well-understood form of a disease. Too often this
problematic concept was used to explain away questions regarding the drug trade. The
belief in the power of addiction was so entrenched that standard historical questions, such
as questions regarding the success of opium marketing in a given region, were not even
asked since the success of drugs was assumed to be obvious, given their “addictive”
nature. Refusing the all-too-easy explanations of “addiction” and “loss of control” opens
up opportunities to ask new historical questions about drugs and their trade, questions
considered otherwise as too obvious. Asking what made Iranian opium so successful in
the Chinese markets is a superfluous and tautological question for those who believe that
“addicts” will purchase their drug no matter what the price might be, but an entirely
legitimate question for those who reject the disease model of addiction.
Chapter Four combines these insights to present the function of the Iranian opium
trade within the inner workings of the contemporary global opium market. The chapter
begins with a description of the Indian opium monopoly developed by the East India
Company since the late 18th century that enabled the Company to create a closed system
of an almost total control over the Chinese opium market. This brings up the question of
how Iranian merchants managed to sidestep the British trade network and penetrate the
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Chinese opium market, a question only briefly discussed in the existing historiography.
This work contends that the success of Iranian opium depended on its high quality and its
introduction into the market at the right time.
Several factors were significant in making the 1850s and 1860s the right
“historical moment” for Iranian opium in China: Improvements in steamboat navigation;
the opening of the Suez Canal and the end of the Second Opium War in China. These
developments gave market exposure to Iranian opium under favorable conditions. Due to
the low cost of production and the much lower customs rate in Iran, trading in Iranian
opium was highly profitable even if it sold for significant lower prices than the Indian
brands. In addition to good timing, the producers quickly adapted their product to the
demands of the global markets and managed to improve significantly the quality of the
opium produced in Iran within a few decades. By the end of the 1880s, pure Iranian
opium contained higher rates of morphine than the Indian brands, and Iranian-prepared
opium fetched similar and even higher prices in the Chinese markets. Although some
scholars are critical of the major role taken up by foreign trade in late Qajar Iran’s
economic development at the expense of what should have a been a “normal” transition
from subsistence economy to industrialization, the opium trade is a clear example of how
trade was in fact closely connected to improvements in production and the raising of
standards.
Chapter Five discusses the opium business during the last decades of Qajar rule.
A review of the published works on opium in Iran reveals that most of the research
focused either on the rise of opium production during mid-19th century or on the
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monopolization of opium during the interwar period under the government of Reza Shah.
Developments in the opium sector were largely ignored or marginalized at best. The
expansion of opium trade marked a crucial transitional period for Iran during which not
only did it begin to respond and cooperate with the international campaign against opium,
but also began facing its own problem of excessive opium consumption. By the end of
the 19th century, the large array of anti-opium groups - of diverse motivations,
constitution and modes of activity - turned into an efficient political coalition that made
opium into a critical political question. The Opium Commission, convened at Shanghai in
1909, became pinnacle of this coalition’s achievements. The Commission set the ground
for the 1912 Opium Conference at The Hague. At the conclusion of this conference,
participating countries signed the first Opium Convention. Prior to these events, China
had announced in 1908 its intention to ban completely the import of Iranian opium within
a few years, a move that came into effect in 1912.
Opium consumption in Iran itself was on the rise since the 1850s, parallel to the
modernization of opium production. Opium smoking, previously unknown in Iran,
became very popular at the expense of opium eating. Some viewed opium as a common
staple of hospitality and recreation in many Iranian homes. Opium was a product smoked
by people of all classes, professions, sexes and ages. Alongside the rise in consumption,
the previously carefree attitude toward the opium habit changed into disapproval among
members of the ruling elite and the developing intelligentsia. However, the majority of
Iranians did not share this assessment. Contrary to the US, Europe and China, Iran
lacked a grass-roots anti-opium movement to pressure the political system.
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Chapter Six contains an in-depth analysis of Iran’s early opium diplomacy and its
reaction to the international demand to reduce its production of opium and to act against
its consumption within its borders. Despite having no economic incentive or internal
political pressure to push for joining the anti-opium effort, Iran chose to cooperate with
this initiative for various reasons, and acted within this context to ameliorate the terms of
the treaties for the benefit of Iran’s economic interests, while emphasizing Iran’s
commitment to act against the consumption of opium. Particularly during the 1912
Opium Conference at The Hague, the Iranian delegation was anything but passive in its
constant attempt to divert the debates from the realm of trade limitation to the more
convenient discussion over consumption limitations. Iran signed the Opium Convention
presented at the end of that conference, but with a notorious reservation over an article
asserting the responsibility of the signatory governments to monitor the export of opium
from their own territory and actively to prevent smuggling of opium from their shores
into countries that already prohibited its importation. The chapter continues with an
analysis of Iran’s domestic opium regulations legislated in the early 1910s in an attempt
to structure an opium policy for Iran. Despite the meticulous details laid out in those
regulations, a close examination of the law’s language reveals that through this
legislation the government attempted to attain no more than a supervisory position, and,
unlike the role of the British Government in India and other colonialist governments in
East Asia at the time, avoided monopolization of its opium sector. This situation
remained relatively static until after World War I.
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Chapter Seven provides a summation of the last two phases in the century of
commercial opium production in Iran. Under the reign of Reza Shah, every aspect of the
opium business became a state monopoly. Faced with growing difficulties in finding
legitimate markets for its opium, Iran indirectly assisted merchants who converted large
amounts of Iranian to the global illegal markets, a move that set Iran on a collision course
with the League of Nations and the US. After the abdication of the Shah in 1941, Iranian
governments that came to power supported the anti-opium cause and appeared willing to
negotiate a plan with the international community to liquidate Iran’s opium production, in
return for an extensive substitute program and assistance in the construction of
infrastructural facilities. However, the instability of the political system and its ongoing
economic problems made the Iranian governments during that period (some of them
served no more than a few months) hesitant to forego the important revenues created by
the opium sector. This reluctance became apparent during the premiership of Mohammad
Mosaddegh and the oil crisis that followed his government’s move to nationalize the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its holdings. After the coup d’état of August 1953 and
the re-negotiation of Iran’s share in the oil revenues, the economic importance of the
opium revenues to Iran’s economy significantly shrank. In 1955, the new government
moved to legislate and enact a regime of complete prohibition on the production, trade
and consumption of opium in Iran, ending one chapter in this country’s complicated
history with narcotics.
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SECTION 1
CHAPTER 1
Opium is the hardened dross of the opium-poppy flower also known by its
scientific name papavaram somniferum. It contains a large variety of alkaloids with a
vast array of pharmacological properties. Morphine and codeine are the more commonly
used and recognized alkaloids, but other alkaloids attracted scientific attention for quite
some time. Narcotine, for example, was thought in the 19th century to be a cure for
malaria.4 The proportions of the alkaloids in the opium could vary quite substantially,
depending on the type of flower, the area and method of cultivation and the timing of the
sap collection. For example, throughout the 19th century, opium from the Ottoman
Empire yielded between 10-13% of morphine and Indian opium yielded 4-8% depending
on the area of cultivation. Persian opium yielded around 4-7% in the 1860s, but by the
1880s it yielded around 11-13%.
The use of opium is very ancient and archeological findings show that Neolithic
societies in Europe during the 5th millennia BC were already familiar with opium and so
did early Bronze Age societies in Mesopotamia around 3000 BC. Opium is a powerful
pain-killer and a natural constipator; its consumption has soporific effects and most users
report a sense of euphoria that follows its consumption. For many years, societies used
opium to cure a variety of ailments. Pharmaceutical texts from various cultures and
periods use countless opium preparations to treat an immense number of medical
4
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problems. In some cultures it was used as an aphrodisiac, though probably not as a sexual
stimulant, but more as an inhibitor to assist the male to control and extend his sexual
performance.5 It is important to remember that opium was consumed in many forms,
compounds and concoctions, and that the name ‘opium’ does not represent a single
product. For example, in Iran consumers traditionally took it in the form of small pills of
molded raw opium; in India, a powdered form of opium was dissolved in water; and in
post-Renaissance Europe an alcoholic tincture of opium called Laudanum, invented by
the Renaissance pharmacist Paracelsus, and became the most popular form of opium
consumption. The romantic poets and literati, De Quincy and Coleridge, famously
consumed this form of opium.
A more modern method of consuming the drug, opium-smoking came at the heels
of smoking tobacco. The first place where opium was smoked was probably the Dutch
West Indies – today’s Indonesia – were tobacco soaked in opium solution, known as
madak, was smoked by locals and sailors in the second half of the 17th century. Madak
was brought by Dutch traders to the southern regions of China during the first half of the
18th century and quickly gained popularity there. However, it also gained the attention
and disapproval of the imperial authorities who banned the smoking of opium mixed with
tobacco, though allowing the importation of opium for medical purposes. This legal
loophole combined with the improved quality of the Bengali opium produced in the areas
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under the direct control and monopoly of the East India Company, may probably have
been the cause for a move to smoking of pure opium.6
Smoking opium in China grew into an elaborate social ceremony that served
multiple social purposes. Its preparation required some expertise, and most smokers had
their opium pipes made by a professional. The habit involved elaborate smoking
paraphernalia, which also presented an opportunity to display one’s wealth (though rarely
done in excess). Refined upper-class Chinese who smoked the most expensive Indian
opium prepared by an opium master of an exquisite opium house, were a far-cry from the
scandalous-ridden propaganda of the anti-opium organizations. Such individuals, seated
on masterly crafted couches and using their personal gold-lined hand-crafted Jade opiumpipe, were often depicted as engaged in a devilish activity conducted in decrepit opium
dens by the wretched of the earth.7
Since antiquity, societies had known about the soporific and analgesic properties
of opium. It was also noticed that the effects of opium derived from various sources
differed, and therefore modern scientists concluded that opium was merely a chemical
compound containing an element in varying quantities responsible for these soporific and
analgesic effects. In 1804 the German chemist Friedrich Sertürner isolated what he called
“a soporific element” from opium and called it Morphium8 after the Greek god of dreams
Morpheus. It was the first alkaloid ever isolated from its plant source material, a
6
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discovery that led to many more important discoveries in the 19th century like caffeine,
nicotine, atropine, cocaine and many more alkaloids. The commercial distribution of
morphine began only 20 years after the initial discovery by Merck.9 Morphine had a clear
advantage over opium since opiatic medications could now be prescribed in which the
active ingredient was precisely defined as opposed to medications based on opium in
which the amount of active ingredient was simply unknown.
Opium for smoking was valued for much more than just its morphine content.
Taste, fragrance and consistency played a much more important role for the opium
connoisseurs who were able to distinguish between various kinds of opium and analyze
their qualities quite reminiscent of the analysis of professional wine tasters. To say that
the morphine content was the most important quality of opium would be like saying that
alcohol content is the most important quality of wine. In fact, Chinese opium smokers
showed a clear preference for opium with a low morphine content of 4-7%, which was
the normal morphine content in India opium, of both the Patna and the Malwa varieties.
When Iranian merchants tried to sell higher-quality Persian opium with a morphinecontent of 11-13% during the 1880s, it was rejected by smokers in China who found it
too coarse and unpleasant. After that, pure Persian opium with high morphine-content
was sent to Europe for use by the pharmaceutical market, while processed, adulterated,
lower morphine-content opium was sent to China to be smoked.10
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Opium poppies had been cultivated since antiquity in various places around
Central Asia, West Asia and South-Eastern Europe. In all those places the production of
opium remained by and large a cottage industry until the end of the 18th century. Peasants
considered opium an important cash crop, but for most farmers who grew opium-poppies
and processed the opium independently, opium was only one segment of their
agricultural production. The remainder was devoted to foodstuff such as cereal and fruits.
The British East India Company undertook the first concentrated effort to produce opium
on a large scale. The Company gradually monopolized and systematized the production
of opium in the eastern provinces of India toward the end of the 18th. The cultivation of
the opium poppy was greatly expanded, but also licensed and closely supervised.
Peasants were encouraged to grow only opium in exchange for cash; company
representatives bought all the raw opium produced in their territory and carefully
processed it in the Company’s own factories. The prepared opium was auctioned in
Calcutta, and independent merchants then shipped it to Chinese traders, who took the risk
of smuggling the opium into China, where it was nominally illegal.
After the initial success in that region, the Company turned to eliminate
competition from the opium produced in the autonomous princely states of India, known
as the Malwa states, and shipped from Portuguese ports on the Western coast of the
subcontinent. The initial attempts to regulate the production of Malwa opium or at least
to monopolize it by purchasing it in large quantities were a glorified failure. However, as
British control of India expanded northward along the western coasts of the subcontinent,
the Company gained an almost complete control over the shipment of goods through the
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ports and a different system to profit from the Malwa opium was developed. The export
of opium was prohibited from all ports except Bombay, where the authorities charged a
hefty pass duty on every chest of opium. Since the shipping standards of the period
forced almost every ship going from the West to China to dock at Bombay, the Company
enacted a prohibitive duty on the importation and transshipment of opium through the
Bombay port, in an attempt to block the flow of opium from other countries to East Asia.
That policy was only partially successful, and as I will show later it did not block the
arrival of Persian opium in the Chinese market and its establishment there as an important
rival for Indian opium.11
The region of today’s Iran is among the first places in human history where opium
was consumed. Some of the oldest descriptions of opium appeared in Sumerian sources
discovered in Iran, and various sources described the production and use of opium
consistently throughout the ages.12 Opium from the Iranian regions was an item of trade
since antiquity and fair amounts of it were sent to China already during the 14th century,
although it was not a major article of export like silk, dates and spices.13 Reports from the
Safavid period (1501-1722) show that the cultivation of opium poppies expanded in Iran
during that time, as did the consumption of opium, particularly among the governing
11
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elites who used it for recreational purposes. The general population consumed opium
mostly for its medicinal properties, at times considered a remedy for most ills. Foreign
observers of this era pointed out the difference between the widespread recreational
consumption of opium in the Ottoman Empire as compared with the more casual
medicinal consumption of opium in Iran. However, as Matthee has explained, the line
between recreational and medicinal consumption was very fine indeed,14 not unlike the
consumption of whiskey in 18th-century America.
The most common way of consuming opium was in the form of small pills of
processed raw opium, but it was also consumed in a variety of solutions and concoctions
like kuknar, the most common among them. Although the word sometimes relates simply
to opium and sometimes to the poppy itself, kuknar is a dark brown bitter bouillon or
liquor of poppy capsules which was very popular in Iran during the Safavid period and
was still widespread in Central Asia during the 19th century.15 Adamiyat relates to a
custom of drinking a solution of opium and wine16, which is also evident in a line from
one of Hafiz’s wine poems.17 However, Matthee more reasonably suggests that wine and
opium operated in a kind of symbiosis in which opium consumption was the remedy for
wine addiction and vice versa.18
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Historians typically view the eighteenth century as an interval of political
instability and economic decline in Iran. Following the fall of the Safavid dynasty in the
hands of Afghan raiders, the country was thrown into a near century of devastating civil
wars, foreign invasions, population decline, and a drop in agricultural production. Even
under the reign of Nadir Shah (1688?-1747), who regained much of the Safavid lands
under Iranian control and declared three years of complete tax exemption in Iran after his
successful raid on Delhi (1738-1739), Iran failed to enjoy political stability and economic
prosperity. Repeated revolts and in-fighting plagued the country.19 Under these
conditions it is reasonable to assume that opium production in Iran, like the production of
virtually all else in Iran, declined significantly during the 18th century. However, there is
little evidence suggesting that the consumption of opium in Iran was disrupted in a
meaningful way despite royal decrees banning its consumption.20 Whatever the extent of
decline in opium production during that period, it was likely proportionate to the
downturn of economic activity.
By the end of the 18th century the commercial potential of opium in the Chinese
and European markets spurred a large-scale development of opium-poppy cultivation in
India and the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Iran’s opium production during this period should
be understood as stagnation at best, and the economic decline of the 18th century as at
least partially contributing to Iran’s late shift into large-scale opium production and its
delayed entry into the global opium-trade market.
19
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In 1794, the Turkmen Qajar tribe headed by Agha Mohammad Khan defeated the
last of the Zand and Afsharid dynasties, and re-unified Iran under Qajar control. Two
years later, in 1796, Agha Mohammad Khan was crowned the Shah of Persia, the first of
the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925). The stability brought about by the Qajar monarchy was
quickly translated into an economic recovery and buildup. The population growth, the recultivation of arable land turned fallow, increased the agricultural production and the
general economic activity in the country. Many in Iran expected the Qajars to renew the
glory of the Safavid Empire, but the circumstances of the 19th century were very different
than those of the 16th and 17th centuries. The 19th century was a period of imperialist
pressures on Iran from both north and south, and the tribal armies of the Qajars proved to
be no match for the modern armies of Britain and Russia. The clear military advantage of
the imperial powers motivated their blunt involvement in Iran’s internal matters and
limited significantly Iran’s ability to act independently in international affairs. Iran was
forced to cede lands in the north to the advancing Russian armies, and surrendered to
British demands to abandon a siege on Herat following a bombardment of Bushehr by a
British men-of-war. The Industrial Revolution in Western Europe meant a flood of cheap
imported manufactured goods that devastated the traditional guild masters and shifted
Iran’s trade balance in favor of import. Iran’s pre-industrial agrarian economy was no
match for the industrialized economies of Iran’s imperial adversaries.
Iran’s geographical location inadvertently made it the diplomatic battleground for
British and Russian imperial ambitions, which made Iran the unwilling buffer state in the
two-empires race to gain control over Asia in what was later called the Great Game. Both
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Russia and Britain either defended Iran’s neutrality against their adversary’s
encroachment and at the same time tried to gain more political and economic influence in
Iran for their own benefit. Critics of the Qajars during the 19th century and afterwards
argued that the despotic nature of the Qajar monarchy, its tendency for self-indulgence,
its disinterest in the welfare of the people, its religious conservatism and the irrationality
of the Qajar bureaucracy, were the reasons behind some disastrous decisions and policies
that turned Iran into a pawn in the hands of the European Empires.21 Others suggested
that decision-makers in Iran – including the Shah – were very much aware of the dangers
Iran faced and acted within the realms of the possibilities they had, given the
insurmountable military and economic advantage of the Empires they faced. These
scholars point out that the Qajar Shahs, particularly Nasr al-Din Shah (1848-1896), were
constantly involved in an active diplomatic balancing act, pitting the Powers against each
other in an attempt to keep them from further encroaching on Iran’s land and the
independence of the monarchy.22
At the onset of the Qajar era, Iran had a strong crafts and artisanship sector that
was not only supplying the local market but also the markets of neighboring countries.
Iran’s agricultural sector was based on subsistence crops like wheat and barley, and it
21
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comprised only a small part of Iran’s exports. This changed dramatically in the second
half of the 19th century as a result of several developments. Most important was the
growing commercial links of Iran with foreign markets, whether it was pursued willingly
or imposed by the treaties Iran was forced to sign with Russia and Britain. As in many
other regions of the world during that period, the flood of manufactured goods into Iran
brought a sharp decline in traditional handicrafts and a reliance on imported
manufactured goods that required cash.23
However, the improved commercial links between Iran and the world meant also
a potential for the growth of Iran’s exports. Iranian merchants engaged in the importation
of Western goods into Iran were simultaneously looking for export goods to offset the
negative trade balance they created by their activity. Given the lack of modern industry or
even the conditions to develop one, Iran was encouraged24 to expand its cultivation of
cash crops which resulted in the rapid growth in the cultivation of commodities such as
cotton, opium, tobacco and dried fruits during the second half of the 19th century. Parallel
to these developments, since 1864, Iran’s existing cash crop, silk, took a major blow, as
the silkworm population was decimated by the Pebrine disease that struck the growing
areas in Gilan.25 This decline probably gave an incentive and further provoked a sense of
urgency to develop other cash crops that would compensate for the losses of the silk
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industry. Thus, in the second half of the 19th century agriculture became the leading
economic industry of Iran, with agricultural products in various levels of processing
comprising almost all of Iran’s exports. Even in the later decades of the 20th century,
almost all of Iran’s exports except oil were agricultural products, of which carpets (also
considered fully processed agricultural products) encompassed only one-fourth.26
At the same time, Iran suffered from some impairing structural problems. First
among them was the growing economic burden of the pensions to the unproductive
sectors of the Iranian elite, particularly the courtiers. The government’s role in nurturing
the turn to cash crops, and to opium cultivation in particular, was more important than
most historians give it credit. However, the growing flow of income during the 1860s and
the 1870s increased the government’s appetite for expenses beyond what the inefficient
taxation system of Iran was able to provide. Eventually, in order to fund the expensive
demands of the Shah and the courtiers Iran took out loans from European banks in the
early 20th century, loans with difficult terms of return.
Furthermore, the outdated system of land-ownership imposed another burden on
Iran’s economy.27 Different forms of land-ownership existed in Iran, but the uncertainty
of ownership became the common denominator among them. Tuyul lands, for example,
the most recognizable form of land-tenure in Iran, were to be reverted to the crown in
case the grantee died or if the Shah could simply appoint a different person to manage a
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tuyul plot. In reality, though, many tuyul owners could turn their tuyuls into hereditary
private property. Great variation in taxation upon lands existed depending upon three
factors: location; the specific relation of the grantee to the Shah; or simply the ability to
collect taxes in a given area. This erratic system brought about abuse of the system for
landowners tended to mistreat lands and the peasants under their control out of fear that
their tuyul might be taken from them and passed onto another person.28
Among the various cash crops of Iran, opium-poppy cultivation was particularly
suitable for cultivation given the economic and social conditions that prevailed in the
country during the 19th century. Although various methods of producing opium from the
pods of the poppy-flower existed since antiquity and well into the early 18th century, one
method had been reported from almost all opium-producing regions since the late 18th
century with very few variations. This system remained in use in areas where opium was
produced by manual labor either for legal or illegal consumption. Typically, the opium
poppy (papaver somniferum) grows for about three months after it is sown. During that
time the plant grows a stalk of about 1-1.5 meters (approx. 3- 5 feet) at the top of which a
seed-pod grows with colorful flower petals that fall when the seed-pod ripens.29 At that
point the pod contains peak amounts of morphine-rich resin. The week or two following
the fall of the petals is considered the best time to collect the opium from the seed-pod of
28
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the poppy. The outer walls of the pod are scored using a special knife in order to allow
the stored sap to ooze out. The sap is then left to harden on the pod for about half a day
and then scraped off the pod.30 The hardened resin is defined as raw opium, and, when
collected, the resin takes the shape of small brown-colored crystals. The climatic
conditions in Iran, particularly in the southern regions, are ideal for the cultivation of
poppies that thrive in areas where wet periods are followed by long dry periods. Poppies
in Iran were usually sown around March, by the end of the wet season, and the opium
was collected from the mature pods around May. In fact, some areas in eastern Iran could
have up to three opium seasons, although peasants rarely took advantage of this potential
before the modernization of opium production in the mid-nineteenth century.
Raw opium usually underwent preliminary processing almost everywhere it was
produced. The methods of processing varied widely not only between places but also
between traditions, purposes and economic situations. Generally speaking, raw opium
crystals were moderately heated and then molded together to form a mass. That mass was
either kept for personal use or packed in various forms and sizes. As long as the
production of opium was sporadic and unplanned, opium was processed using domestic
facilities, and it was packed in various sizes wrapped in poppy leaves. Merchants, who
purchased opium in order to export it, either used the original masses of opium they
received from the peasants or re-packaged the opium themselves. During the second half
of the 19th century, domestic processing virtually disappeared and raw opium began to be
30
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processed in large quantities in regional workshops. This opium, intended for export, was
usually packed in the standard size of a chest. A chest of opium included about 150
opium “cakes” of sizes varying between 0.75-1.5 lbs. each, wrapped separately with
paper or simply poppy leaves. Calculating an estimated weight loss of about 5-10% due
to dehydration during the period of time between packing and delivery in China or
Europe, the chests were intended to weigh about one Chinese picul at the point of
disembarkation which is the equivalent of about 133.5 lbs. Opium prices, taxes and
customs in the international market were therefore quoted per chest.31
Given the conditions of agriculture and peasantry in Iran during these years, it is
not difficult to appreciate the advantages of opium-poppy cultivation and opium
production for the peasantry. The yield of a poppy field was high in value but relatively
small in bulk and could be easily carried on a single mule or even by hand. The product
could also be preserved for a long period of time without spoiling. The Iranian plateau
contained many remote and isolated villages separated by long, mountainous roads and
away from any kind of commercial center. Given those conditions, opium became the
ideal product for peasants who wanted to diversify their sources of income beyond mere
subsistence. Even between large urban centers, there were few roads, and transportation
remained arduous, long and dangerous. Thus, even if comparable crops in bigger bulks
could attract similar or even higher market prices than opium, it would have been
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difficult, expensive or maybe even impossible to transport them to a commercial center to
be sold for those prices.32
Of course, opium-poppy cultivation was not without risks: Frosts, or sudden
floods, especially around the month of April could destroy an entire crop, and even
regular amounts of rain during the collection period could cause severe damage to the
collection process, since the resin would not harden in wet conditions. The risk was
accentuated given the high cost of poppy seeds. As a result, most cultivators devoted only
a small part of their land for poppies, while most of their land yielded subsistence crops
like wheat and barley. The need for a short, labor-intensive effort during the collection
period was another limiting factor on the amount of land appropriated for poppy
cultivation, since there was no reason to grow more poppies than the labor at hand
allowed handling.
The economic conditions of Iran facilitated the modernization of opium
production in the late nineteenth century. I employ the term “modernization” without
committing myself to the age-old theoretical debate regarding this concept. I use this term
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loosely to describe the process by which the quantitative and qualitative differences
between Iran’s opium business in the first and second halves of the nineteenth century
were formed. In this sense, the term “modern” merely corresponds with similar
developments that took place in other countries, either as part of the rise of capitalist
industrialism and trade or as a direct (or indirect) result of it. I do not contend that the
modernization of opium production was part of a large-scale socio-economic
“modernization project” or that it defined the latter part of the 19th century as a “modern
period” in Iranian history. Instead, I refer to a specific economic process that can be
analyzed using pairs of binary categories: small-scale vs. large-scale; local vs.
international; sporadic vs. organized; traditional vs. scientific; slow-reaction to changes
vs. quick response, etc. The modernization of the opium production in Iran can be
understood using these categories: as an immense and rapid increase in the acreage
devoted for poppy cultivation; a re-organization of labor of the production process in
general; an application of new methods of cultivation, collection and processing;
application of new funding systems; and integration of Iran’s opium business to the
global opium market. This shift took place in a rather short period of thirty years, roughly
between 1850 and 1880.
Prior to 1850, opium production in Iran remained marginal and intended for the
domestic market. In the 1840s the total annual production of opium exceeded no more
than 100,000 lbs., or about 750 chests of opium, much of which was targeted for the
domestic market.33 However, Willem Floor concludes that even this number may have
33
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been highly exaggerated. Judging by subsequent British consular reports, which focused
more on the production of opium rather than on Iran’s general economic status, it
appeared that Iran had not reached an annual production of 100,000 lbs. before the 1860s.
Floor concludes, quite reasonably, that the number 39,000 lbs., or 300 chests of opium
quoted by Mr. G. Lucas, the Assistant Resident in Bushehr in a report from 1879, as the
annual production of 1859, probably represents more accurately the annual production of
opium in Iran during the first half of the 19th century.34
In another report on the opium production in Iran dated in 1869 Ronald Thomson,
the British Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, set the annual production of opium in Iran for
1868/9 at 15,500 man-e shah, which equaled approximately 209,000 lbs., or representing
over 1,500 chests of opium. According to Thomson’s report, the production in that year
was double the production of opium in 1860.35 Another account from Mr. G. Lucas from
May 1879, estimated the yield of 1878/9 at 6,500 chests of opium (the equivalent of
860,000 lbs. or 400 metric tons).36 According to this source the production of opium in
Iran had increased more than twentyfold in approximately thirty years. The adulteration
of opium in Iran decreased significantly during this time due to the Chinese market
demand for a pure product, and thus the upsurge in opium production actually
represented an even more significant increase of raw opium yield.
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Production and trade experienced extensive re-organization. In the first part of the
19th century peasants typically made the decision to grow opium-poppies independently,
and the raw opium they collected was separately processed in a domestic environment.
Before the 1850s farmers, cultivating either their own land or working as sharecroppers,
would either retail the opium they collected and prepared in the market-place, or – as
more often happened – they would sell it wholesale to a merchant. The relationships
between merchants and farmers often appeared random and non-committing, and
landowners paid little attention to opium over other crops. This outlook changed in the
second half of the 19th century. New financial relationships emerged between farmers and
opium merchants, with several variations depending on the type of land ownership.
Merchants began to buy entire yields of opium in advance, paying cash directly to
the cultivators. For the peasants, this arrangement lowered significantly the risk they took
upon themselves by growing poppies, because poppies tended to be fragile, and entire
crops could be ruined due to untimely rains or frosts. Therefore, many considered it
prudent to diversify their crops.38 Merchants also found this arrangement advantageous
arrangement because the rising demand for opium made their ability to secure access to
raw opium an important link in the opium business. Diversification of investments
guaranteed for the wise merchant access to enough opium even if some crops in given
areas were lost due to inclement climate conditions. Similar to the development of the
trade in Malwa opium, the proximity of the Iranian merchants to the peasants who
cultivated the land gave them an advantage over foreign merchants, even if it did not save
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them from occasional bankruptcies due to the high level of speculation involved in this
trade.39 Opium-poppy cultivation spread to areas that had little previous experience with
opium. Large-landowners either ordered their share-croppers to switch to poppycultivation, or as they turned fallow land into arable land, they used it for growing opiumpoppies. Merchants who previously did not own agricultural property began purchasing
land in order to develop it for poppy cultivation and hired farmers for this purpose.
Factories used to process large quantities of opium appeared in different regions
of Iran, while the opium production in the home-environment of the peasant gradually
became phased out. This development resulted in part from the merchants’ dissatisfaction
with the ubiquitous adulteration of the opium processed by the peasants themselves and
reflected their desire to maintain control over the process.40 Home-processing did not
completely disappear, and remained quite prevalent in 1913 when the government
considered regulations to divert all processing to government-approved facilities. 41
The cultivation methods themselves were considered novelties of sorts in Iran.
The manual method of scoring the pods and scraping off the hardened resin may seem
“traditional” or “antiquated,”42 though they may have appeared as innovative in
nineteenth-century Iran. Several accounts attest that new methods of opium cultivation
39

The merchant paid the peasant in advance an amount based on what he believed would be the prices
during harvest, but if the prices would drop by the time of the harvest (which occasionally happened) the
merchant could be left with stocks of opium that were worth less than what he paid for them. The
advantage of local merchants over foreign merchants did not mean the foreign merchants were no involved
in the opium business, but they operated through “agents” who in reality were merchants with access to
local growers, an access the foreign trade houses did not have.

40

Floor, Agriculture in Qajar Iran, 445-49.

41

NAI/FD/Secret-I/March 1914/No. 17-18.

42

As opposed to the modern Poppy-Straw Method, in which dried pods of opium poppies are mechanically
collected and chemically processed to extract the various alkaloids from the pods.

36

arrived in Iran from India to Iran. Although historians lack consensus about who should
be credited with this initiative, it is clear that the Indian methods were deemed an
improvement upon methods familiar to Iranians until the 1850s.43 New scientific
knowledge of chemistry likely informed these new modes of cultivating opium poppies
and producing Persian opium. The discovery of morphine in 1807, accompanied by better
understanding of the new chemical sub-field of alkaloids, allowed scientists to present a
criterion by which to compare samples of opium from various derivatives to determine
their quality, not simply by stating their morphine content, but also by identifying
adulteration. Between 1850 and 1880 various sources cite a dramatic improvement in the
quality of Iranian opium, and as a result Persian opium experienced a sharp rise in its
prices. Europeans frequently tested Iranian opium in their laboratories. This feedback,
coupled with the data coming from the international opium markets, resulted in improved
cultivation and production methods.44
This period witnessed the integration of Iran’s opium business into the global
opium market. By that I mean not only a shift in focus from a production that was
initially intended for the local market to an export commodity, but also a significant
qualitative difference between opium produced before and after1850. At the start of the
nineteenth century the exporting merchants bought opium from small producers the same
way they bought other goods, and they exported opium as part of a larger shipment that
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included a range of other items. Willem Floor gives evidence of mere sporadic exports of
Persian opium in small quantities in the first decades of the 19th century.45 The merchants
were rarely involved in, or understood, the cultivation and production processes
themselves. Comparing various kinds of opium was difficult, and such comparisons
depended more on reputation rather than on objective knowledge.
However, after 1850, the export of opium became a specialization of sorts. Opium
exporters supervised closely the poppy cultivation, as well as opium collection and
production. Often, they themselves financially invested in its production by giving loans
to farmers who cultivated poppies or by owning land and hiring farmers to cultivate
opium poppies for them. The immense increase of exports meant that some merchant
ships left the ports of Iran carrying mostly opium, with other products, if there was any,
loaded only if space remained. The feedback from international market demands exerted
pressure upon and determined the market reaction in Iran. Price changes in the Shanghai
and London markets had an immediate effect on merchant decisions regarding shipments
and stock management in Bushehr. Shifts in taste in China had repercussions on the
production standards of opium preparation, even in the most remote regions of the Iranian
plateau.
Amirahmadi divides the Qajar period into four economic phases. He calls the
third period, of 1864-1890, a “period of catastrophes and regress,” in which production
generally failed, inflation increased and the devaluation of the currency continued. The
fourth period of 1890-1926, he describes as a period in which Iran witnessed “a gradual
45
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incorporation into the world economy.”46 However, Amirahmadi does not focus on the
opium industry in his book, and, as shall be seen, the opium industry did not experience a
serious regress during the 1870s and 1880s. Rather, the opium sector gradually became
incorporated into the global economy during this interval.
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CHAPTER 2
What motivations helped develop this particular segment of the local economy,
and which economic circumstances enabled its success?
The historiographical literature offers numerous explanations. One group of
scholars emphasizes the role of specific individuals and personal decision-making. In his
book Amir Kabir va-Iran, Fereydoun Adamiyat argues that already during Amir Kabir’s
reign as the chief Minister of Nasr al-Din Shah (1848-1851), experimental cultivation of
opium poppies took place in the outskirts of Tehran, although he claims mistakenly that
only in 1870 had opium production reached export levels.47 Likely, Adamiyat sought to
separate the pre-modern and modern opium phases of opium production (though he does
not name them as such). Subsequently, Adamiyat reports an affair during the early 1850s
in which Iranian merchants complained about a ban employed by the British authorities
in Bombay not only on the importation of Iranian opium into Bombay, but also on its reexportation through the port. Mehdi Bamdad writes in his historical biographical
collection that in the early 1850s, Mirza Hussein Khan Sepahsalar, who later became
Mushir-e Dowleh, another well-known chief Minister of Nasr al-Din Shah, was First
Consul of Iran in Bombay. Bamdad claims that it was Mirza Hussein Khan who
communicated to Amir Kabir the potential profits to be gained from the export of opium
to China and suggested that this industry be developed in Iran.48

47
48

Adamiyat, Amir Kabir Va Iran, 399-400.

Mahdi Bamdad, Sharh-i Hal-i Rijal-i Iran [Biographical Dictionary of Iranian Personalities] (Tehran:
Ketabforushi Zavar, 1347 [1968]), 411.

40

The independent historian, Abdollah Shahbazi, conflates these reports to construct
an elaborate conspiracy theory about the allegedly corrupt connections between Mushir-e
Dowleh and the Bombay-based Sassoon family and their scheme to bring the “evil”
opium to Iran. According to Shahbazi, Mushir-e Dowleh received a fantastic amount of
150,000 Rupees by the Sassoon Company for his role in brokering the cultivation of
opium in Iran and for lifting the British ban over the re-exportation of Iranian opium
through Bombay. Supposedly, this deal brought enormous profits for the Sassoons
through their trading initiatives in Iran.49
Shahbazi was not the only scholar to rely on the accounts of Adamiyat and
Bamdad in reconstructing the role that key individuals played in launching the modern
opium business in Iran.50 A careful factual analysis and reliance on additional source
material reveal that Shahbazi’s narrative of the events does not hold much water. First,
the Government of Bombay did not impose a ban per se over the re-exportation of
Iranian opium or opium from any other country. A ban on imports was simply directed
against the spirit of free trade that the British Empire promoted around the world,
particularly in Bombay. In the Iranian case, such a ban was not allowed under the
conditions of the commercial treaty signed between Iran and Great Britain in October
1841 in the aftermath of the failed Iranian campaign to conquer Herat in 1837.51
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Although the treaty of 1841 clearly favored British economic interests, it guaranteed
some measure of fair treatment for Iranian merchants in British territories. Thus, Iran and
Britain could not legally prevent the importation of British or Iranian products into their
own territories respectively. The complaints of the merchants mentioned by Adamiyat
refer to the British policy of prohibitive pass duty exacted on all opium arriving in the
Bombay port by ship, whether it was intended for importation or re-exportation.
Although, in reality, this duty was designed to block competing opium shipments from
arriving to China it was not similar to an actual ban.52 In any case, the pass duty was
enacted already in the 1820s and the problems of the Iranian merchants who tried to ship
opium through Bombay had begun before the reign of Amir Kabir as the chief minister.
Indeed there are documented complaints of Iranian merchants regarding this British
policy already in 1843.53
More importantly, the prohibitive pass duty policy continued way into the late
1880s and was certainly not removed by the alleged efforts of Mirza Hussein Khan
Sepahsalar, as Shahbazi claims.54 Moreover, Shahbazi’s claims about the role of the
Sassoon family in this affair make no sense at all. Indeed by the late 1860s the Sassoons
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did develop and expand their investments in Iran, including wholesale purchases of
opium, but in the early 1850s the Sassoons were still struggling to gain power within the
context of the Bombay trade community. The Sassoons trade empire was established on
the enormous profits they made from trading in Malwa opium, thus the protectionist pass
duty enacted by the Government of Bombay was acting in their favor, and they stood to
gain nothing from it being cancelled.55 Moreover, although the Sassoon family wrote
many letters requesting a reduction of the pass duty for Malwa opium in Bombay, letters
extant in the archives of the British Government of India, not a single reference points to
their alleged wish for the reduction of the prohibitive pass duty for non-Indian opium
arriving by sea at Bombay.56
Shoko Okazaki credits the Isfahan-based merchant and Renaissance-man Āqā
Mohammad-Rezā Arbāb al-Esfahānī as being the first Iranian merchant-landowner who
learned the business of opium in India and brought it to Iran. Okazaki contends that
Arbāb al-Esfahani’s success inspired poppy cultivation and the production of opium in
Iran. According to Okazaki, Arbāb went to Bombay in the early 1850s, “where he learned
various agricultural and industrial techniques from Parsis,57 most importantly the Indian
method of poppy cultivation and opium making, which, after returning to Isfahan in
1273/1856-57, he introduced both there and in other provinces. […] In the beginning of
55
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the 1880s, together with other Isfahani merchants, he established the Kompānī-e Teryāke Esfahān for [opium] refining and […] exporting. This company was then one of the
largest business concerns in Isfahan.” Okazaki asserts that it “was only as a result of
Arbāb’s efforts that poppy-growing took root in Persia,” although he acknowledges
Adamiyat’s account concerning the experimental poppy-growing initiative of Amīr
Kabīr.58
Okazaki’s evaluation of Arbāb’s role in the formation of Iran’s opium business
raises many questions. One wonders whether it is reasonable to credit one person with the
launch of such a large-scale and multi-faceted economic initiative that necessitated opium
cultivation across a vast geographic terrain, as well as the complex production and trade
of opium in both local and international markets. Such monopolistic control of the opium
industry could not reasonably have operated in nineteenth-century Iran.59 Given the
business environment of Qajar society -- often of a laissez-faire nature and not inclined to
a hegemonic control of the kind described by Okazaki -- the portrayal of Arbāb as the
single most influential opium businessman is not supported by historical evidence.
First, we already know that poppy-cultivation was not a novelty in Iran and that
opium was not at all a new article of export in the 1850s. In light of that, the claim that
Arbāb learned “the Indian method of poppy cultivation and opium making”60 must be
properly qualified. Whatever methods of cultivation were learned by Iranians from
58
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Indians, the differences were marginal. There were indeed some differences in the
methods of sap collection, since in Iran the method of scaring the ripen pod was not the
only method of collecting opium. Other methods, like crushing the pods and squeezing
them, fermenting the pod or drying whole pods and then grind them, were also popular in
Iran.61 With the new focus on producing prepared opium for smoking, those methods
were practically extinct, but it is not likely that the “Indian” method of scoring the pods
was completely unknown in Iran. In fact, it is more likely that Arbāb learned in Bombay
new methods of opium production and new kinds of financial arrangements for the opium
business.
One must remember that the Parsi community in India of the mid-19th century
was hardly an agrarian community, but mainly a community of traders and artisans, and
the economic success of such notable Parsi merchants like Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy and
Jamsetjee Tata stem from their ability to create financial contracts with peasants in the
Malwa states and not because they directly controlled fields where poppy was
cultivated.62 Financial arrangements like purchasing entire crops in advance, giving loans
for seeds with future crops as a guarantee were indeed a novelty adopted in Iran. In
addition, the establishment of local workshops where large amounts of raw opium were
processed was another Indian innovation that found its way to Iran. Those workshops,
which centralized the cottage industry of processing raw opium, were not only more
efficient but also made supervising the quality of the prepared opium easier. But most
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importantly, it is a plausible speculation that what Arbāb and other Iranian merchants
really learned in Bombay was that even with the high pass duty imposed by the
Government of India on the export of Malwa opium from the Bombay port, there was
still a handsome margin of profit left for the merchants.63 In conclusion they must have
realized that shipping opium from Iran - where customs on opium were no way near their
levels in India - could result with enormous profits in the Chinese market.
Of course, I do not aim to argue against claims for personal credit as such. It is
quite possible that Arbāb was indeed crucial in the spread of opium cultivation and trade
of opium in Iran, but one must remember that he was simply not alone in his efforts.
Other merchants were discovering the same methods of poppy cultivation and the
transportation routes directly to China at quite the same time.64 Personal credit of this sort
is more likely to reflect vanity rather than historical reality. It should be noted that the
sources from which we learn about Arbāb’s economic pioneering are his own testimony
and two references written in the 1880s, one by Iʿtimād al-Saltanah, the noted court
historian of Nasr al-Din Shah, who was a long acquaintance of Arbāb, and another by
Najm al-Mulk who met Arbāb in 1882. This means that the testimonies that were not
Arbāb’s self-praise about his own prime role in pioneering the opium business of Iran
were written only after the period in which it became such an important part of Iran’s
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economy.65 In addition, he doesn’t play much of a role in British sources from that
period, certainly not sources discussing opium shipments to China. Generally speaking,
the focus on one person, important as he might be, is often misleading in historical
perspective and in this case it diverts the attention from the wide-range transformation
that took place in Iran, a process that involved many merchants, landlords, state officials,
peasants and day-workers.
A more in-depth debate revolves around the economic context and circumstances
that motivated and enabled the rise of modernized opium production in Iran. The origins
of this venture was usually not simply discussed in the current scholarship as such but as
part of a larger debate that revolves around the state of the peasants in late 19th century
Iran and the narrative of Iran’s economic history during the late Qajar period. The main
debate revolves around the evaluation of the development of Iran’s cash crop sector in the
second half of the 19th century. While some scholars argue that it was a positive and
constructive development with beneficial long-term results for the Iranian economy and
Iranians as a whole, others view it as an unfortunate development instigated by
foreigners, encouraged by small, oppressive, self-serving elite which delayed Iran’s
capitalist development for generations.
The rise to power of the Qajars brought renewed stability and security to a
country torn by a century of strife and war, and had a positive effect on Iran’s economy.
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However, the early Qajar monarchs also witnessed the consequences of Europe’s military
and economic advantages over Iran. A series of military defeats forced Iran to sign
several commercial treaties, first with Russia,66 and subsequently with other European
Powers – accords that, among other things, imposed a unified duty rate of mere 5% ad
valorem on all imports and exports between Iran and the said countries. Though
humiliating by nature and notoriously remembered in Iranian popular culture, the longterm impact of these trade agreements may not have been so negative. One might argue
that the low duties may have encouraged trade with Iran that under different conditions
might not have materialized.
During the first half of the 19th century Iran was important for the European
Powers first and foremost for its strategic position as a buffer between the expanding
Russian Empire and British India. Iran’s economic potential was only of secondary
importance to its geo-strategic importance during that period. This changed significantly
during the second half of the 19th-century as a result of the commercial treaties mentioned
above, signed in the 1830s and 1840s, and there is a general agreement among scholars
about the basic elements of the economic process that followed them. Foreign industrial
goods flooded the Iranian market, and Iran’s previously vibrant sector of manual
industries and crafts mostly collapsed, with the exception of carpet-making. This
situation created a negative balance of trade in Iran, which led to a growing outflow of
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gold and silver from the country. Since Iranian currency was based on a silver standard
its value further fell by the ongoing depreciation of silver throughout the 19th century.67
These negative developments were the economic motivation for the tremendous
growth of Iran’s cash crop sector in the second half of the 19th century.68 From an
agricultural sector focused on the production of cereals, Iran’s grew to include opium,
tobacco, fruits, nuts, indigo and cotton, the majority of all intended not for local
consumption or as raw material for local industry but for export. As a result of the growth
of this sector, control over land - now more than ever before the most crucial mean of
production - became a highly desired prize. This led to the creation of large estates held
by a relatively small group of large landowners; some of them were themselves
merchants. Two significant factors contributed to this development: First, the weakness
of the central government helped turn appointments for tuyul lands, which were actually
short-term management leases, into hereditary ones which meant they became de facto
private property. Second, in order to overcome its cash shortage the government began
large-scale sales of Khaliseh lands. Those were crown lands theoretically managed
directly by the state, but in reality were mostly in a state of decay and neglect and very
often simply usurped by local land-owners. The sale of those lands by the state increased
67
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the pool of land under cultivation and encouraged private entrepreneurs to further
develop them.69
However, the results of these developments, the interpretation of their meaning
and the evaluation of the relation between the economic, social and political
developments within the Iranian society are contested among scholars of this period. The
interpretation of Iran’s economy during the late-Qajar period depends on a series of
topical questions; first among them is the question of who gained from the transition to
cash crops, or, to be more correct, in what way did the revenues of the new cash crop
economy affected the distribution of wealth in Iran. According to Gad Gilbar, who holds
the view that living standards in Iran improved across the board:
“… part of those engaged in the carpet-weaving industry, whether rural or
urban, witnessed an improvement in their economic conditions. No less
important, from the social point of view, was the effect of the spread of this
industry on the nomads: it allowed for closer economic links between them
and the settled population.”70
More clearly he stipulates:
“… up to the end of the nineteenth century the increase in agricultural
production brought about an increase in the real income of some sections of
the settled rural population [and also] certain improvements in the standard of
living of the peasants took place.”71
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He further brings evidence to prove that during the second half of the 19th century
the peasants’ diet became richer and more diverse, the consumption of local goods
increased, and testimonials that peasants were able to save small amounts of money that
served them to avoid moneylenders for unexpected expenses, like weddings and the
purchase of imported food during a drought. In addition he argues that there are no
indications that point out an increase in peasant indebtedness during that period, and on
top of that he quotes descriptive reports which compare the state of Iranian peasants with
those of their equals in the Punjab and find that of the former to be superior.72
Discussing the opium business specifically, Roger Olson presented a very
different view arguing that the opium revenues were concentrated in the hands of very
few merchants while many peasants were reduced to practically wage laborers, forced to
grow opium by greedy landowners and unable to grow their own food. This new
arrangement was advantageous to the peasants as long as there was plenty of food in the
market and the prices were low, but in periods of short supply of food and rising prices
the effects on the peasants could be devastating. According to Olson’s description, the
discontent of the peasants developed towards the later part of the 19th century:
“… There does not appear to have been much initial resistance to the idea of
cultivating opium on the part of the villagers. That was due primarily to the
tremendous range of inducements available to landowners, merchants, and
tax farmers. In some cases, tax farmers offered to reduce or even eliminate
the collection of taxes on land devoted to opium cultivation. In other cases,
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merchants advanced loans on relatively easy terms to the debt-ridden
villagers in return for their agreement to grow opium for them.”73
Landowners could of course use threatening tactics to convince villagers to
cultivate opium poppies but this kind of measures was unnecessary at first since the
peasants themselves were quick to respond for the prospect of quick cash profits.
However, by the mid-1870s the mood towards opium changed:
“… the attitude of the villagers tended to become more negative as the longterm effects of vastly increased opium cultivation made themselves felt. […]
expanding opium production tended to take increasingly large amounts of
land out of grain production. As a result, the region’s total food supply was
reduced and grain prices rose. […] in years when for any number of natural
reasons harvest in the region was bad, famine was quick to strike.74
Ahmad Seyf presents a similar argument even more vigorously. According to
Seyf, although the move to cash crop production was welcomed by the government and
landlords, as well as the large merchants who stood to make a handsome profit, the
situation was totally different for the peasants, the landless laborers and the working
people of the towns, i.e. the bulk of the population. Although the peasants may have been
able to increase their earnings, their new dependence on purchased food worsened their
situation for several reasons. (1) Since the surplus of foodstuff was not high in Iran to
begin with, the transfer to cash crops decreased it even further which caused an increase
in food prices, which meant a decrease in the value of the money the peasants earned. (2)
The absence of roads and mismanagement meant that it was especially difficult to
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transport food from one province to another, and thus while there was plenty of food in
one district there could have been a shortage in another. Even people who had money had
actually nothing to buy with their money. (3) In certain occasions this situation worsened
to the point of widespread starvation as in the case of the great famine of 1870-1872.75 In
addition to those reasons he argues that whatever increase in real income the peasants
made was eroded by inflation.76
Within this debate, opium and other cash crops are used within each scholar’s
narrative of Qajar Iran’s economic history, and by implication the place of the
Constitutional Revolution (1906-1908) within this narrative.77 For those who suggested
that the conditions of the peasants in Iran improved, cash crops and opium were markers
of development and progress, catalysts of economic expansion and prosperity. For those
holding the opposite view, cash crops and opium marked not progress but social and
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economic stagnation, not progress for the benefit of all but a mean utilized to strengthen
the few at the expense of the many.
According to the former view, the latter part of the 19th century was a period of
economic growth that was the result of both outside economic pressures but also local
economic entrepreneurship.78 Yet, parallel to the growth of the Iranian economy, the
Qajar government’s expenses increased significantly as well, even though this increase
was disproportionate not only to the actual growth of the economy but also to the amount
of income the government was able to actually collect through taxes, customs and duties.
Throughout the second half of the 19th century, the Shah and his courtiers refused
vehemently to cut the monarch’s expenses on his lavish lifestyle or cut the pensions of
the courtiers. Instead, in its weakness and corruption, the central government brought into
Iran financial European involvement in the form of loans with outrageous interest rates to
which the customs authority of Iran was given as a bond. A generous-to-a-fault policy of
concessions’ distribution gave away the resources of Iran to foreigners for mere trifle.
These unpopular steps antagonized the population at large, but particularly the merchants
who felt that their property and status are in danger.79 Extrapolating from this line of
argumentation, the constitutional revolution of 1906-1908 is thus, according to this view,
a result of an alliance between merchants and lower-classes alienated from the nonproductive upper-classes and encouraged by the economic development across the board.
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This narrative of the Constitutional Revolution raised several indirect objections,
most of which can be characterized as a rejection of the over-emphasis on economic
factors and a stress on the role of other groups in Iran, particularly the Ulama and the
lower classes.80 Seyf’s rejection of the economic narrative presented by Gilbar is a
different case, since unlike other scholars he does emphasize the importance of economic
factors, although he does not connect his argument to the narrative of the Constitutional
Revolution. Since he rejects the idea that cash crops improved the situation of the
peasants, the idea of a merchants-people alliance against the monarchy is not reasonable
within the perimeters of his argumentation. If anything, the peasants in the late Qajar
period are supposed to be alienated from the merchants according to Seyf’s theory. His
depiction of the merchants as a class who cooperated with the monarchy and the Foreign
Powers to enrich themselves at the expense of the peasants makes it reasonable to assume
that he would probably reject a description of a merchant-people alliance against the
monarchy.81 Thus, extrapolating from Seyf’s narrative of late-Qajar economic history
strengthens the scholarship that emphasizes role other groups in the Constitutional
Revolution, such as the westernized intellectuals, the Ulama and grassroots organizations.

80

Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981); Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The
Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period; Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran : A Study
of the Role Played by the Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian Politics (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977). –
emphasize the role of the Shi’I clergy, the Ulama. Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution.
emphasizes the role of popular grassroot political activism. Bayat, Iran's First Revolution: Shi'ism and the
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909. – emphasizes the role of heterodox radicals, babi Ulama and
secularists; and Martin, Islam and Modernism. emphasizes the role of the conservative Ulama and the
urban lower classes. All in all, economic factors play only a marginal role in this body of scholarship.
81

Seyf, "Commercialization of Agriculture."

55

A slightly more sophisticated economic argument is suggested by Amirahmadi, as
he describes the turn-of-the-century as a period of struggle in Iran between two segments
of the bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the wealthier sectors of the bourgeoisie, which
shifted its investments to foreign trade and cash crop production while entering an
alliance with the feudal state; and on the other hand, the national bourgeoisie, who
struggled for industrialization and entered an alliance with the urban middle classes, the
poor, and occasionally the rural population. The first group depended upon imperialist
forces, not only for its economic prosperity but for its very survival, while the second
group rejected imperialism as the source of their stagnation and inability to further
develop capitalism in Iran.82
Another issue at stake here is the world-system economic theoretical framework
known as the Dependency Theory. This theory, developed initially as a critique of the
evolutionary approach of the 1960s sociology, argues that “The modern history of any
given country […] makes sense only as part of the history of the organized world system
that capitalism historically has created.”83 Therefore, to study inequalities between
societies one must focus on the economic relationship between them. According to this
theory, the main relationship between societies has been throughout the last few centuries
an exploitative one, creating wealth at one end of the relationship (the ‘Center’ or
‘Metropolis’) and poverty at the other end (the ‘Satellite’ or ‘Periphery’). The Metropolis
uses whatever advantage it has (political, diplomatic, military, scientific, industrial etc.)
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to exploit the Periphery and thus to eternalize its own advantage. With its military power,
the Metropolis forces “free-trade on equal terms” upon the Periphery and then uses its
industrial advantage to collapse the Periphery’s economy and re-organize it for its own
needs and benefits. Most commonly, Metropolis states first flood a Periphery market with
cheap manufactured goods, devastate the local industries and force it to move to largescale production of raw materials. These raw materials are bought by the Metropolis,
turned into finished goods and then sold back to the Periphery.
The appeal of this theoretical framework is clear, even beyond the simple fact that
it makes a lot of sense. First, it explains a wide variety of phenomena with a small
number of elements. A relatively small set of theoretical tools explain not only the
relations between historical societies but also contemporary ones. It provides an
apparently objective language that describes interactions on a global scale as a unified
system or at least a set of supra-national structures, allows a non-judgmental analysis of
those systems84 in a holistic and structural way,85 and at the same time arms the exploited
with self-liberating advice without the Marxist-style destroy-all revolution.86 In addition,
while traditional Marxism explains the poverty of the under-developed countries by an
84

While evolutionary analysis like that of the modernization theory categorizes societies as “developed” ,
“developing” or “under-developed” according to a static (and practically invented) scale, a dependency
theorist will argue that development and underdevelopment are only meaningful terms within a capitalist
system which creates them. In other words, underdevelopment itself is created by the advance of a global
capitalist system; it is not a stage on the road for development.

85

While modernization theorists explain development or under-development of each society as particular
cases, disparate from each other, dependency theorists use a holistic approach that views development as a
notion that exists within the context of the global capitalist system.

86

Adherents of the modernization theory would urge developed societies to assist under-developed
societies on either a voluntary or utilitarian basis, assuming that under-developed societies cannot help
themselves. A classic development theory recipe for “under-developed” periphery countries would be to
decrease imports as much as possible, prevent foreign investments in raw materials production,
industrialization and greater reliance on self-produced goods.

57

undefined combination of lack of industrialization, a despotic regime and imperialistcapitalist exploitation, the Dependency Theory portrays a mechanism of international
political economy that explains how impoverished societies became impoverished
through a rigid division of labor that made the Center wealthy and the Periphery poor.87
However, serious critique has been raised against the dependency theory on both
theoretical and practical grounds. One important argument stipulated that the bilateral
relations of exploitation described by the Dependency Theory do not add up to a system
that should be the sum of those relations. The relation of exploitation assumes a certain
hierarchy, but examining actual relations according to the theoretical framework of the
dependency theory it appears that chains of exploitation do not simply connect to a single
hierarchical system, and even if we re-organize the sets of exploitative relations we do
not get a coherent World-System that explains all the economic relations between
societies in a given historical period.88 A more practical critique against the theory was
that in many cases the historical data simply does not allow us to describe specific
relations between Metropolis and Periphery as one-sided exploitation.89 Moreover, states
which adopted the advice of Dependency theorists to sever (or at least limit) their
economic ties with the exploiting Metropolis tended to fail economically, while at least
87
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some other countries have managed to use the old Modernization Theory recipes for their
own advantage.90
Seyf uses the case of opium production in Iran to bring a nuanced display of what
he understands as the exploitation of Iran by Metropole economies and its inclusion as a
peripheral member into the capitalist world-system. What he wishes to solve through this
discussion is the apparent conflict between the transformation of a given economy into a
cash-crop producer, which is usually the marker of progress and development, and the
subsequent impoverishment of that economy. Of course, this is only true if one views
economic development of a market as an isolated, mostly internal, process. However, if
one is to examine such development using the theoretical tools of Dependency, then it is
revealed that:
“… The cultivation of cash crops in Iran did not represent an overall
development of the productive forces, but on the contrary, was a substitute
for the failed productive capacity of the nonfarm sector. […] the old
traditional system was breaking up, but the course and results of those
changes were not determined by the internal laws of the traditional economy
but by external factors, mainly factors associated with foreign trade. […] the
old did not disappear, and the new was built not on the ruins but upon the
surviving remnants of the old. […] unlike the development in the
metropolitan economies which was spontaneous and self-propelled, changes
and development in Iran were geared more or less to the need of the
metropoles. […] It is in this context that we regard dependent development
not as non-development but rather a distorted development process which, in
turn, exhibits structural underdevelopment in the key sectors of the
economy.”91
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To prove his argument Seyf devotes a long section in his article to a specific
analysis of the production and trade of Iranian opium in the late 19th century in an attempt
to show that its production and trade represented not economic development but the
complete opposite. Opium cultivation, he argues, expanded from the 1850s through the
1860s, shrank slightly in the early 1870s but renewed its expansion afterwards. Since the
mid-1880s it began to shrink again and maintained this trend through the early 1900s.
Primitive methods of cultivation, he argued, resulted in low-quality opium that was often
adulterated, opium that attracted only low prices in the Chinese market. Foreign
competition from India, Japan (sic!) and the Ottoman Empire checked the prices of
Iranian opium in the Chinese market and practically blocked its way to European
markets.
The drop in global demand due to the advent of new opium legislation and an
economic decline in China was another blow to the Iranian opium industry. Thus,
according to Seyf, opium cultivation developed as a large-scale business in Iran in
response to a trade deficit which in itself developed out of the trade treaties imposed upon
Iran by the European Powers. As such, it contributed nothing to the development of
capitalism in Iran; it involved no new methods of production that could be used to
improve other aspects of the agricultural market or extended to promote industrialization,
and; it did not improve the economic situation of the population at large save for a small
layer of merchants and landowners. In fact, it worsened the situation of the lower
classes.92
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Seyf’s article is one of the most clear-cut examples of the problematic treatment
opium received in Iran’s historiography, but the problems that characterize Seyf’s
arguments appear to a certain extent in the scholarship of other scholars in the field,
including even Gad Gilbar who holds an opposite evaluation of the role of opium
production in Iran. Several factual mistakes stand out in this analysis: Despite Seyf’s
assumption that Iranian opium was of low quality throughout the second half of the 19th
century, the quality of Iranian opium improved significantly in the 1880s and, as I will
show later, it commanded higher prices in China, even surpassing reputable Patna opium;
Iranian opium indeed had to compete with other brands of opium over the Chinese
market, but this task was actually accomplished quite successfully. Iranian opium was
certainly not blocked out of European markets – not by competition nor otherwise; Japan,
of course, had no opium production of itself, it merely bought opium from other sources
for distribution through the monopolies it established in its colonies of Korea,
Manchukuo and Formosa, and in any case, this episode belongs to a later period as
Japan’s major colonialist period did not begin before 1895.93
Other problems are more structural in nature, in relation to the conduct of the
opium trade: Adulteration is not simply fraud, because all opium is adulterated to a
certain extent, and “pure opium” (which is in fact raw opium) is really not a very useable
product until it is processed; It is completely impossible to discuss “opium prices” as if
they were an unchanging constant, while in reality, the opium trade of the 18th and 19th
centuries was a highly risky business, as prices often fluctuated dramatically and
93
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suddenly. Speculation in opium was rife and information about the success or failure of
crops in even the remote regions of the world could have had an immediate impact on the
prices of opium; The drop in global demand for opium by the end of the 19th and the
early 20th centuries actually helped Iran because it removed the competition of Indian
opium and Iran suddenly became the biggest producer of opium in the world without
reducing its own production.94
With regards to dependency theory, the case of opium is probably the least
suitable case to prove the efficiency of this theory in analyzing Iran’s economic situation
in the 19th century. First, opium is not exactly a raw material since it acts more often as a
finished good. In any case, a reciprocal system of purchasing opium from Iran to be sold
later back to Iran as manufactured opioids like morphine and heroin simply did not exist.
Second, Iranian opium was in direct competition with Indian opium which made British
officials increasingly worried during the second half of the 19th century. Thus, in the
context of opium production and export, Iran can hardly be described as exploited by the
British Empire.95 Third, most of Iran’s opium was sold to China, and thus, even if we
describe the trade of opium between Iran and China as exploitative (which is doubtful)
this relationship certainly does not take place between a “center” / “metropole” and a
“periphery”. Whether or not Iran can be described as a case of dependent economy, the
opium sector is not the case to prove it.
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The indictment against opium in the case of the Great Famine of 1870-1872 is
another problem that needs further analysis, though it appears that the validity of the
argument has already been seriously questioned. That poppy cultivation was a major
cause for the great famine of 1870-1872 is of course not an original argument made by
scholars of recent decades. Foreign observers have argued it already in the 1870s and this
had been no doubt the common opinion in Iran as well. British observers who were
present in Iran during the famine in various capacities had made their opinion clear that
the expansion of opium cultivation at the expense of cereal cultivation caused the
shortage of food during the drought years of 1870-1872.96 It is also true that this opinion
was shared by at least some among the political leadership of Iran, and Seyf is right that
after the famine, the cultivation of opium was limited to a certain extent by the
authorities. The governor of Fars, Zill al-Sultan, for example, enacted limits on the
amount of land allowed to be turned from cereal-cultivation to opium cultivation.97 The
reason so many subscribed to this apparently reasonable causal explanation is obvious:
On the one hand there is an enormous expansion in the production of opium and on the
other hand a severe shortage of wheat, thus many simply referred to the connection
between the two as a matter of fact.98
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However, already in the late 1970s, scholars like Nasser Pakdaman and Vahid
Nowshiravani expressed their reservations about this too-easy a connection, pointing out
that simple common-sense observation of the nature of poppy cultivation does not go
hand in hand with an argument that it significantly replaced grain cultivation.99 A more
detailed work by Shoko Okazaki has shown that the expansion of opium cultivation did
not affect grain production in Iran, which remained the main agricultural product in the
country. Okazaki convincingly demonstrates that the acreage necessary for the
production of the annual amount of opium reported before and after the 1870s was in fact
relatively small and thus the expansion of opium production cannot be blamed for the
lack of grain in the market during the famine.100
The drought of 1869-1871 was the initial cause for the disturbance in the supply
of grain, but Okazaki effectively presents direct and indirect evidence which proves that
there was no real shortage of grain in Iran at the time and that the famine was caused by
the greed of various merchants, landowners, senior bureaucrats and religious officials
who engaged in hoarding and market manipulation, taking advantage of the situation to
amass an enormous fortune, even at the price of watching their fellow subjects starve to
death. In addition, he points his finger at the central government and at least some
provincial governors who were particularly ineffective in preventing the situation from
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developing in the first place and displayed a disturbingly disaffection towards the
suffering of the people.101
Where the idea about the connection between poppy cultivation and the famine
originated is not clear - whether it was the opinion of Iranian officials quoted by British
observers or vice versa – and a review of the sources does not reveal it. The obvious gap
between the persistence of this observation and its invalidity demands some sort of an
explanation. Understanding several political and social contexts may explain why this
connection between opium and famine was convenient for those who argued it and those
who accepted it as logical. One such context, crucial for the understanding of the British
interest in the Iranian famine, is the recurrence of famine in British-controlled India.102
Several famines took place in India in the 1860s and 1870s: One broke out in
Orissa in 1866, another one in 1869 in Rajputana and yet another one in Bihar in 187374. The mortality in those three famines reached 2.5 million people. Worse yet was the
great famine of 1876-1878 which covered almost all of South India in which between 610 million people perished.103 The question of famine was a hotly debated political issue
at the time which was used by the anti-imperialists of the period as a political tool against
the British government and its colonialist policy.104 Blaming opium for the famine in Iran
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could have been masqueraded criticism of the British administration of India and the
enormous profits it made from opium there. Another possibility is that linking the famine
to poppy cultivation in Iran was an attempt to divert the attention from the fact that grain
continued to be exported out of Iran by British merchants even in the midst of the famine,
thus contributing to the severity of the famine, and only local riots forced a release of this
grain from storage at a fair price.105 There is of course no one British position on the
questions of opium and imperialism, yet blaming opium production for the famine in Iran
appears to be serving the interests of more than one side of that debate.
As for the promotion of this idea in Iran itself, it is important to remember the
direct involvement of some bureaucrats and clerics in the market manipulations that
brought about the famine. In a recent article about the rise and fall of the merchant
councils (majalis-i wukala-yi tujjar) in 1884-85, Gad Gilbar recounts the vast business
interests of Zill al-Sultan, the governor of Isfahan and several other southern
provinces,106 the same Zill al-Sultan who ordered in 1880 to sow one jarib of cereal for
every four jarib of opium as a preventive measure against future famines.107 It is not
unlikely that Zill al-Sultan himself was involved in hoarding, profiteering and other
manipulations during the famine, and therefore this order may be seen as an attempt to
distract public opinion from the real causes of the famine. Of course, the perception of
opium as a moral evil made it easy to accept unfounded arguments such as its role in the
Great Famine of 1870-1872. Even Shireen Mahdavi, who is quoted above for her
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convincing survey of the arguments refuting the claim about opium’s role in the 18711872 famine in her biography of the famous 19th-century merchant Amin al-Zarb, writes
about the food shortages of the 1890s later in the same book: “One of the causes of the
shortage of bread was that since the 1860s, when the cultivation and production of opium
became popular, much of the land previously allocated to the cultivation of wheat and
barley was allotted to opium production.”108
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CHAPTER 3
In order to better understand the development of Iran’s opium business in the 19th
century, it is imperative to be first aware of the problematic language and bias that shapes
the way our society understand drugs and its impact on the academic research. Opium is
commonly referred to as a drug. Most of us understand that the word “drug” has the
broader meaning of medication in general, but when somebody talks about the 1960s as a
time of “Sex, Drugs and Rock ’n’ Roll” we understand that the reference is not to aspirin.
The more technical term “psychoactive drugs” refers to the mood changing properties of
some drugs, their direct chemical impact on the brain and their effect on the mind. Of
course, many drugs fall under that category. Drugs like: heroin, opium, cocaine, khat,
cannabis, LSD, MDMA, methamphetamines, etc. would be the most obvious; but coffee,
tobacco, alcohol, tea and chocolate share many of the same attributes and properties.
The first major difference between the two groups is clearly their legal status. The
drugs on the first group are strictly controlled substances under various international
treaties, national legal system, and various local regulatory regimes, and their nonmedical consumption is almost universally prohibited. Of the second group, only the
consumption of tobacco and alcohol is mildly controlled and limited but not prohibited,
except in some Muslim countries where alcohol is a religious taboo. Most people would
agree that consumption in great quantities of drugs of the second group is not healthy but
that small quantities do not generally pose a particular danger, as opposed to drugs in the
first group, the consumption of which is generally considered dangerous even in small
quantities. It is also generally assumed that the reason for prohibiting the consumption of
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drugs from the first group is the scientifically proven medical threat they pose for public
health, while the moral apprehension from drugs is considered (by those who are able to
differentiate between the two) only of secondary importance – at least in societies where
the general agreement is that the state should not legislate morality. The prohibition of
alcohol in Islam or of tobacco in the Sikh religion are perceived as quite different since
those are primarily religious and moral taboos, along the lines of the dietary restrictions
of Judaism or the vegetarianism in most of the Indian religions.
The general belief is that there are “hard drugs” like heroin and cocaine and “soft
drugs” like the cannabis drugs, and that the “rating” system was generated scientifically.
Some people are aware that in previous generations the social and legal approach to the
drugs which are illegal today was different, but assume that scientific discoveries
revealed the dangers of those drugs and that those discoveries led to a change in the
social place of drug consumption and to legislation against it. However, a historical
analysis reveals that early anti-drug legislation which was undertaken in many countries
at the beginning of the 20th century, directed at the various opiates, cannabinoids, and
cocainoids known at the time, was highly motivated by moralistic, racist and nationalist
motivations, while the scientific evidence about the dangers of those drugs was at the
time inconclusive at best. In fact, even today, the scientific community is far from being
united about the medical dangers attributed to illicit drugs, a fact that is almost unknown
to the general public.
From a historical perspective it is easy to discern that the legal, moral and even
scientific attributes of every psychoactive drug changed many times in the past and is still
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changing. Coffee was banned in many European states in the 18th century and its drinkers
considered possible traitors and trouble makers; miracle medicines from the 19th-century
containing large amounts of opium turned into dangerous drugs; alcoholic drinks
described as “diabolic” by the temperance movement became markers of good taste, and;
the healthy habit of smoking became one of the greatest health hazards of our time. In
short, from the point of view of drug scholarship all psychoactive drugs are equal.
Drug Scholarship, or simply the study of drugs, can be divided into three major fields:
(i)

Drug Sciences – that is the study of drugs within the context of the natural
sciences and particularly the medical sciences. These days it is generally a
sub-field of neurobiology and the scientific effort there is generally focused
around the effects of drugs on the brain, the nature of “addiction” and the
ways to identify it – whether it is an acquired disease or genetically
conditioned.

(ii) Drug Therapy – generally discussing the nature of “psychological addiction”
to drugs and the proper way to treat it.
(iii) Drug Historiography and Sociology – which is the study of past and present
encounters of society and drugs. Drug Historiography and Sociology can
broadly be categorized into several themes of study:
1. The history of drug production and trade.
2. The history of drug consumption, which also includes the medical
history of drugs.
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3. The history of anti-drug ideology and the movements that helped
spread it.
4. The history of drug-related legislation and the drug-related law
enforcement.
Drug scholarship also informs drug-related legislation and the enforcement of the
drug laws in every specific country, in a close power/knowledge relationship. In a recent
article, David Courtwright described the main rifts within the field of drug scholarship,
between the ‘pharmacologists’ who maintain a materialist approach to drugs and the drug
experience, and the ‘constructivists’ who point out to the crucial impact of human and
social experiences upon the encounter with drugs. Of course, in our society the
‘pharmacologists’ are those among the community of drug scholars who maintain
positive and close relations with legislators and enforcers. They also tend to ignore or
simply be unaware to the merits of drug history and the achievements of drug historians
that might be relevant for their own research.109 Courtwright points specifically at the
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) as a proponent of a scientific model that
understands addiction as a “chronic, relapsing brain disease with a social and genetic
component, significant co-morbidity with other mental and physical disorders, long-term
changes in brain structure and function visible in imaging studies, and a defining loss of
control over drug craving, seeking and use despite adverse consequences” that he calls
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“The NIDA Paradigm”.110 Proponents of the NIDA-Paradigm consistently ignore or
underestimate historical evidence that contradicts the main assumptions of the paradigm.
This state of affairs has its own history. Our society is a narcophobic society. It is
ridden with narcophobic discourse and it has been so since the late 19th century. This
discourse includes distorted meaning of otherwise truthful facts, misconceptions,
inaccuracies and outright myths. It is a common belief that drugs are a health danger; that
they can cause addiction even if they are taken in small quantities, and; that “soft drugs”
like cannabinoids, ecstasy and khat, are a segue to “hard drugs” like heroin, cocaine and
methamphetamines. Many people believe that drugs cause crime, and many others
believe – against all economic logic – that, in the case of drugs supply alone determines
the demand. These so-called truths are taken by most people as self-evident and are rarely
challenged or even examined rationally.
This discourse has many harmful consequences. The fear of addiction instilled by
this discourse is so strong that some people prefer to endure unbearable pain and not use
morphine-based medications. Some governments – especially in Africa – are so terrified
of drugs that they refuse to accept morphine-based medications intended for cancer
patients even when those are offered for free. With close to zero access to modern cancer
treatment in most African countries, cancer patients are doomed to die a slow painful
death with mere paracetamols to alleviate their pain.111 The American Drug Enforcement
Authority (DEA) is uncompromising in its war against cannabinoids and for several
110
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decades engaged in an ongoing relentless political battle against any attempt to allow
cancer patients, even terminal ones, to use cannabis in order to alleviate some of the most
unpleasant side effects of cancer treatment.
For the purposes of this dissertation, more important is the impact of the
narcophobic discourse on historical research. The narcophobic discourse assumes that its
arguments about drugs are laws of nature, universal in application and independent of
cultural and social conditions. In other words, drugs are outside any historical context.
Within this discourse, the history of drugs and drug consumption is understood in
teleological terms: societies may experience a period of unrestricted drug consumption
until the “truth” about the drugs is revealed and than those drugs are prohibited. In some
societies this inevitable process took place in an earlier stage and other societies
experienced that in a later stage.112
Historical evidence contradicts this shallow perspective. It is not the purpose of
this dissertation to refute all the aspects of the narcophobic mythology, but it is
imperative to disprove at least some of the common beliefs and misunderstandings about
drugs, particularly those which inhibit sound and balanced historical research. First, it is
true that some drugs can be a health danger, but the health dangers of drugs are not
necessarily unique or set them apart from other foods, drinks and legal medications.
There is no doubt that a long-term consumption of some drugs - even in relatively small
112
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quantities - may cause an accumulated damage to the body. Taken in large doses, almost
all drugs are poisonous and potentially lethal, but this phenomenon is not limited to
heroin, cocaine or LSD. Over-consumption of many substances – like alcohol, fat foods,
and cigarettes – may cause serious health risks, and in large quantities may even cause
immediate poisoning and death.
Many health-risks related to the consumption of drugs are in reality not directly
caused by the drug itself. For example, most people who die in relation to the use of
ecstasy or MDMA do so because of over-consumption of water, or simply put: waterpoisoning. It should also be pointed out that since the production process, wholesale and
retail of almost all illegal drugs is unsupervised by proper authorities, the end-product
purchased and consumed by the drug-user at the end of this chain is hardly ever the pure
form of the drug by that name. Marijuana often contains large traces of dangerous
pesticides that are prohibited by the USDA; heroin and cocaine are often mixed with
powdered sugar, baking soda, and even arsenic and strychnine; with a lack of production
standards, consumers of LSD, MDMA and meth use unknown doses of the active
ingredients in the drug they are taking even when they take what appear to be similar
tablets each time. In short, some of the health hazards connected with drugs are so
because those drugs are illegal to consume. Criminalization has made drugs more
dangerous than they used to be.113
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It should also be remembered that almost all the drugs that are currently defined
as controlled substances used to be medications, and some of them still are.114 Opium was
used to cure various ailments for thousands of years; heroin was originally a cough
medicine for children; cocaine was widely used as anesthetics by dentists, and;
methamphetamines were popular diet pills in the 1950s. Of course, opiates and
cocainoids in various forms are still widely used in medications and as anesthetics.
More serious is the claim that drugs cause addiction. The question of addiction is
a complex one. There is no doubt that people who consume some drugs on a regular basis
may develop physical dependence upon that drug, and when they stop taking the drug
this dependence will be expressed by a variety of withdrawal symptoms. Those
symptoms can be: headaches, pains of various sorts, increased perspirations, constipation,
diarrhea, fever, nausea, shivering, insomnia, hallucinations, etc. This is true not only in
relation of heroin or cocaine but in the case of alcohol, cigarettes and coffee as well.
“Psychological addiction” is perceived as something different than “physical addiction”
although many understand them as two aspects of the same phenomenon. To summarize
the common understanding of psychological addiction to a drug, it is an urge or a desire
to consume more of the drug, be it heroin, cocaine, alcohol, cigarettes or caffeine. It is
usually described as an uncontrollable compulsion to continue and consume. The
consumers may well be aware that the continuation of their habitual consumption is
harmful to them – both physically and financially; they may hurt other people, commit
crimes and betray their own previously held morals; they may even be aware that they are
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“addicted”, nevertheless their “addiction” is “stronger than themselves” and “forcing”
them to maintain their habit at all costs. Those who see physical addiction as separate
from psychological addiction would argue that even if a person manages to get over the
symptoms of detoxification and conquer his physical addiction, he may still relapse back
to his old habit if the psychological addiction was not treated. This description is known
as the “disease model” of addiction.115
The NIDA-paradigm takes this description a step further and describes addiction
as a chronic brain-disease, which characterizes people with specific “brain-structure”.
According to NIDA scientists, the “addiction disease” may be triggered by various drugs
or activities like sex, gambling, computer games etc. Different people with “different
brain structures” may be triggered to become addicts by different things. It is also
possible that some people may be “potential addicts” although the addiction may never
be triggered if they do not come in contact with the substance or the activity to which
their brain is triggered to become addicted.
Two important questions must be asked about this very popular notion of
addiction: (1) Do drugs really cause psychological addiction, and is it really a disease?
(2) Does the addict really lose control over his addiction? The answer to both these
questions is negative. Let us first look a bit deeper into the nature of psychological
addiction. Of course, continuous consumption of a drug causes physical dependence and
a sudden break in consumption after a prolonged period of consumption causes a series of
painful symptoms known as withdrawal syndrome. In some severe cases a sudden break
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in consumption (going “cold turkey” as the popular idiom describes it) can even cause
death. Physical dependence on drugs is a phenomenon with clear physical symptoms.
Psychological addiction, on the other hand, is something very different. It is completely
a-symptomatic, meaning that the identification of psychological addiction depends
entirely on the verbal report/admission of the so-called addict or on an interpretation of
his or her behavior. There are no physical markers of any sort – no test of any kind – that
can clearly determine whether a person ‘has’ a psychological addiction. Psychological
addiction is exactly what it is – psychological. Its causes are personal experiences,
cultural background and social context, not the consumption of chemical substances.
Addiction is only a disease as a metaphor. When we fall in love we understand
that Eros did not really struck us with his arrows, and we understand that Poseidon is not
really angry during a storm at sea, although these are illustrative and even inspiring
metaphors. Yet, for some reason so many of us insist that people with psychological
addiction suffer from a real physical disease. Addiction, as many scholars point out, is
much more related to the life problems of the addict than to the consumption of a
substance of some sort. To say that psychoactive drugs cause addiction is a
misinterpretation of the connection between the material and the spiritual aspect of
humanity.116 The NIDA-paradigm represents a revised phrasing of the disease model of
addiction as it identifies the “disease” as a pre-existing condition located within the
“brain structure” of the patient even before he ever used a drug. However, the refutation
of the conventional disease-model applies in this case as well.
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Drug addicts do not “lose control” over their actions. The idea that somehow
drugs take over the will of the consumer and dictate his or her actions is irrational and
based on no evidence apart from the testimony of the addicts themselves – which is,
again, a-symptomatic. Drugs are inanimate objects and as such it is simply wrong to
apply to them agency, or in other words: intentions, wills and desires. It also makes no
sense to assign them the ability to control people, who are by definition intentional beings
with wills and desires of their own. In this respect, drugs are even less than viruses,
germs and bacteria. When viruses, germs or bacteria attack our bodies we do not think
that it represents some sort of an intentional action, we do not say that the bacteria
controls our minds even when it attacks our brain.
The idea that a person’s wills and desires can be completely controlled by another
person – let alone an external material – relies on literary fantasies that have no scientific
basis. The rise of psycho-analysis, the sweeping popularity of Communism and NationalSocialism and cold war fears, can all be traced as sources for the modern-period idea that
one’s mind can be put under someone else’s control. Cold War-era movies like “The
Ipcress File” or “The Manchurian Candidate” represented the fear of brain-washing and
mind-control rampant in western society at the time. However, all the research and
experimentation done in this field during the 20th century was a declared failure that
produced very little. The human will was discovered to be more resilient than what it was
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initially thought to be. Thus, the idea that drugs somehow control the will of the addict
simply has no scientific basis.117
Another related common misperception about drugs concerns the concept of
tolerance. The bodies of people who use drugs – particularly “hard drugs” – develop a
tolerance to the initial quantity of the drug they consume, thus in order to achieve the
same experience repeatedly (the same “high”) they must gradually increase the intake of
the drug they consume. According to the popular mythology about drugs, the increase of
intake is linear, necessarily indefinite and without intervention the drug user will
eventually die from an overdose (OD) intake of the drug. In reality, almost all habitual
users reach a balanced plateau from which they do not increase their regular intake of the
drug, and they are able to maintain the same level of consumption for many years and
even decades. Actually, it is argued by many that most OD-related deaths from the intake
of illegal drugs occur because of the current prohibitionist regime. In most of those cases
it is often discovered that the patient who suffers from symptoms related to overdose
intake of a certain drug either procured the drug from a new supplier or that the supplier
received a new wholesale shipment of the drug. Thus, because of the vast differences of
adulteration between the drugs sold by various suppliers, the users might suddenly
increase their intake of the drug unintentionally.118 Recent research also shows that in the
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last decade most cases of death caused by an OD intake of a drug occurred as a result of
unintentional over-consumption of a prescription opiate.119
In a similar manner, the association of drugs and crime is unjustified and
misrepresented. Drugs do not cause crime. Crime is a social action that obtains its
meaning within a social and legal context. It cannot be caused by inanimate objects.
People cause crime, not objects. In fact, as many scholars pointed out, most criminal
activity related to drugs can be directly attributed to the criminalization of drugs.
Criminalizing drugs did not kill the drug business, but merely drove it underground. The
danger involved in the illegal drug business drove prices up and attracted crime
organizations that monopolized the business. Profits derived from the drug business were
used in turn to strengthen the power of those organizations, enabling them to buy more
weapons, employ more soldiers and pay more bribes. In fact, it is safe to say that the
existence of some of the major global crime organizations depends on the continuation of
the current prohibitionist drug policies.
Fear mongering, distortion and a good deal of racism, play an important role in
the perception of “drug crime”. For example, most people are not aware of the fact that
Crack (or Crack-Cocaine) is a compound of Cocaine and baking soda; therefore it is
basically not different inherently than regular white-powdered cocaine. Mixing cocaine
with baking soda reduces the price of the drug to a level that appeals to low-income
consumers in the US, most of them African-Americans. However, a panic-stricken
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campaign during the 1980s portrayed crack as a new drug viciously attacking inner-city
communities (again, note the application of agency to a drug). The result was that Federal
Sentencing Guidelines enacted in 1987 set a mandatory of 5-year imprisonment sentences
for possession of mere 5 grams of crack-cocaine, while the same sentencing was set for
trafficking of 500 grams of powdered-cocaine. Since most users of crack-cocaine were
poor inner-city African-Americans, while the more expensive powder-cocaine was more
popular among White-Americans, the result was that African-Americans were punished
at a ratio of 100:1 compared with White-Americans for practically the same offense.120
Another myth about drugs is the argument that when it comes to drugs - supply
alone may determine the demand. It is a counterintuitive argument that goes against
normative economic rationale, but in fact it is a more sophisticated argument than it first
appears and it is used in various forms to justify prohibitionist policies. According to this
argument, in the case of drugs like opium, heroin, alcohol, cocaine and cigarettes, there is
a clear connection between the increase of supply and the increase of demand. When
government limitations on the importation of opium into China had been removed
following the Opium Wars, Indian opium flooded the Chinese market and the result was
a sharp rise in the consumption of opium in China; Following the beginning of industrial
production of opium in Iran in the 1850s, was a constant rise in the consumption of
opium within Iran throughout the second half of the 19th century; During the years of
alcohol prohibition in the US, alcohol consumption dropped to its lowest rate ever in the
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entire history of the United States. The practical conclusion is, according to the
proponents of this argument, that supply alone may explain the rise or the demise of a
given “plague of drug addiction”, and thus limiting and even extinguishing the supply of
drugs will entail a reduction in the demand for those drugs. Permitting the supply of
drugs – even under supervision and limits – will inevitably increase the demand for and
the consumption of those drugs. This reasoning explains why since the 18th amendment
for the United States Constitution was repealed in 1933,121 there was a constant rise in the
consumption of alcohol in the US; and why the decriminalization of cannabis in the
Netherlands brought a sharp rise in the consumption of that drug there alongside with a
sharp expansion of drug-tourism.
Yet, there are several basic flaws and problems with this line of argumentation.
First, as I have mentioned before, it is based on the mistaken application of agency to
drugs. People who believe that drug users lose control over their wills and desires are
susceptible to believe that the mere existence of drugs in the market has some magical
influence on the drug consumers who feel an uncontrollable desire to purchase them. The
more serious problem with this argument is that not only it over-simplifies the cases
quoted, but also - very similar to astrologers - the proponents of this argument ignore and
do not try to explain historical cases that go contrary to the logic of their argument. The
increased demand for opium in China during the 19th century received many other
explanations that focus on social and cultural reasons: urbanization, improved
121
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transportation, the spread of leisure culture, the rise of a new bourgeoisie etc.122 Relying
merely on the supply levels of opium to explain opium consumption in China ignores the
social and cultural context of opium consumption in that country.
Historical evidence can also be used to refute this argument more directly. During
the last decades of the 19th century, the Government of India was carefully controlling the
production of opium in order to block the flooding of the Chinese market and subvert a
price reduction. By the end of the 19th century, while production in India was rising, sales
of Indian opium in China were plummeting, as locally-produced opium and Persian
opium took its place. In fact, during the 1890s a mere 50% of the annual production of
Indian opium was sold in China and the rest remained in storage in India, and even this
came after the production of opium in India during that period was reduced by 50%
compared with the previous two decades. The conclusion is that demand for drugs – like
any consumer products – relied on factors like prices, taste, fashion, consumer trends, and
not simply on the mere availability of the drug in the market.
Mirroring the negative myths about drugs, similar myths abound about the
positive effects of drugs as well, though most are equally unfounded. Most famously,
popular culture has perpetuated the myth about the creative inspiration drawn from drugs,
particularly the hallucinogenic ones. Creativity is neither bound by nor released by
chemicals. The use of opium by Samuel T. Coleridge, Lord Byron and Thomas De
Quincy is often pointed out as an example of the creative power “released” by the use of
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drugs.123 However, a sober and unbiased examination shows that creative people are
creative independent of the drugs they may or may not consume. Untalented people do
not become talented because of drug use.124
The narcophobic discourse amounts to a flawed understanding of the role of drugs
in history and misguided conclusions about the proper place of drugs in contemporary
society. The understanding of drugs as mere chemicals, and the drug experience as a
mere chemical sensation of the brain, strips drugs of their cultural significance and drug
experiences of their social context. Trusting the truthfulness of the narcophobic
discourse, the public is mostly unaware that those claims remain unsupported by
scientific evidence. Segregating drugs to the domain of the medical prevents a serious
examination of the role of drugs in society, while politicians use the fear of the so-called
“drug problem” for self-promotion through misguided legislation. In the last century,
drugs were used repeatedly as a scapegoat that channeled society’s fears of social,
economic, racial and political instability. Focusing on the misery of drug-addiction and
fighting an unwinnable “war on drugs,” diverts our attention from the real problems of
social injustice that relate to drug consumption. Historical evidence reveals that societies
experienced drugs differently and show the absence of a uniform drug experience. The
consumption of the same drugs served a wide range of cultural purposes across time and
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place. An unbiased understanding of the role of drugs in history may help us not only to
deal more reasonably with the question of drugs, but also to face more honestly the
problems of our modern society.
Disavowing the narcophobic discourse, this research intentionally avoids the
facile explanations of “addiction” or “loss of control” to explain, for example, the
commercial success of certain kinds of opium among certain kinds of population.
Understanding the basic flaws of those ready-made explanations may not only encourage
the suggestion of alternative explanation but also bring about new research questions that
otherwise would not have been asked. These questions in turn would provide new ways
to understand the history of drugs as part and parcel of normal human history, and undo
pitfalls of synchronic analysis and the distorting romantic spell of exoticism surrounding
them.
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CHAPTER 4
The connection between India and opium has long shaped the contours of the
classic story of colonialism and imperialism. As in Iran, opium was a familiar product
manufactured sporadically in various regions since ancient times. Since the end of the
18th-century the East India Company revolutionized the production of opium, converting
it into India’s most crucial commodity. The Company helped transform the Indian opium
business into one of the most successful and prosperous commercial ventures in history.
From its base in Calcutta the East India Company established a meticulous monopoly
system of licensing, collection and processing of opium. Licensed peasants in Bengal and
other north-eastern regions of the sub-continent were allowed to cultivate opium poppies.
The Company’s agents collected the raw opium from the peasants to be later processed in
factories located in Patna and Benares. Processed opium was then sold to supercargoers,
or in other words merchant-smugglers, who assumed the risk of smuggling opium into
China, where it was nominally illegal through most of the 18th and the first half of the
19th centuries.
The Company’s army enforced its monopoly on the production of opium in the
areas under the company’s control.125 The lucrative trade of opium with China resulted in
a complete reversal of the balance of trade between the British Empire and China. The
high demand for tea in England and its colonies during the 18th century caused an outflow
of silver from Britain into China who had no need or desire for British goods. The opium
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trade tilted the scale and within a few decades drained China of its silver and caused a
severe economic crisis in the country.126
The success of the East India Company relied on its ability to maintain a
monopoly on the production of opium in India and a monopoly on the sale, or to put
more correctly the smuggling, of opium in the China market. But this success soon
encouraged others to try and participate in this lucrative market, and the Company had to
find ways to defend its monopolistic status. Other regions in the sub-continent where
opium was traditionally cultivated were perfectly suited for massive opium production,
especially in the Malwa plateau and Gujarat, areas over which the East India Company
had very little control.127 This Malwa opium, which the British defined as “illicit”, was
shipped to China through ports in the West-Indian Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman
and Diu. During the first half of the 19th century the East India Company made enormous
efforts to annihilate opium production in the Malwa states, or at least block its arrival at
the Portuguese ports. But despite many such attempts as well as endeavors to purchase
Malwa opium directly from peasants, to convince local Maharajas to ban the production
(or at least the passage) of opium in their territories, the Company’s efforts were to no
avail. The risk for the Company’s monopoly was that even though Malwa opium was
considered an inferior product to the Company’s Patna opium, it could pull down the
prices of all opium products in the market.
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However, over the years, the Company has reached a modus vivendi with the
Malwa opium and managed to not only embed it into its opium monopoly scheme but
also to profit directly from it. The Company decided to allow the export of Malwa opium
from the Bombay port, and the Bombay port alone, and exacted a nominal fee as pass
duty per chest entering Bombay from land. This policy was at first only a mild success,
and “smuggling” continued for a while, but the British takeover of Sindh in 1843 was a
timely event that sealed the last entrepôt through which Malwa opium was shipped to
Daman and Diu. After 1843 the company gradually increased the pass duty to
unprecedented levels. On top of that, the Company enacted since the 1820s an enormous
preventive pass duty on opium entering the Bombay port by sea, carried on ships from
countries with whom Britain had a commercial treaty that did not allow preventing the
importation of certain items, thus effectively blocking opium from Iran and the Ottoman
Empire to be shipped to China.128
This combined set of policies made it possible for the Company, at least in the
first decades of their application, to control and manipulate the prices of opium in China
in order to keep them at an optimal level. The leadership of the Company believed that if
the prices of Malwa opium were too low it would create an incentive in the Chinese
market to buy more Malwa opium at the expense of the fully-British-controlled Patna
opium, thus creating an undesirable competition that would force a price reduction of
Patna opium as well. By raising the price of the pass duty on Malwa opium in Bombay
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the Company could artificially increase the costs of production and transport for the
merchants which encouraged them to raise the market prices, thus keeping the price of
Malwa opium close enough to the price of Patna opium.
Prices that were too high posed different kind of risks. For one, high prices would
have created an incentive for merchants to bring non-Indian opium to China relying on
the high-prices to cover the extra costs of delivery and potential risks. An additional risk
was that prices that were too high would lower the barriers-to-entry into the market for
local cultivation of opium in China. The Company assumed that at a certain level, high
market prices for opium would encourage local Chinese entrepreneurs to venture into
opium production despite the imperial decree that forbade it. This scheme also carried the
risk of opium from other sources arriving on the Chinese market beyond the British
ability to manipulate it.129 However, given the limited technology of maritime travel by
the first half of the 19th century, ships arriving from the west on their way to the EastAsian markets were forced to stop at Bombay for supplies and had no suitable alternative
port they could use for this purpose. Taking advantage of this situation, the preventive
pass duty for opium entering Bombay by sea was kept at a level that was higher than the
price of opium in the Chinese markets, a move that made the export of non-Indian opium
completely unprofitable. This policy practically prevented opium shipments from other
countries, such as Iran and the Ottoman Empire, from arriving in China and kept the
market almost free for Indian opium and East India Company manipulations.
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In light of this context, two major questions arise with regards to the development
of the opium business in Iran: how did Iranian opium manage to succeed in the Britishcontrolled Chinese market despite all those obstacles? And, why did it happen in that
specific period? Current historiography either disregards these question or deals with in
an indirect fashion.
As I mentioned above, it is widely agreed that the general phenomenon of cash
crop cultivation in Iran during the second half of the 19th century was one that developed
as a response to the growing deficit in Iran’s trade balance and the economic devastation
of the manual arts and crafts by imported finished goods from industrialized countries. It
was assisted by technological improvements in sea-faring, particularly steam navigation,
which made it not only possible but cheap to export cash crops out of Iran. Opium,
according to this line of argument, was merely an incidental success for a product that
was already easily and widely cultivated in Iran, which found a ready market in China.
This is basically the position found in Olsen, Keddie and many other scholars who
concentrated in their writings more on the impact of opium cultivation (and cash crops in
general) rather than its origins.130 Even Ahmad Seyf who mentions that the profitability
of large-scale production of opium in Iran was already predicted in the early 19th century,
fails to explain why the opium industry in Iran started growing only in the 1860s.131
One attempt is made by Gad Gilbar who suggested that a sharp increase in the
cultivation of cotton at the expense of poppy cultivation occurred in India during the
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cotton famine of the early 1860s caused by the US Civil War (1861-1865). This shift
supposedly caused a shortage of opium supply in China and created an opportunity for
Iranian merchants to set a foothold in the Chinese market.132 It is an interesting
speculation that connects well to some very well-known historical developments. The
cotton famine of the 1860s indeed caused a sharp increase in the production of cotton in
India, as well as in Egypt, Iran and other countries around the world. However, reports of
the British Government of India on the production and trade of Indian opium from the
period show no indication that there was any noticeable reduction in the production of
opium in India during that period, certainly not one that came as an immediate result of
increased cotton production. In a detailed analysis of India’s production and sale of
opium by A. Eden, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, from 1869, the following
table (Table 1) is supplied:133
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Table 1: Report on the Export of Malwa and Bengal Opium and their prices, 1861-1869

Number of

Price in China

Chests

of Malwa

exported from

Opium (in

Bombay

Rupees)

Number of

Price in China of

chests sold in

Bengal Opium (in

Calcutta

Rupees)

1861

29,250

1,558

21,423

1,994

1862

48,730

1,617

29,393

1,554

1863

31,592

1,579

39,240

1,439

1864

35,275

1,501

49,640

1,124

1865

29,796

1,515

64,111

1,016

1866

35,722

1,781

40,000

1,376

1867

35,534

1,629

47,999

1,352

1868

34,628

1,505

48,000

1,435

1869
(six
months)

19,821

1,515

22,470

1,422
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As Table 1 shows, there is no noticeable pattern of reduction in the sale of Indian
opium to China during the American Civil War when production in India allegedly
decreased to give way for the production of cotton, and in fact it appears to be on the rise
in some years. One should also remember that even at the peak of its production in the
1880s, Iran’s opium export did not exceed more than 10,000 chests of opium,134
rendering the suggestion that Iran could make up for a reduction in the production of
Indian opium improbable.
It is imperative to point out that the rise of opium production in Iran and its
success in the Chinese market are not to be treated lightly or considered as obvious. Since
the common perception is that opium is a “special” product that holds a unique type of
“attraction” for the consumers, it is necessary to emphasize that just like any other
product, when the price of the opium becomes too high; customers’ inclination to buy it
declines. Though it is a common belief that opium consumers (and heroin consumers, for
the same purpose) will buy their drug no matter what the cost might be - because they are
“addicted” - in reality it is simply not the case. That was not the case in 19th-century
China and it is not the case even with the most habitual of opiate-consumers in our
contemporary society.135 Like many other business ventures, the success of Iran’s opium
can be explained by a combination of a good quality product brought to the market in the
right time. Both these factors –“timing” and “quality” deserve an in-depth analysis.
With regards to timing, several historical developments contributed to the success
of the exportation of Iranian opium to China in the second half of the 19th century: (1)
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Improvements in steamboat navigation; (2) the opening of the Suez Canal; (3) the end of
the Second Opium War in China; and, (4) A crisis of opium prices in India and China in
the early 1860s.136
As discussed above, the preventive duties on opium which entered the arrived at
the port of Bombay by sea effectively prevented the exportation by sea of non-Indian
opium to China. Iranian merchants responded by searching alternative routes for trade
with China that would enable them to bypass Bombay. The land route to China along the
ancient Silk Road was proven too costly and too dangerous, and it was quickly
abandoned.137 One option used by Iranian merchants was to send their opium to Java and
from there to China. Later on there was even an attempt to send opium directly to China
from the Persian Gulf. 138 Iranian merchants soon discovered that the best and cheapest
route to China goes through the port of Aden where the pass duty for re-exporting opium
was merely 10 Rupees (Rs.) per chest - significantly lower than that of Bombay. Later
they sent their opium to Suez where it was transshipped to China duty free.
Following the technological improvements in steam-navigation during that
period, more and more shipping lines offered their services for carrying goods. This gave
Iranian merchants a larger choice of non-British ships that were willing to travel to China
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without touching port in any British-controlled port along the way.139 The opening of the
Suez Canal accelerated this process as even more shipping lines between Europe and
East-Asia were available for Iranian merchants who wanted to ship their opium to the
Eastern markets.
The end of the Second Anglo-Chinese War also known as the Second Opium War
(1856-1860) and the signing of the Treaties of Tienjin were an additional factor which
helped the successful introduction of Iranian opium into China. The main achievements
of the war, i.e. the expansion of the rights to trade in China, the ceding of additional ports
in China for foreign trade and, above all, the legalization of opium trade in China, were
supposed to embolden the hold of the British Empire over the China. Merchants of Indian
opium expected that the new treaties would ease significantly the trade of Indian opium
in China. However, the forced legalization of the opium trade in China was also good
news for local entrepreneurs in China who began producing massive amounts of opium in
the southern regions of the country, and of course for merchants who dealt in imported
non-Indian opium from Iran and the Ottoman Empire.
The Chinese market post-1860 was flooded with opium which caused a
significant price reduction. The new lower-level of opium prices was able to guarantee
profit only to opium that cost significantly less to produce and transport to China.140 This
made Iranian opium highly attractive for merchants since its production costs were lower
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than those of the Indian opium and, on top of that, Iran did not have the elaborate
customs system the British Raj imposed on Malwa opium. The British victory in the
Opium Wars destabilized the Chinese opium market and opened it for non-Indian opium
who took over the market eventually, significantly reducing the profitability of producing
opium in India.141
One particular affair of an early crisis in the opium market that took place in the
summer of 1861 may be seen as an early example of developments that led to the success
of Iranian opium in China. The end of the Second Opium War created high expectations
in India that the opium trade would significantly expand and that a price increase would
soon follow that expansion. However, an unexpected rise in the crop of both Patna and
Malwa opium in 1861, and the beginning of local opium cultivation by Chinese
entrepreneurs, kept prices in China at bay and sales at a slow pace. This had disastrous
results for the Indian opium market. Advanced purchases of opium in above-market
prices by local merchants in the Malwa states who borrowed money to fund those
purchases, left them with cheap opium, incapable to cover their debts. Speculators in
Calcutta, who contributed to the price rise in April and May 1861, found themselves in a
similar state of insolvency in June 1861. The attempt of all those to quickly regain some
of their losses by getting rid of their opium chests in a hurry, pushed the prices even
further down. The concurrent refusal of the British government to reduce the pass duty of
141
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700 Rs. on Malwa opium at Bombay as a measure to stop this deterioration caused many
merchants to significantly reduce their shipments of opium to China.
According to a memorandum sent to the Acting Commissioner of Customs, Salt
and Opium in Bombay in July 1861, the cost of purchasing opium and sending it to
China, reached 1,550 Rupees while the price of opium in China fluctuated around 700
HK Dollars or 1,540 Rupees (at the contemporary exchange rate of 2.2 Rs. per HK
Dollar). This meant close-to-no profit for the opium merchants who withheld their stocks
and minimized their shipments awaiting a price increase or a decrease in the pass duty.142
This affair took place at basically the same time in which, according to almost all the
available sources, the sales of Iranian opium in China began to rise. Since there was no
reduction in the demand for opium in China during the 1860s Iranian opium could easily
be sold there, and due to its lower production and taxation cost (compared with both
Patna and Malwa varieties of India opium) Iranian opium was still profitable for the
merchants who dealt with it. While Indian merchants withheld their stocks of Indian
opium, merchants who dealt with Iranian opium were only limited by the amounts of
opium Iran could produce and export.
It is not easy to determine where was most of the opium profit made, and
contradicting information exists that point out various groups as the main profiteers.
According to the 1881 report of Ronald Thomson, the British Minister in Tehran, the
opium-cultivators and the middlemen who collected the opium and sold it the exporters
made most of the profit. He presents a detailed receipt delivered to him by one merchant
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that shows the cost of sending a chest of opium from Bushehr, that is the Freight On
Board (FOB) price, is 1255 Rs., including all charges, customs and commissions. At this
price the said-merchant could not make a profit since the prices in China at the time were
539 HK Dollars, that in 1881 were 1179 Rs., i.e. representing a loss of 79 Rs. per
chest.143 Despite the perceived loss incurred by that particular merchant, it is crucial to
note that the real cost of Iranian opium was significantly lower than the real cost of the
Indian brands of opium.
Of course, one must be cautious with declarations made by merchants regarding
their expenses and their declared losses. It is indeed a well-known fact that the opium
trade in the 19th century was a highly-speculative trade given to highly-fluctuating prices
determined by a variety of difficult to foresee conditions. It is also true that many opium
merchants of various nationalities indeed went bankrupt. Because of the time it took to
ship opium from Iran and India to China, prices could change significantly between the
time the opium chests were loaded in the Indian Ocean and the time they were unloaded
in China. Merchants could keep opium in storage and wait for the right opportunity to
load it and send it to China or London, but they could not do the same in China and
London after they already sent the opium. Thus, if the process were low upon arrival,
their agents were still forced to sell in order to recover at least some of the costs. At the
same time, it is also well-known that many merchants made a fortune in that market, and
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the examples are numerous. Only a meticulous research in the private papers of opium
merchants may reveal the real extent of expenses, profits and losses.144
But even if we accept this presentation of the FOB cost of opium chests in Iran,
clearly the only way to see profit in such business was to receive a better price on each
chest, and that could best be achieved by improving the quality of the opium sold. The
quality of Iranian opium – either good or bad – was referred to by various writers,
although it is difficult to point to any publication where this subject fared prominently.
There is plenty of evidence in historical documents discussing the quality of Iranian
opium, which testifies to the importance of this issue for contemporary consumers,
producers, merchants and pharmacists. However, in historiographical writing these
references are usually treated as anecdotal, except for an occasional discussion about the
economic problems caused by over-adulteration.145
Ahmad Seyf is the only scholar who dealt with the question of the quality of
opium itself in Iran, as a separate discussion alongside the question of adulteration.
According to Seyf, The quality of Iranian opium was poor in the 1850s and declined even
further way into the early 20th century. Seyf suggests that “On the one hand, widespread
adulteration of the opium destined for the Chinese market tended to reduce the price it
fetched there, whereas on the other hand, unchanging primitive methods of cultivation
and preparation meant that its quality was not improved and in most cases
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deteriorated.”146 This he bases mainly upon the declining prices of opium for export
throughout the second half of the 19th century. The argument rightly made here by Seyf is
that there is a connection between the quality of a mass-produced product like opium and
the existence of economic progress in Iran. The alleged deterioration in the quality of
Iranian opium is for Seyf proof for the distorted nature of opium production that actually
stalled Iran’s economic development instead of introducing progress.
When referred to opium, this argument is difficult for some scholars to accept,
since the production of “dangerous” drugs is normally perceived as a danger to society
not as a marker of economic progress. Nikki Keddie, for example, simply refused to even
discuss this possibility, faced with this stipulation about the positive role of opium in the
Iranian economy.147 However, notwithstanding moralistic objections to opium production
and consumption, the historical evidence shows that the quality of Iranian opium did
indeed improve in the second half of the 19th century, an improvement that could not
have happened without the spread of modern scientific knowledge in Iran, a phenomenon
which in itself is a signifier of social and economic development.
The quality of opium is established upon a large variety of categories, some of
them are objective characteristics and some are more subjective. Since opium is not a
simple product but an array of products used for different purposes, various opium
products may receive different evaluations even if the basic source material – hardened
dross of the opium-poppy flower – is similar. Objective categories may include details
146
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such as the morphine content, the purity of the mixture, the amount of adulterating
substances, the quality of the packaging, the existence of plant leftovers, moisture level
etc. Subjective categories may include odor, taste, after-taste, sweetness, sharpness etc.
Iranian opium was marketed in two main forms: Smoking opium and Medicinal opium.
Persian Smoking opium, or prepared opium, was exported mainly to China as a slightly
moist mass divided and packed in a variety of sizes and shapes. Medicinal opium,
intended for use in the preparation of pharmacopeia, was exported to Europe and the US
as either a moist mass, similar to smoking opium, or as dried powder. Smoking opium
was a processed mixture of opium and other materials such as oil and fruit juices with a
morphine content of about 7%. Pharmaceutical opium was a purer product with hardly
any adulterants boasting a morphine content of up to 13%.148
The discovery of morphine in the early years of the 19th century was a most
welcomed development among everyone in the medical professions. Until the 19th
century there was no method to tell the difference between various opium products. This
was not simply a business issue, but an important medical one. With no understanding of
the compound nature of opium there was no way to know how much opium should be
prescribed to a given patient.149 The discovery of morphine changed that and gave
doctors and pharmacists a standard by which the strength of the medicine could be
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controlled and designed for the needs of the patient. However, up until the 20th century
producing morphine was not a simple process and it required expensive equipment that
was only available in well-equipped scientific laboratories or large factories. Morphine in
its pure form remained expensive and unobtainable for most patients who continued to
use various forms of opium as a remedy for their ailments. For honest pharmacists and
doctors, knowing the percentage morphine in a given sample of opium became a crucial
issue and pharmacological literature from the 19th century is filled with laboratory
analysis of samples taken from leading opium brands in the market and various methods
designed to assist the pharmacist to establish the morphine percentage of the opium
supply in his shop.150
There are no reports on the quality of Persian Opium from the 1850s and early
1860s, but according to all testimonies it was of poor quality. Ronald Thomson, the
British Chargé d'affaires in Tehran, reports in May 1869 that Persian Opium improved
significantly during the previous decade. He reports about variations in quality between
regions, with the Caspian provinces producing the worst kind of opium, Khorasan, Yazd,
and Isfahan producing average quality of 7-10% and Kerman and Kashan producing the
best opium with 12-13% morphine content.151 A year earlier, the first reference to Persian
opium appears in the Proceedings of the American Pharmaceutical Association. A lab
report about various samples of Persian opium finds 8-10% morphine in the high-quality
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samples and 5-6% morphine in the low-quality samples.152 A report in the British
Pharmaceutical Journal and Transactions from 1875-6 reports that in the 1860s Persian
opium used to yield 5-8% of morphine, but recent specimens were found to contain 10%
morphine.153 As a result, the prices attracted by Persian opium improved accordingly.
While in the 1860s Persian opium would sell for 250-350$HK per chest, by 1879 Persian
opium sold in the Hong-Kong market for 450-520$HK per chest.154
The low quality of Persian Opium in the early years of modernized production
was the result of two factors: first, the actual low percentage of morphine in the raw
opium collected from the poppy fields; and, second, the massive adulteration of foreign
materials during the preparation process. The adulteration of opium is not necessarily an
act of fraud, because “opium” was indeed a processed product and adding flavors and
stabilizers to the mixture was considered a required expertise not a fraudulent act.155 Of
course, when some merchants took advantage of this fact to increase the amount of
adulterants and lowered the amount of raw opium in the mixture, the Chinese buyers
reacted with a severe backlash and rejected entire shipments of Iranian opium, forcing the
producers and merchants to improve the product significantly.156
Iranian opium improved even further by the 1890s. Meticulous lab tests
conducted in India in specimens of Persian opium revealed that it was superior to Patna
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opium in every respect. Not only had its morphine content of 11-13% surpassed the 5%
on average of Patna opium, but its consistency was over 90% while the consistency of
Patna opium was merely 75%. The report finds the higher prices fetched by Persian
opium wholly justified. According to the report the Bengali opium to the Persian opium
is “as a glass of port to a glass of gin or as a Havana cheroot to a Burma”. To further
impress the superiority of the samples of Iranian opium over the Indian ones, the report
states that there is “no reason to try to imitate the Persian drug. It would be difficult, if
not impossible, to manufacture all the Bengal opium to a standard 90%”.157
Iranian opium was successful even in the face of the growing place of Chinesegrown opium in the China, since, as explained by Zheng Yangwen, imported goods
carried a particular attraction for Chinese consumers who considered them exotic markers
of good taste and affluence.158 Iranian opium was making a similar impression in the
European markets, and a report from 1884 details that for the first time Iranian opium
was sold in European markets for better prices than Turkish opium from the Ottoman
Empire, which was the leading brand in those markets for generations.159 The analysis of
Table 2, which details the opium prices in the early 1890s clearly shows that at its best,
Iranian opium fetched the best prices in the market. The enormous difference between the
prices in 1891 and 1894-85 can be attributed to a momentary crisis of trust when overadulterated opium from Iran was discovered and rejected in China, pushing down the
price of all opium coming from Iran.
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Table 2: Opium Prices of Various Brands of Opium in China, 1890-1895160

1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895

Behar
New
479
515
474
498
500
610
551
611
617
839
720
864

Old
487
504
480
508
507
641
543
586
633
706
728

Benares
New
478
514
454
489
479
630
544
616
602
830
713

871

842

Old
476
481
45
497
489
639
538
635
625
694
708

Malwa
New
500
525
490
497
496
541
520
607
591
684
684

881

708

Old
520
544
517
532
528
559
535
624
611
704
714

Persian
New
456
500
297
445
281
434
419
545
554
739
707

Old
418
508
297
410
273
440
396
584
581
807
767

742

757

803

(All prices in HK Dollars. Ranges represent maximum and minimum
points in the market throughout the year.)
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The increasing quality of Iranian opium can certainly be attributed to the talent
and entrepreneurship of the peasants, but It is only logical to conclude that scientific
knowledge and high-level of agricultural proficiency were also required in order to raise
the morphine content in the opium poppies growing in Iran, though only indirect
evidence exists in this respect. In one report it is mentioned in passing that agents from
France have occasionally been sent to Iran to collect samples of opium for testing.161
Thus, it is possible that this connection may have included a transfer of agricultural
knowledge back to Iran, but no additional information suggests that this was the case. In
any case, Iranian cultivators rightly deserve the credit for this achievement which should
not be taken for granted. Pharmaceutical journals from the 19th century are abundant with
reports about attempts to develop opium poppy cultivation in European countries or in
the US, but although some of those small-scale experiments yielded excellent results,162
similar success in large-scale cultivation projects was never realized.163
Additionally, a botanist from the Government of the United Provinces in
Allahabad requested the British Legation in Tehran for a sample of poppy seeds from
various regions in Iran since he heard that they yield higher morphine-content than the
Indian variety. He was answered that the difference in morphine-content stem from the
method of cultivation rather than the biological variation.164 A noteworthy aspect of this
161
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One report from 1870 even mentions an experiment in Tennessee that yielded opium of 20% morphine
content, although with only limited amounts of opium actually produced successfully. PoAPA, 1870.
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Even today, opium-poppy cultivators for the legal market who use the poppy-straw method, produce
opium of very low morphine content, although they rely on mechanized picking and processing which
makes the collection process more cost-efficient.
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process was the fact that the improvement in the quality of Iran’s opium took place in
various places around the country, which meant that there was an efficient way for
knowledge to spread throughout Iran even though links between different parts of the
country – even if they were in the same region - were in a poor condition.165 The best
opium in Iran was produced in the Yazd and Kerman regions, and specialists from these
regions were hired by merchants and landowners to teach cultivators in other provinces to
produce opium. Since the improvement in the quality of Iranian opium represent an
improvement throughout the country, the necessary knowledge for such quality
production must have reached even the most remote regions of Iran. Thus, inadvertently,
poppy cultivation and opium production became a vehicle for promoting scientific
knowledge necessary for economic development in other fields as well.
Dismissing the success of Iran’s opium business, under the assumption that opium
is a product with extraordinary appeal for the consumers that does not follow the normal
rules of supply and demand, is not only incorrect and unsustainable but also unjustifiably
dismissive of the efforts and achievements of Iran’s cultivators and merchants and their
successful promotion of Iran’s opium business in the face of fierce competition. Although
it is true that very often cash crops bring instant revenues at the cost of long term
stagnation, this was not the case of opium in Qajar Iran. The production of opium
required the use of scientific knowledge and scientific methods previously unknown in
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Iran did not have any railway until the late stages of the 19th century and even then all that was built was
a short line around the capital city of Tehran. Main roads between major urban centers were few and
traveling was generally a risky business due to the fear of highwaymen and tribal robbers. Many villages
were located in remote disconnected areas with roads that did not even fit a horse-carriage or a bullock.
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Iran, the progress which they brought was apparent in the constant improvement in the
quality of Iranian opium within just a few decades in the mid-19th century.
Opium revenues may not have re-shaped the Iranian society and economy entirely
and cannot be credited with the creation of a middle class and burgeoning industrial
capitalism, but opium revenues were certainly not used as a modern tool in the hands of
the pre-modern political and economic elite to strengthen its power at the expense of the
oppressed lower classes. This would have been true if opium could have been considered
as a sort of economic rent, in the sense that it required very little investment; very few
people were actually employed in the production process, and; if most of the income
generated was received by property-owners who played no productive role. If this was
the case, the impact of opium on the economy of Qajar Iran could have been understood
as similar to that of oil in 20th century oil-producing states, especially in the Persian Gulf
region. However, opium in the 19th century was no rent and Qajar Iran was certainly not a
rentier state: The production process was highly labor-intensive, and, not only was the
government not the major beneficiary of the opium revenues but even the large
merchants who were active in the market could not control it entirely, let alone achieve a
monopoly. In fact, the Iranian opium market was very welcoming to new investors of
various financial resources who wished to take part in this booming business.
Therefore, it is safe to stipulate that the productive sectors in Iran – in and of
themselves – experienced growth and progress during the second half of the 19th-century.
There is also enough evidence to show that the results of this progress were felt by large
sectors of the society, not simply the ruling elites and the large landowners. Despite being
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a major cash crop in Qajar Iran, opium was not the only cash crop and its cultivation in
Iran was far from being a monoculture, unlike cotton in Egypt or sugar in the Caribbean
Islands. The cultivation of opium-poppies and the production of opium in Iran did not
serve foreign interests and was not part of an exploitative capitalist arrangement. In fact,
the British Empire actively tried to block the Iranian opium trade which was in direct
competition over the Chinese market with British-controlled Indian opium. This leads to
the conclusion that when analyzing the economic instability in Iran by the end of the 19th
century more emphasis should be put on the personal incompetence in the government
and its staunch refusal to undertake comprehensive reform than just on the external
pressures by foreign powers.
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SECTION 2
CHAPTER 5
By the end of the 19th century, Iran’s opium business was established as one of
the most important sectors of its economy. Considered by users a product of the highest
quality, it attracted the best prices in the Asian markets. The opium revenues which
poured into Iran enriched many merchants and were the main source of income for an
entire class of peasants, workers, agents, transporters, retailers etc. The customs exacted
from exported opium were, by that period, 80-90 percent of all annual customs collected
by the kingdom. As observed in the previous chapters, the government was not only
aware of the success of the Iranian opium abroad, it also actively encouraged the
expansion of its cultivation at home and some high-ranking officials were themselves
actively involved in the production and trade of opium. Despite this, the government had
actually very little control over the opium business and its management. Iran’s was
certainly a far cry from the monopolist system developed by the East India Company in
the eastern regions of the Indian subcontinent, and not even the indirect control through
duties that operated in the western regions of the subcontinent. The smaller role of the
government in the opium market meant a smaller share in the revenues which was of
course very attractive for merchants who traded with Iranian opium, because it
guaranteed them higher profits.
Nevertheless, the last decade of the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th
century saw two important developments that forced a change in the Iranian
government’s policy. The first was the growing financial problems of Iran, which
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exacerbated by the end of the 19th century. Like other countries whose currency remained
on a silver standard after the 1870s, when almost all the Industrialist European Powers
and the US moved to a gold standard, Iran suffered a growing depreciation of its
currency. The treasury was burdened by loans taken under outrageous terms by the court
from foreign banks, and in order to pay the returns the government had to sell assets,
bureaucratic positions and granted concessions for foreigners for mere pittance that was
paid directly to the Shah. In their attempts to find new sources of income, both prerevolutionary and post-revolutionary governments of Iran eyed the enormous revenues of
the opium sector as a great potential for increased revenues for the government. But in
order to improve the collection of duties, taxes and custom, the government had to first
gain a certain amount of control over its production and trade.
Another important development was the intensification of the suspicion and
resentment towards opium consumption in Europe and China. This materialized by the
end of the 19th century into strong political movements that pressed world governments to
control the global opium trade which fed what became to be perceived as a global
epidemic of opium addiction. The Iranian government, including the Shah, was probably
aware of the rise in opium consumption and held a somewhat negative appreciation of the
habit. The international anti-opium campaign was at least familiar to Iranians who visited
Europe and the US and certainly those who studied in European Universities for longer
periods of time. Until the end of the 19th century the Iranian government either
disregarded if not completely ignored these developments. But as the 20th century
unfolded Iran found itself in a world that attributed great significance for these issues
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which in turn forced Iran to take into consideration the new trend against opium and
develop its own “opium policy”.
All the same, the government had to gain some form of control over the market of
opium marketing in order to be able to regulate the consumption of opium. Weaving
together these parallel developments, this chapter will provide a nuanced understanding
of the various forces and interests that shaped Iran’s opium policy in the early decades of
the 20th century, and follow Iran’s opium business as it entered a transitional period in
which the government attempts to abandon its laissez-faire policy towards opium and
move to a position of control and regulation. It is a period in which the dynamics of the
opium production and trade became more and more determined by the economic
problems of Iran and the social impact of the opium consumption, both in Iran and in the
world at large.
I.

Production and Trade at the Turn of the Century
The production of opium in Iran reached a certain plateau by the 1890s and its

expansion subsided or at least slowed down significantly. From the available information
it appears that the maximum annual production capacity of opium in Iran during that
period was between 8,000-10,000 chests or between 550-680 metric tons. The statistics
show variations in the reported output on different years, but those stem probably from
crop failures due to late frosts in April, prolonged droughts or plagues of blight, but the
maximum of just around 10,000 chests was not crossed.166 In fact, this quantity of opium

166

See a summary report on the trade of Iran in 1908, in which a merchant is quoted saying that the export
of opium has declined somewhat in recent years from its previous level of 8,000-12,000 chests annually
due to new limitations on the import of opium in China. NAI/FD/Secret-E/March 1909/No. 147-155. In
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continued to represent the potential of Iranian opium production through the first half of
the 20th century as well.167 At the same time, as mentioned in the previous chapter, a
significant improvement in the quality of Persian opium was noted. A chemical analysis
of Persian opium samples conducted in 1896 by Surgeon-Major A. R. W. Sedgefield, the
Factory Superintendent and Opium Examiner of the Benares Opium Agency in Ghazipur,
revealed that Persian opium, whether purchased in the Persian Gulf or in China, had a
very high consistency of 90% on average. Reportedly, the standard consistency of Bihar
and Benares opium during that period was 75% and 71% respectively.168
One probable explanation for the high-quality of the opium from Iran is that
adulteration of processed opium – a normal trait in the processing of opium – was
reduced to a minimum, which means that it is possible that acreage devoted for poppycultivation still expanded during that period, even though the output appears to
stagnating. Another possibility is that more attention was devoted for the production of
higher-quality opium at the expense of expanding the poppy-cultivation areas. During the
1890s the price of Persian opium doubled and even tripled, which made it one of the most
expensive brands of opium in the Far East markets, thus clearly making quality more
that same year, the Iranian delegation reported to the Shanghai Opium Commission that annual production
of opium in Iran stands at about 10,000 piculs. USNA/RG 43.2.9/Entries 34-36/Box 1 [International Opium
Commission, Shanghai, Vol. 2, Report of the Delegations], pp. 317-318. Unfortunately, statistical data
from other British official sources varies in quality. Until the 1890s reports from Iran focused on
production in general, but reports from 1890-1910 focus mostly on export from Bushehr, and mostly on the
value of the opium export in pound sterling rather than its quantity. However, without additional
information about the prices per chest or per lbs. of Iranian opium in the relevant year, it is impossible to
tell how much opium was produced, even though the general impression from the data shows that it is
within the same framework of revenue from the adjacent periods before and after.
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See for example a survey of opium exports and an estimate of production between 1910-1925, in
“Report to the Council”, League of Nations – Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in
Persia, p. 42.
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profitable than quantity for the merchants.169 Production in Iran remained similarly stable
in the early 1900s despite the many upheavals of that decade (See Table 3). Production
remained more influenced by unexpected weather than the events of the Constitutional
Revolution, the political tension in the capital, the deposition of the Shah, the civil war
and the elections for the Majlis.
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Table 3: Opium Production in Iran, 1906-1925170
(In Chests of Opium)

170

Year

Total
Export from
Production Bushehr

1906-07

4300

2126

1907-08

3000

1908-09

2772

1909-10

1217

1910-11

542

1911-12

1554

1912-13

1900

1913-14

5137

1914-15

5834

1915-16

5327

1916-17

5118

1917-18

4997

1918-19

2435

1919-20

2163

1920-21

2435

1921-22

1705

1922-23

4404

1923-24

4606

1924-25

7182

NAI/FD/Secret-E/October 1907/No. 112-121; NAI/FD/Secret-E/July 1910/no. 292-294;
NAI/FD/Secret-I/March 1914/No. 17-18; “Report to the Council”, League of Nations – Commission of
Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia, p. 42.
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The first evidence which testifies that a change in the laissez-faire policy towards
opium was considered by at least some in the Iranian government is an affair that took
place in 1890. Henry Drummond-Wolff, the British ambassador in Tehran, reported the
Foreign Ministry early on April 1890 that he was informed by the Amin-i Sultan about
negotiations that were taking place between the Iranian government and the legendary
Jewish-Russian banker and railway magnate Lazar Poliyakov to grant him a concession
to establish an opium monopoly in Iran. This was during the early stages of the internal
strife in Iran which brewed around the Tobacco concession, which was granted to the
British Major Talbot and was just announced in the previous month. In its constant
attempt to balance between Britain and Russia, the two great Powers competing for
influence in Iran as part of the larger strategic competition known as “The Great Game”,
this can be seen as an attempt by the Shah’s government to satisfy the Russians, who
were no doubt angered by the Tobacco concession granted to a British citizen.
This caused some anxiety among the British representatives. Had the Russians
receive a monopoly on Iran’s opium business it would have enabled them to set foot and
receive some influence in the Persian Gulf, from where most of the opium was exported,
a presence the British were unwilling to suffer and were determined to prevent. In
addition, but of lesser importance, several British opium merchants were bound to lose
some of their business. In their attempt to thwart the move, the British Legation in Tehran
began organizing a coordinated action with the embassies of other European Powers in
Tehran to confront the Government of Iran on that subject. Ironically, in the hasty British
correspondence that ensued, the argument was raised that an opium concession of that
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sort might be a violation of the Turkmanchai Treaty, an argument the Russians
themselves raised in protest against the Tobacco Regie later that year.
However, just a week later the Amin-i Sultan informed Sir Drummond-Wolff that
no opium concession would be granted, which raises the suspicion that the Iranian
government was merely trying to test and see the British response for such a move
although a serious proposition was not really discussed.171 Poliyakov himself eventually
received a concession to establish a bank in Iran and he founded the Russian Loan and
Development Bank in 1891, which together with the British Imperial Bank of Persia
monopolized banking in Iran for several decades until a national bank was established by
Reza Shah’s government. He also received the concession to build the railway between
Bandar-i Anzali and Tehran, though this concession did not materialize.
A long-term commercial development that began in the same decade was the
growing importance of the Japanese-controlled markets for Iranian opium, parallel to the
expansion of the Japanese Empire. China ceded the island of Taiwan (Formosa) to Japan
in 1895 as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the Sino-Japanese war of 1894.
Following its takeover, the Japanese government first banned the use of opium in the
island, but quickly changed its policy and declared a government monopoly on all opium
sales in the colony. Iranian opium quickly became the most popular brand of opium on
the island, and a British report from 1896 shows that the vast majority of the Iranian
opium that arrived in Hong-Kong was later transshipped to Taiwan. The report speculates
that since Iranian opium was more consistent and rich with morphine, it allowed the
171
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practice of multiple usages of the opium by mixing the ashes of the burned opium with
some fresh opium, something that could not be done with the less consistent and less
potent brands of Indian opium, a characteristic that no doubt appealed to the poor
laboring population of Taiwan.172 Noticing the popularity of the opium from Iran, a
representative of the Japanese government of Taiwan named Mr. Iyanaga was sent in
1899 to the Middle East to survey the opium producing areas in Iran and began
discussions in Tehran to negotiate a Commercial Treaty between Iran and Japan, a
proposition that was happily received in Iran.173
Japan’s role in Iran’s opium business intensified in the decades that followed as
the position of Iranian opium as the leading brand in Taiwan became more and more
established. A new route of export was set for Iranian opium intended for that market
through Singapore, where it was transshipped directly to Taiwan, and it was no longer
sent first to Hong-Kong.174 In 1909 it was reported that Mitsui, the great Japanese trade,
banking, mining and industry conglomerate, was purchasing enormous amounts of
Iranian opium annually.175 In 1914, a report from the British Consul-General in Isfahan,
John Lorimer, confirmed that a destination shift indeed occurred in Iran, following the
Chinese ban on opium imports that became effective in 1912, and Iranian opium was
mainly shipped to either London or Japan and Japanese-controlled areas in East Asia.176
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This cooperation continued well into the 1920s and 1930s, as Japan became the most
important unofficial trade ally of Iran.177
Parallel to the commercial development of the Iranian opium trade, the anti-opium
ideology was gaining more and more support and political power around the world. The
notion that opium smoking is a vile and dangerous habit and therefore the global opium
trade should be stopped, gained more and more international support, a process that was
bound to impact Iran. The growing rates of opium consumption in Iran itself could also
no longer be ignored. But let us first review the development of opium consumption in
Iran.
II.

“Traditional” methods of opium Consumption in Iran
As the production of opium underwent a comprehensive process of modernization

in the second half of the 19th century, the consumption of opium in Iran had gone through
a significant change of its own at the same time. As mentioned above, opium was
consumed in Iran in a variety of forms and formats for many centuries if not millennia:
Small pills of processed opium simply called taryak or afyun; Kuknar, which is a sort of a
fermented opium drink; simple tea made of boiled opium powder or boiled poppy pods;
and other opium concoctions. The alcoholic opium tincture known as Laudanum, so
popular in Europe in the early-modern period, was not as popular in Iran due to Islamic
limitations on the consumption of alcohol. Generally speaking there was a correlation
between the form of the opium consumed and the purpose for which it was consumed.
177

Numerous sources report that Japanese ships were involved in large-scale smuggling operations of
Iranian Opium to East Asia during the 1920s and 1930s, sometimes carrying as much as 100 metric tons of
opium on board.
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Pills were eaten mostly for health purposes, while opium tea and opium wine were
consumed more as recreational and leisure activities. People suffering from fever, pain,
diarrhea etc. would consume small pills of opium to address their sickness for the
duration of their sickness.
Based on our modern medical knowledge and our understanding of the reasons
and causes of diseases, we might say that the consumption of opium in one of those cases
merely alleviated the symptoms of the disease, but did not address the cause of the
disease itself, which may have been bacteria or a virus, or malfunction of an internal
organ etc. However, with the lack of this type of knowledge opium was a powerful
remedy that appeared to solve the “problem”. Many, usually men over the age of forty,
who did not suffer from any disease in particular, consumed opium regularly in small
daily doses as a general remedy for good health.178 Opium tea, which can be easily
brewed by dissolving powdered opium or a piece of opium mass in boiling water with or
without the addition of tea leaves, was drunk at the end of meals or by itself as an
accompaniment for meetings with family, friends or business associates. The fermented
opium brew, kuknar, was prepared by specialists and was consumed in mostly leisure
settings like the Chai-Khaneh (tea shop) or the Caravan-serai (a travelers’ road inn).
Still, this “division of labor” between health and pleasure was far from being
strict, and the line between them in that context cannot be simply defined. This point is
often not easily accepted since our contemporary society tends to separate pleasure from
health when it comes to drugs. The attempt to classify opium consumption in pre-modern
178
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Iran according to a strict separation between consumption for medical purposes and
pleasure represents an anachronistic outlook based on the popular perception of drugs
under our current prohibitionist regime. However, unlike the current perception of drug
consumption as either medicinal or recreational (but not both!), up until the late Qajar
period Iranians viewed the consumption of opium as a medical remedy accompanied by
pleasure or as a pleasure with healthy virtues. The strict separation between the two
simply did not exist. It is not unlike the medical recommendations often made regarding
the health benefits of moderate consumption of red wine and dark chocolate,179 thus
allowing moderate consumption of wine and chocolate to be perceived by consumers as
not only enjoyable but also healthy.
The second half of the 19th century saw some significant changes in the
consumption of opium in Iran, in terms of the amounts of opium dedicated for local
consumption;180 in terms of the social expanse of consumption, and; in terms of the
formats of the opium consumed. Of course, one must take this sort of declaration with a
grain of salt since comparing the consumption of opium in Iran before mid-19th century
and after it, cannot be made on equal terms. Although a substantial amount of
quantitative data regarding the production and export of Iranian opium from the second
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The health sections of newspapers and TV shows all over the world are notorious for reporting
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half of the 19th century onward exists, most of the quantitative references and qualitative
information regarding opium consumption during the same period relies mostly on
estimates and personal impressions reported by travelers and other visitors, which leaves
a large margin for possible errors. Even the 1926 report of the League of Nations’ (LON)
Enquiry Commission sent to Iran to examine the production of opium in the country,
points out that “it is practically impossible to give any figures for internal consumption”,
and mentions that numbers like 20, 30 and even 50 percent were frequently suggested.181
As for the period that preceded the 1850s, we do not even have quantitative estimates but
merely passing comments by visitors about the habits of the local population.182 Although
there is no particular reason to doubt that indeed a rise in the consumption of opium did
occur in Iran during the second half of the 19th century, one must keep in mind the lack of
accurate and conclusive information.
III.

Quantitative Rise in Opium Consumption
Despite the absence of statistical data about opium production pre-1850, it may be

possible to deduce the rise in consumption of opium in Iran from the existing
information. First, we know that most of the opium produced in Iran until the 1850s was
meant for local consumption. Although there are some indications that small quantities of
Iranian opium were exported to other countries and even other continents already before
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“Report to the Council”, League of Nations – Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in
Persia. Geneva: Publications of the League of Nations Geneva, December 1926. p. 42.
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See the testimonials of several European travelers who visited Iran in the early parts of the 19th century
portraying a picture of mostly benign consumption of opium throughout the country, in Matthee, The
Pursuit of Pleasure, 207-210.
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the 1850s, it is quite clear that it was only a small part of Iran’s production.183 It is
probably safe to assume that almost all the opium produced in Iran up until the 1850s was
also consumed locally. As mentioned before, the report of Mr. G. Lucas from 1879 that
estimates the annual production of opium in Iran in 1859 at 39,000 lbs., or 300 chests of
opium, is quite a reasonable one. In addition, it probably represents more or less the
average annual production of opium throughout the first half of the 19th century, which
was more or less static.184 Almost all of those 300 chests most probably represent the
annual consumption of opium in Iran during that period.
The same report estimates the annual Iranian production by the end of the 1870s
stood at 6,500 chests of opium, out of which about one-sixth - or approx. 1100 chests was dedicated for the local market.185 This number represents an increase of between
three-to-five-fold in local consumption of opium since the 1850s. According to an earlier
report by Ronald Thompson, production in Iran in the year 1869 was about 15,500 man-e
shah which is approx. 1500 chests of opium. Of that amount he estimated that 600-700
man-e shah, which is approx. 60 chests of opium, are dedicated for the local market.186
Although the increase in the production is consistent with the later report by Lucas, the
apparent drop in the consumption does not appear compatible. Thompson may have been
mistaken about his evaluation of the local market. If we speculate that he mistakenly
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quoted local consumption as 600-700 man-e shah187 instead of chests, we can see that
this figure is compatible with the growth of consumption according to the later Lucas
report. Alternatively, if we assume that Thompson was correct we might be able to argue
that the profits from exported opium were so lucrative that merchants preferred exporting
opium rather than selling it in the local market. Very similarly, merchants preferred
during the exact same period to export wheat rather than distribute it in the local markets.
Later reports from the region stressed that consumption in Iran, however, was expanding
even further. A 1909 report from the Gulf region by Major Percy Cox, argued that
consumption in Iran was rising still, and reached a third of the entire annual production.
Cox went further to suggest that the expansion of production in Iran in the future might
not be for the purpose of export, but to satisfy the growing demand in the local market.188
How should this expansion in consumption be explained and understood? For
many people the answer is quite simple, so simple that it needs no spelling out. The mere
existence of increasing amounts of opium in the market increases the consumption. The
more opium a country produces or imports - the higher the consumption of opium in that
country will be. Yet, though this argument is accepted as common knowledge it is in fact
more counter-intuitive than it might appear. First, the connection between mere existence
in the market and increased consumption requires a certain “leap of faith” that is both
unnecessary and unjustified. To claim that the mere existence of opium in the market
somehow causes people to purchase forces one to assume some mystical impact of the
product on people’s mind. This mystical connection is not even directly connected to the
187
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question of addiction, since it is common to believe that even people who are not
addicted to opium in a society where more opium becomes present in the market will
become addicted. But this irrational explanation is not necessary since there are many
other ways to explain the popularization and commercial success of products in a given
market than simply their existence in it. For example, products may be liked by people of
fame and later popularized among their admirers; products may gain fame by word of
mouth; successful marketing campaigns might convince many people to buy a certain
product. All those arguments explain how knowledge about a product is gained and
translated into desire which translates into consumption.
More importantly, the existing quantitative and qualitative data is sufficient to
supply a more reasonable explanation for the rise of opium consumption in Iran. As
mentioned above, the collapse of Iran’s manual industries and the replacement of their
products with imported industrial goods triggered a shift in Iran’s economy towards the
production of cash crops. Gad Gilbar argues that this development had a positive effect
on the peasants’ income, and he brings several examples of evidence which demonstrate
the improved conditions of the peasants. According to Gilbar “there are various pieces of
evidence to show that peasants in many areas had a more diversified daily diet,
consuming commodities which they could have hardly afforded before. Sugar, tea,
tobacco and opium are perhaps the best examples of articles which peasants consumed in
large quantities in the late 19th century.”189
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The rise in the consumption of opium is thus not dissimilar to the rise in
consumption of other goods like sugar and tea. What was previously an unaffordable rare
luxury for most people became suddenly abundant and affordable for a large segment of
the population. No doubt, the consumption of opium was also a marker of social status
dependent upon such details as the quality of the opium consumed, the method of
consumption, the paraphernalia used, and the social setting in which it is consumed, all
reflected a specific social status. Referring to the increase in the consumption of opium as
a semi-mystical phenomenon is not only unscientific but also ignores the economic
context that provides the more simple and sensible explanation. In any case, despite the
slightly ambiguous information regarding the exact amounts of opium produced in Iran, it
is clear that local consumption of opium was rising as the 19th century unfolded, and it
continued to rise even as the growth in the production of opium moderated and subsided.
Clearly, these parallel developments meant that the importance of the internal market for
the producers gradually increased.
IV.

From Eating to Smoking
Beyond the mere increase of consumption in gross terms there was a change in

the patterns of consumption in Iran. The most notable of all was the spread of opium
smoking. Opium smoking itself was first introduced into China in the 17th century by
Dutch traders from Java who soaked tobacco in boiled opium and called it madak. Madak
was popular in the coastal regions of south China, but it was banned in 1729 by the
Imperial Government, fearing that the congregation of madak smokers was really a
meeting place for heretics and political conspirators. The import and use of pure opium
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for medicinal purposes, however, remained legal and thus very quickly many in China
turned to smoking pure opium and continued to do so even after the smoking of pure
opium was banned as well. Opium smoking became very popular in China and among
Chinese communities in East Asia, and later it spread to other communities throughout
Asia.190
It is generally agreed that opium smoking was late to arrive in Iran, although there
is no conclusive evidence that explains the circumstances in which this habit took hold in
the country. Several sources point to the particularly high number of opium-smokers in
the eastern regions of Khorasan and Kerman and suggest that it might mean that opium
smoking arrived first to those regions, being the first stop of merchant caravans and
pilgrims from East Asia.191 However, this general explanation is insufficient because it
would have made the same sense if the smoking of opium had spread in Iran from the
southern port cities of Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Khoramshar, bustling trade centers
with passing merchants and travelers from all over Asia. Though there is no conclusive
information regarding the beginning of opium smoking in Iran, it is clear though the by
the second half of the 19th century it was already quite popular there and its popularity
grew as the consumption of opium in Iran expanded in general. Still, this does not mean
that opium-eating disappeared. Older men continued to consume their daily dosage of
opium pills, but some consumers ate opium for leisure purposes as well. In fact opiumeating was still very common in Iran very much into the 20th century and at least one
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report points out that opium eating became mildly popular during a period in which the
tax on opium for smoking was raised.192
V.

Social Expansion of Opium Consumption
Another important pattern change was the expansion of opium consumption to

new groups in the population who did not consume it before. Although opium-eating was
not particularly limited to a specific social group in Iran, up until the 19th century it was
mostly consumed by men of a certain status mainly for medical purposes. During the
Safavid period it was consumed as a drug of pleasure mostly by courtiers, intellectuals
and dervishes in a variety of formats and concoctions. There was no special limit on the
consumption of the drug beyond those circles but it was either not particularly popular by
the general population or simply too expensive. By the mid-19th century this changed
dramatically as opium smoking spread to almost every corner of Iran and was smoked by
almost anyone, including young, old, men, women and children – everyone smoked
opium. With the successful transition of Iran from subsistence economy to cash-crop
economy, the peasants’ income increased significantly which gave them the opportunity
to purchase new items, to save money and to consume a larger variety they could not
consume before, among them was opium. E. G. Browne recounts in his travelogue
numerous encounters with opium smokers of all sorts and classes, among them carriage
drivers, lower-rank clerks, merchants and intellectuals.193
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In fact, opium became so popular that in many Tea-Houses where opium was
smoked by groups of men as part of their social pastime, the owners used to collect the
remains of the smoked opium and the used water of the water-pipes where opium was
smoked and prepare a concentrated opium drink called shireh-ye sokhte. This highly
potent potion was consumed mainly by the poor who could not afford to buy real opium,
which is a further indication to the growing popularity of opium even among the poorest
classes. Women were also avid opium smokers, a fact that is repeatedly pointed out and
marveled at by foreign observers194 as it appeared to stand in such contrast to what was
considered by Europeans, and particularly English ones, the acceptable behavior of
women in the late Victorian Era. Respectable women, however, smoked opium at home
in family events or during visits of other female friends, and did not attend the TeaHouses who were mostly the domain of men.
VI.

International Opposition to Opium
It is clear though that with the rise of consumption, the general attitude in Iran

towards opium consumption gradually changed. This change of mood echoed the more
high-toned movement against opium in Europe and the US that culminated into powerful
social and political power groups that intensified their campaign against the non-medical
use of opium in the late 19th century. Negative attitudes towards the consumption of
opium for pleasure existed in Europe already in the Early-Modern period. Sensational
descriptions of licentious Orientals drinking exotic opium concoctions became widespread in early-modern Europe as travelogue literature gained popularity. Opium was of
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course a well known medication in Europe, especially in the form of Laudanum, but its
use for recreational purposes was not particularly noticed. But as the trading activity of
Europeans in East Asia intensified, and particularly the direct involvement of Europeans
in the opium trade, the use of opium as a drug of pleasure spread in Europe, accompanied
by questions of morality.
By the end of the 18th century Europeans became well-aware that the recreational
consumption of opium was not limited to Orientals but also among Europeans
themselves. The intellectuals and the artists of the Romantic Era were enchanted by
Oriental cultures which they identified as a source for the exotic, pure and authentic and
embraced what they imagined as the aesthetics and habits of their imagined Orient. One
notable example was Thomas De-Quincy’s descriptions of his opium-consumption in the
“Confessions of an English Opium-Eater” of which the mere insistence on the adjective
“English” in the title was probably meant to pre-empt the automatic association of opium
with “the Orient”.195 The highly-publicized scandalous opium consumption habits of the
Romantics strengthened the problematic image that opium already had in the West and in
fact reinforced the public opposition to opium.
This became an organized social and political movement throughout the 19th
century demanding a total global reorganization and restriction of the opium trade in
order to eliminate non-medical consumption of opium. Non-religious restrictions on the
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consumption of goods – mainly luxury goods, like coffee, sugar, cocoa, tobacco etc. –
were not a new phenomenon. Usually those restrictions were initiated by the political
elite of a given polity and their application reflected either the elite’s suspicion of
potential political opponents using luxuries to attract supporters, or (in the spirit of
mercantilism) fear that uncontrolled consumption of an imported luxury would cause a
potential specie drain that will lead to a financial crisis and other reasons such as that.196
Moral concerns about the alleged impact of some products on the consumers were also
often a driving force behind initiatives to ban this or that product, yet until the early
modern period these concerns were in-line with the same dynamic of elite anxieties about
keeping the masses under control.
The anti-opium political activism of the 19th-century represented a different kind
of dynamics in that it materialized social discomforts into a grass-root movement of the
people rather than sporadic actions of the ruling elite. The concerns about society’s
“moral fiber” originated within the community rather than forced upon it from above.
The anti-opium coalition included a wide range of individuals, groups and organizations
whose objection to opium was rooted in a variety of reasons of mostly a moral nature,
although very often not compatible with each other. For most of those who were against
opium in the West, opium was an evil substance like alcohol, the pleasure derived from
consuming it was suspicious and dangerous to the soul, and its consumers were corrupted
and enslaved to their perverted desires by their continuous consumption. In China, opium
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was the quintessential symbol of colonialism and exploitation, the substance that caused
China’s deterioration in every possible aspect: politically, economically and socially. For
Chinese nationalists opium was an evil substance used by evil foreign powers to help the
humiliation of China. Since the opium trade was one of the cornerstones of the British
colonialist enterprise in India, for many in England and other European countries there
was a strong connection between the opposition to the opium trade and their opinion of
the colonies and the way they were managed. Some believed that colonialism was a noble
mission of the West and the opium trade was a shameful stain on this otherwise positive
cause. Others, who were opposed to Colonialism altogether, held that the opium trade
reveals the evil essence of the entire colonialist project.
Above all that, the consumption of opium was identified by the general public in
Europe and the US with everything that was foreign, strange and exotic. Chinese
laborers, atheist doctors, flamboyant socialites, all considered morally suspicious and
threatening by the majority of mainstream citizens of Europe and the US.197 Indeed, the
smoking of opium was considered a vice even among the most notorious drug trading
agency in history, the East India Company. As Owen has shown, the directors of the
Company believed that although the smoking of opium was a deplorable vice, it was still
better for the greater good (as they saw it) to operate the opium trade responsibly by the
EIC’s monopoly than irresponsibly by other – less responsible – merchants. “Were it
possible to prevent the use of the drug altogether […] we would gladly do it in
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compassion to mankind; but this being absolutely impracticable, we can only endeavour
to regulate and palliate an evil which cannot be eradicated”.198
As the 19th century progressed, the various personalities, communities,
organizations and movements who were opposed to opium, gained more and more
political power and they made the question of opium, alongside the question of alcohol, a
major political issue. There was an important difference though between the anti-alcohol
activism and the anti-opium one, as the opposition to opium from a very early stage was
handled as a question of international politics. Unlike alcohol, which was locally
produced, highly familiar in every class of society and extensively used in Europe and the
US, opium was a foreign product that had to be imported from Asia and most of its users
were ultimately non-Europeans. While practically anyone can easily produce alcohol in
almost any environment, opium required an organized agricultural effort that took place
mostly in specific areas in Asia. The anti-opium efforts were thus focused first and
foremost on a drastic reduction of opium production and trade, particularly the
production and trade of Indian opium. Although anti-opium activists did not neglect
efforts to put legal restriction on the consumption of opium in Western countries, and
198

Court of Directors to the Governor-General in Council, 24 October 1817, Third Report, 1831, App. IV,
p. 11. Quoted in Owen, British Opium Policy in China and India, 103-04. This continued to be the position
of several British officials for many years. Notably, Sir Rutherford Alcock, who served in a variety of
diplomatic position in China and Japan from the 1840s till his retirement in 1870, maintained a consistent
dislike and moral disapproval towards the opium trade. However, he believed that curtailing the opium
trade was either undoable or carried to many economic dangers to both the British Empire and China.
According to Rutherford “no attempt of the British Government to stop or materially diminish the
consumption could possibly avail, or be otherwise than productive of aggravated mischief to India, to
China, and to the whole world, by giving a motive for its forced production where it is now unknown, and
throwing the trade into hands less scrupulous, and relieved of all those checks which under the British flag
prevent the trade from taking the worst characters of smuggling, and being confounded with other acts of a
lawless and piratical nature affecting life and property, to the destruction of all friendly or commercial
relations between the two races.” Alexander Michie, The Englishman in China During the Victorian Era,
as Illustrated in the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1900), 197.

133

indeed they had several successes already in the late 19th century, this effort was
secondary to the goal of global control of opium production and trade.
Political pressures in Britain finally led to the parliament’s approval in 1893 for
the establishment of a Royal Commission on Opium set up to investigate the opium trade
in Asia, the impact of the opium trade on India and the impact of opium consumption on
China. Surprisingly, the commission’s conclusions were that opium was not harmful to
Asians; that it was in fact analogous to the consumption of alcohol by Europeans, and;
that the Chinese claims about the harm of opium were mostly based on economic
concerns rather than medical evidence.199 However, the mere establishment of the
committee was in itself an official British recognition of the problematic moral standing
of the opium trade in general.
The acquisition of the Philippines by the US following the Spanish-American
War (1898) forced the US to deal with the question of what to do with the legal
arrangements for the opium trade in the Islands that it inherited from Spain. The Opium
Investigation Committee set up in 1903 by the governor of the Philippines to examine the
question of opium in the Islands recommended that the opium trade would become a
government monopoly, and the consumption of opium for non-medical use would be
prohibited.200

199

Paul Winther, Anglo-European Science and the Rhetoric of Empire: Malaria, Opium, and British Rule
in India, 1756-1895 (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2003); Owen, British Opium Policy in China and
India, 311-28.
200

United States. Philippine Commission. Opium Investigation Committee. et al., Report of the Committee
Appointed by the Philippine Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and the Traffic Therein and the
Rules, Ordinances and Laws Regulating Such Use and Traffic in Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, Hongkong,
Saigon, Singapore, Burmah, Java, and the Philippine Islands (Washington, DC: Govt. Print. Office, 1905).

134

These two reports, which received much international attention, set the stage for
the Shanghai Opium Commission of 1909. For the first time, representatives from a large
number of states - including most of the main drug-producing countries – convened
together, exchanged information and ideas about the opium question. This was a turning
point in the history of opium prohibition as it was the first international
acknowledgement that the drug problem should be engaged by international cooperation.
The key to the success of the Opium Commission was its inclusive format which helped
to secure the participation of the producing countries. Despite their intention to act during
the commission to minimize the losses they expected to incur as a result of curtailing the
lucrative market for smoking opium, they united by the basic agreement about the
dangers of non-medical use of opium and the need to contain its production and trade.201
Official representatives from nations all over the world convened again at The
Hague in 1912, this time to negotiate an official convention that would represent the
combined international effort to control and limit the production and trade all over the
world. The Opium Convention signed at The Hague in 1912 laid out a plan to accomplish
this goal gradually, allowing nations to make their own decision about their own drug
policy while pledging to comply with other states’ drug policies, i.e. producing countries
could still produce opium and export it to other countries, but they also committed to
actively prevent the export of opium from their ports to countries who had forbidden it.202
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Beyond the mere edicts of the convention itself, which reflected the negotiated balance
point between the various economic interests of the signatory nations, the importance of
the 1912 Opium Convention was that it set a 20th-century standard “code of behavior” for
nations who wanted to be part of the global family of nations. This was re-affirmed after
WWI, by the Treaty of Versailles and the establishment of the League of Nations, as
article 295 of the Treaty makes the signing and ratification of The Hague Convention part
and parcel of the Versailles Treaty, which practically made it a condition for becoming
members of the League of Nations.203
VII.

Early Negative Approaches Towards Opium in Iran

Like the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of drugs and alcohol represent
therefore historical victories of moral motivations over economic interests. However,
there is no doubt that the political power of moral concerns is stronger at times when the
economic importance of the activity deemed “immoral” is weakened, and stronger
alternatives arise. Slavery was crucial for the Southern states economic backbone in the
first half of the 19th century, but the rapid industrialization of the Northern states made
slavery less important for the Union’s economy. Along the same lines, the unlimited
production and trade of opium and opiatic drugs was directly and indirectly profitable
and beneficial for a large array of merchants, pharmaceutical companies, railroad
constructors who employed a large force of Chinese laborers etc. But the industrialization
of the late 19th-century and early 20th-century created new opportunities for trade and new
kinds of industrial production that required more skilled labor and for which intoxicated
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workers posed a threat.204 Thus, new economic ventures for which opium was not
necessary - and sometimes even a direct danger - indirectly enabled the moral and
ideological opposition to opium. It is, therefore, to be expected that a significant change
of the moral attitude towards opium would be a by-product of a significant economic
reform; and the opposite would be the by-product of continuity or stagnation in the
market structure.
While the demand for a major reform in the global opium trade became a major
political issue in Europe, China and the US, very little of it made an impact on Iran. The
history of drug prohibition shows that the prohibitionist drive was usually motivated by a
sense of threat, whether it was real, exaggerated or manipulated. This threat may be
constructed in many forms, whether it is military, political, economic, racial etc. At one
point, the disapproving attitude towards certain behaviors, habits or social activities,
becomes a prohibitory attitude as these activities begin to be perceived as dangerous and
threatening. In Iran, a certain change in mood towards opium consumption can be traced
in the sources towards the end of the 19th century, but it was considerably less intensive
as it was in the US and Europe. Up until the second half of the 19th century, most reports
show that Iranians had quite a comfortable approach towards the consumption of opium.
The French traveler Guillaume-Antoine Olivier, who traveled in the Middle East by the
turn of the 19th-century, reported that although opium consumption among Iranians was
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widespread, few people took it in excess. Other observers from later periods have noted
that the consumption of opium was prevalent among all ages, sexes and classes,205 which
means that the consumption of opium could not have been perceived as a fringe social
phenomenon as it is commonly perceived in our contemporary society.
Some sources suggest that there was a difference in the social perception of
opium-smoking as opposed to opium-eating. One source points out early in the 19thcentury that as opposed to opium-eating, opium-smoking is condemned by “public
morality” in Iran,206 which in itself is an indication that opium smoking was not
completely unknown in early 19th-century Iran, but also that on some level there was a
social discomfort towards opium even before the large expansion of opium production in
the country. Reports from the latter decades of the 19th century emphasize the devastating
effect of opium smoking as opposed to the benign effects of opium eating, suggesting
that opium smokers were looked upon negatively, disparaged even by the opiumeaters.207 It thus appears that there is something of an accumulation of sources that reveal
some similarities between the views of respectable people in Iran and Europe with
regards to opium consumption. Yet, since all those reports were made by European
observers they must be treated with caution, since even the most sympathetic observers
were highly influenced by the heated political debate about opium in Europe.
In his report on his one-year tour of Iran during 1887-1888, E. G. Browne
describes the opium habit of many people he met along the way, including his own
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adventures of opium-smoking. While describing his failed attempt to stop smoking opium
after a period of regular smoking, Browne comments:
“"After all," I had said to myself, "a great deal of exaggeration is current
about these things; for how few of those in England who talk so glibly about
the evils of opium-smoking, and waste their time and other people's money in
trying to put a stop to it, have any practical acquaintance at all with it; and, on
the other hand, how many of my friends here, when they feel depressed and
worried, or want to pass a quiet evening with a few congenial friends in
discussing metaphysics and ontology, indulge in an occasional pipe.”208
Note how Browne alludes to the European common perception of opium
consumption in the Orient while describing actual opium consumption in the
Orient, in what appears to be a remarkable – though tacit – critique of fantasy vis-àvis reality. Despite the negative conclusion about the physical dependency caused
by opium, the reader easily notes that the smoking of opium, portrayed by Browne,
is far from being the activity of hopeless misfits who smoke opium with their noless hopeless friends in a shady, decrepit den. Still, there is an undeniable sense of
discomfort with the consumption of opium by Iranians themselves as portrayed by
E.G. Browne in passing. One such case is the meeting Browne had with the postmaster at a small outpost outside of Shiraz who admits that he “occasionally
indulge in a pipe of tiryak when depressed in spirits” while consulting Browne
“about some disorder of the chest from which he was suffering”. Apologetically he
tells Browne “what else is there to do in this desolate spot where there is no society
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except these tribesmen?”209 Opium smoking is therefore not something to be proud
of, although it is also not something to be too particularly ashamed of.
At the height of the political dispute regarding the Tobacco Concession in the
early 1890s, the leading Shiite cleric of the time, Mirza Hassan Shirazi of Najaf,
published a religious edict in which he declared all tobacco in Iran unholy since it has
been handled by infidels and thus encouraged large segments of the population to refrain
from smoking it, which was one of the most important political moves of the famous
Tobacco Protest.210 In an attempt to repeal the edict, Nasr al-Din Shah wrote the cleric a
famous letter in which he engaged in a long debate about the supposed supremacy of the
monarchy over the clergy. By the end of the letter the Shah added the following remark:
“A strange service you are doing to the people! Everyone who was not before
an opium smoker is now smoking opium. You have given splendid currency
to the smoking of Indian hemp (charas)! A man won’t give up the qaliyan
(Iranian water-pipe) for no reason. Inevitably he will go and smoke either
opium or hemp or put some other filth which he can get hold of into his
qaliyan to smoke and become mad, ill and die. Really I am amazed.”211
Nasr al-Din Shah is quite aware of the rising popularity of opium smoking in his
kingdom and he’s also quite aware of the negative results of opium smoking. The most
interesting aspect of this remark is that it reflects a sense of responsibility by the court
over the general well-being of the subjects, even if the thought of actually doing
something about it, not to mention prohibiting the consumption of opium, probably did
not cross the Shah’s mind. At the same time the Shah had no reservations about the
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production of opium itself and the huge profits it brought to the treasury, and he was
quite happy to pride himself for this success. When the Shah heard about an enormous
profit of 300,000 tomans made in a single deal by the famous merchant Amin al-Zarb, he
exalted the conditions created by the court that allowed such a profitable deal and made
no reference for the dangers of opium smoking that allowed this enormous profit in the
first place.212
It should also be noted that Mirza Hassan Shirazi himself was probably aware of
the existence of negative feelings toward the smoking of opium. According to a British
Foreign Department secret report from Mashhad, “Some of the Ulema of Meshed have
submitted a petition to Mirza Hasan Shirazi and asked for orders on certain important
points, among which is the use of opium. “It has been brought to the notice of the
Mujtahids in question that the Russian nation is being ruined by smoking opium, and he
has been asked to limit its consumption to a small quantity or to declare it unclean and
forbid its use altogether”.213 Clearly this was an attempt to apply the same methods – so
successful in the campaign against the Tobacco Regie – against the smoking of opium.
Although it does not appear that Shirazi responded favorably to this request, it reveals
that there were certainly some among the clerics who did not approve of opium smoking.
The combination of these anecdotes reveals that at least some among the political
elite of the country during the late Qajar period held a negative view of opium, though it
did not amount to a serious demand that the consumption of opium in Iran was at any rate
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a topic the government should pay attention to and maybe even act to control it. It is
therefore somewhat surprising that shortly after the end of the Civil War in Iran in 1908
and the re-assembly of the constitutional Parliament (the Majlis), the new government
decided to cooperate with international anti-opium effort, respond positively to the
invitation to participate in the Opium Commission in Shanghai and appoint a delegate.
Surely, cultural factors played a role in this development. The second parliament included
more liberal-minded representatives and was purged of some of its more conservative
members. No doubt, among them were westernized intellectuals who became aware of
the western perception of Iranians and western ideas about opium smoking, either during
their studies in Europe or through their engagement with Western writings or western
visitors to Iran.
Similar to the process in which Iranian men became acutely aware to the
European perception of Iranian intricate male sexual practices as homosexual vice, and in
response re-configured those practices, it is reasonable that opium smoking became
synonymous for some intellectuals with Iran’s backwardness.214 Of course, there were
important differences between the disparities of Iran and Europe regarding sexual
practices and leisure-consumption practices. While the shift from the particular Iranian
strain of homo-eroticism and homo-sociality to the European heteronormativity required
what Najmabadi defines as “re-configuration” aimed at a “demarcation to distinguish
homosociality from homosexuality”, opium consumption was a different issue. First,
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unlike European heteronormativity, European alcohol drinking could not similarly serve
as a socially respectable alternative because of the clear Islamic sanctions against it.215
Second, opium smoking was not only a unique cultural marker of the Iranian
society but it also represented vast economic interests. Either way, the small group of
anti-opium proponents was unsuccessful in making a significant impact on the Iranian
public opinion, thus, the rejection of opium-smoking remained a marker of elite-snobbery
for most of the early decades of the 20th century. Given the financial importance of opium
for both the government, the big merchants and landlords and the large number of petty
traders, production workers and cultivators, the opponents of the opium could not hope
for a lot of public support in their fight against opium. There was certainly no organized
or even un-organized grass-root support for anti-opium ideas to speak of during that
period.
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CHAPTER 6
Taking into account the economic importance of opium for Iran and the very mild
objection its consumption raised there, Iran’s decision to join the international diplomatic
efforts against opium right from the start, beginning with the 1909 Opium Commission
that convened in Shanghai, was at the very least surprising. Unlike other producingcountries who joined the first Opium Commission, Iran had no clear interest or internal
political pressure to end its opium trade.
China was the biggest opium-producer in the world at that time, but the Chinese
government and the various nationalist organizations in China were vehemently opposed
to opium-smoking. As part of the reforms undertaken by the Chinese government
following the demise of the Boxer Rebellion (1898-1901) the government announced its
intention to end the smoking of opium in China and published several decrees and edicts
which established severe limitations on the production and trade of opium in China, that
has been legal since 1860. It also announced a plan to assist addicts to cut their habit and
prevent new smokers from joining the ranks of opium abuse. The Chinese Government
then turned to curtail the flow of opium into China from foreign countries. It entered into
intensive negotiations with the British Government of India and In 1907 both parties
signed the Ten-Year Agreement, under which China committed to end the opium
production in China itself whereas British India committed to gradually curtail the export
of opium to China until it is ended completely by 1917.
In 1908 the Chinese Government went further to take advantage of the fact that it
had no treaty relations with Iran and the Ottoman Empire and announced unilaterally that
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starting from January 1909 the importation of the Persian and Turkish opium would be
strictly limited and continue only through a special licensing system. The amount of
opium imported from those two countries would be gradually reduced until the import
would cease completely by 1916.216 Later on, the Chinese government went further and
brought forward the date of complete prohibition of Persian and Turkish opium in China
to January, 1st 2012.217 The Nationalist government that took control over China after the
fall of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) further intensified its anti-opium efforts setting up
forced rehabilitation programs and cracking down on producers and merchants.218
However, opium continued to be produced in massive quantities in the areas controlled
by the various warlords who did not accept the central government’s authority. For the
central Chinese government, opium was the fuel that financially energized its internal
enemies and weakened its ability to overcome its enslavement to foreign Powers.
The position of the British government of India was more complicated. India’s
opium business gradually became less and less profitable by the last two decades of the
19th century, a process that continued well into the early years of the 20th century. A
variety of both internal and external reasons made opium lose its primary position as the
main fuel of British colonialism in India. The early signs of Indian Industrialization, the
expanding railroad network, and the rising remunerations for peasants as a result of that,
made opium production less attractive for the peasants compared with cotton and wheat.
Opium is highly profitable for peasants in regions with poor infrastructure, but as more
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roads and railroads were constructed – giving previously remote villages quick access to
major international ports - the relative advantages of opium as a high-value small-bulk
product that doesn’t spoil were rendered pointless. At the same time, the flooding of the
East-Asian opium-market with China-grown opium and opium from Iran and the
Ottoman Empire pushed the price of opium down in both China and the other South-East
Asian markets. The combination of rising costs of production in India itself combined
with reduced prices of opium in the international markets meant that opium by the turn of
the 20th century was simply not as profitable in India as it was through most of the 19th
century.219
Facing years of anti-opium campaigns, by the turn of the 20th century, British
India was ready to forgo its Indian opium business as long as other countries will not take
over its place. The Ten-Year agreement between China and British India for the drastic
reduction in the production and trade of opium was a way for the Colonial government to
conduct a dignified retreat from a no-longer successful business while deflecting the
vehement public criticism over the dubious moral standing of the opium trade. The
documents from the period reveal that officials of the Indian government were more
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troubled by the critique leveled against the Colonial government by the anti-opium
political organizations in Europe than they were actually concerned with the
ramifications of the opium trade.220
Much can be learned from the not-insignificant role Iran played as an object for
concern among the British officials in India, while internally discussing the Ten-Year
Agreement with China under negotiations. The general agreement was that a voluntary
curtailment of the Indian opium trade will be quixotic and pointless if Iranian opium will
simply take over its place. However, it was pointed out that the opium trade was such an
important part of Iran’s economy that it was doubtful whether it was feasible at all to
expect Iran to abandon it. One official bluntly articulated in his correspondence the
British ambivalent approach towards Iranian opium by saying that British loans made to
Iran were practically secured by the opium trade and its revenues and therefore, to a
certain extent, the British Empire was invested in the Iranian opium trade.221 In 1909,
when the British-Indian delegation arrived at Shanghai, the fate of opium in India was
already sealed and all the Raj government was looking for was international cooperation
that will not weaken the economic power of the Empire.222
Unlike Iran, the Ottoman Empire, another main producer of opium, chose to
participate in neither the Shanghai Commission nor the later Opium Convention at The
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Hague. Other Colonial Powers who presided over successful opium monopolies in their
East-Asian colonies, like France, Portugal and the Netherlands, had no opium production
activity under their supervision, but merely its purchase and marketing through their
respective monopolies.223
Thus, to end of the opium trade meant potential political, ideological and moral
achievements - and to a certain extent even economic gains - for the Chinese government
and the British-Indian government who were responsible together for approximately 70%
of the world opium production. The Ottoman Empire, who stood to gain none of those,
chose not to cooperate with the anti-opium effort. Unlike China and British India, the
Iranian government could not afford to forgo its opium production and trade, since the
opium revenues were approximately 5-10% of all its revenues. Opium was practically the
main source of foreign currency of Iran before the discovery of oil.224 Even after the
discovery of oil in southern Iran and the establishment of the APOC, opium constituted
8-12% of all export revenues including Oil.225 At the time, the Chinese unilateral ban on
Persian opium imports presented a potential threat to Iranian opium exports while there
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were no visible substitute markets which were able to replace it. Moreover, beyond
government revenues (which was limited due to their low rates and the limited ability of
the government to actually collect them) opium was the main source of income for many
influential merchants, and other tens of thousands Iranian who were either directly or
indirectly employed in the opium industry, with no alternative sources for their
livelihood. Clearly, no one in the government or the Majlis could hope to gain political
support by promoting a prohibition of opium in the face of fierce resistance by the vested
economic interests, as there was no public demand to do so.
Several arguments may be suggested to explain Iran’s decision to participate in
both the 1909 Opium Commission and the 1912 Opium Conference in a move that
appears to be standing against its own interests. First, on a practical level, the Chinese
announcement of their plan to gradually end the importation of Persian and Turkish
opium was naturally a serious threat for the future of Iran’s opium business. The Iranian
government may have had good reasons to believe that this was the first sign of
additional steps that would limit the commercial options of Iranian opium, thus agreed to
cooperate with the international anti-opium effort in order to have a chance to ameliorate
the damages it expected to retain from future measures directed against opium in general
and Iranian opium in particular. Second, the poor economic situation of Iran and the debts
it inherited from the irresponsible Qajar court from before the Constitutional Revolution
required a major reform in the structure of the Iranian market and the means of revenue
collection for the Government. The focus given by the organizers of the Opium
Commission on the control of the opium sector in each country as a preceding step to the
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imposition of limits, must have appealed to the Iranian Government, vying for income
while being notorious for its inability to enforce its power over the provinces.
Third, there was an important diplomatic aspect attached to the participation in
the opium conferences that went beyond the mere question of opium. In the decades prior
to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, liberal intellectuals repeatedly criticized the
Qajar monarchy as a despotic autocracy, blaming the court with selfish mismanagement
of the State’s affairs, treating Iran as their own private property, oblivious and neglectful
for the long-term consequences of their decisions and the effect they might have on the
Iranian people. The ongoing mismanagement of the State’s affairs by the Qajar rulers and
their governments accelerated foreign involvement in the affairs of Iran as the country
continued to be a pawn in the global power struggle between the British and Russian
Empires. The Anglo-Russian agreement of August 1907, dividing Iran into zones of
influence between the two powers, without consulting or even informing the Iranian
government, was not only humiliating but also an ominous sign for the new leaders of the
country that the fate of Iran as an independent state was not secured.
The new Government believed that in addition to financial and bureaucratic
reform, Iran must also pursue a reputation of a civilized country, to become a legitimate
member in the family of civilized nations. Iran’s participation in the international antiopium effort should therefore be understood as part of Iran’s larger diplomatic effort to
recreate Iran as a legitimate member of the International community. This effort and its
goals were very similar to the intentions behind the Chinese New Policies reform of the
late Qing dynasty, announced in 1905. According to Alan Baumler:
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“The entire New Policies reform was heavily influenced by the model of
Japan, and the purpose of the reform was to make China into Japan, an Asian
nation that was accepted as a member of the international community. The
anti-opium campaigns, along with the anti-foot binding campaigns, were the
most important aspects of reforms that were to quickly transform the Chinese
into modern citizens.”226
Fourth, beyond the practical re-assessment of Iran’s situation in a new era of
global opium prohibition and the diplomatic calculations of Iran’s international status, the
post-revolutionary government was no longer indifferent to the opium question. Iran’s
participation in the international Opium Commission may also be understood as a
manifestation of new concerns in Iran regarding public health. Just like practices of
modern hygiene and modern midwifery, curbing the habit of opium smoking was another
important step that needed to be achieved in order to modernize the Iranian society. The
New Iranians were supposed to be not only people who possess a better knowledge of the
world and hold new set of convictions, but also people whose bodies were stronger and
healthier, people who led a healthy lifestyle, in which opium smoking had no place.227
The US government announced its intention to convene a conference on the
opium problem in July 1908. The public mood in the US was probably more virulent
against opium (and certainly against alcohol) than it was in Europe, but the US
Government also hoped to improve its political and economic ties with China through its
unequivocal stand against opium. President Roosevelt appointed Dr. Hamilton Wright as
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a sort of Opium Commissioner and entrusted him with the task to head the American
team that would prepare the Opium Commission and direct it. The main participants of
the commission were representatives from the US, UK, China, France, Japan and
Portugal.
The Iranian government was among the last governments to be approached
regarding participation. Though the government responded positively for the invitation,
the American ambassador in Tehran found it necessary to comment that the government
representatives “manifested a disinclination to participate in the conference”.228 Instead
of sending an official representative from Iran to participate in the commission, the
Iranian government appointed Mirza Ja’far Rezaiof, an Iranian merchant who settled in
Shanghai, to be its representatives for the Commission. Though certainly honored by this
appointment, Mr. Rezaiof was quite shaken by the mission entrusted in his hands and he
told Hamilton Wright that he was appointed to “cut his own throat” for his opium imports
are bound to cease as a result of the commission. Among his peers for the American
delegation, Hamilton Wright was the most consistent advocate of internationalizing the
“opium problem”, understanding the wider picture of global opium production and
repeatedly pointing out that it was not merely a “Chinese” problem, but one that “should
engage the whole world, Occidental as well as Oriental”. He considered the participation
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of Iran in the Commission as a success just as much as he considered the nonparticipation of the Ottoman Empire as a failure.229
Though each participating country was supposed to conduct a research prior to the
meeting, the Iranian government informed the commission that as a result of the
“unsettled state of politics at present” in Iran, the Government has not been able to
prepare a comprehensive report on the status of Opium in Persia in time for the
commission’s assembly, and instead submitted only a brief summary, promising,
however, that a conscientious effort was made to ensure that the report will address all
issues and furnish whatever statistics that is available. The report declared that the opium
business was not monopolized by the government in any way. The annual production is
estimated at about 10,000 piculs, of which 2,500 piculs were dedicated for local
consumption – partly for medical purposes but mostly for “indulgence in the smoking
habit”. Out of the remaining opium: 2,000 piculs were exported to Europe; 500 piculs
were exported to Africa and: 5,000 piculs were exported to Hong-Kong and Singapore.
According to the report, there was no direct export from Persia to China. It was also
reported that of the 5,000 piculs exported to Asia, about 3,000-3,500 piculs were
consigned and sent to Formosa, and only the rest was sent to China.
With regards to internal consumption, Iran argued that opium-smoking was not
prohibited in Iran “but that habit is not by any means popular (sic!). In fact it was
indulged in only by the poorest, lowest classes of the population”. The quality of the
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Persian opium is declared to be next in excellence of quality to Indian opium. The
government derived an annual income of 350,000 tomans or 70,000£, out of a total value
of 600,000£ for the annual exports of opium.230 A request was made to explain how Iran
derives its income from the production of opium, for which the Iranian delegation replies
that a provincial tax is levied on the output of the poppy231 of 5 tomans per picul. To this
should be added additional 40 tomans per picul as export duty. The Japanese delegation
questioned the data supplied regarding the consignment of 3,500 piculs of opium to
Formosa, but the Iranian delegation did not reply.232
Beyond the statistical information, this report is significant for understanding the
meaning of the opium question for the post-revolutionary government of Iran. First, all
the various reports regarding the production and trade of opium in Iran from that era
estimated the annual output of 8,000 chests and an export of 6,000 chests as the ultimate
peak of production in the best of years. Since no survey was conducted in Iran prior to the
preparation of the report, the data presented in such a report conveys a certain message.
Most probably, this was an implied recognition by the Iranian government of the
extensive internal trade in contraband opium. Another possibility is that it is an attempt to
stress the importance of opium to Iran’s economy in order to prepare the ground for later
demands for international assistance to substitute the opium revenues with funds from
other sources.
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Particularly telling was the discussion of the issue of opium consumption in Iran
made in the report. On the one hand, it was argued that 2,500 chests of opium were
dedicated annually for internal consumption and on the other hand it was argued that
opium smoking was not popular. Clearly, to describe the annual consumption of 170
metric tons of opium by a population of approximately 7,000,000 people as not popular is
paradoxical to say the least. It should be remembered that the annual consumption in
China was estimated at about 100,000 chests, which is about 40 times more than what it
was in Iran, while the population of China then was about 50 times larger than of Iran.
That is, on average, Iranians consumed more opium than the Chinese during the early
decades of the 20th century. Relegating the opium-smoking habit to the realm of the
“poorest and lowest classes” shows that contempt for opium-smoking in early 20th
century Iran was more than anything else, an internal struggle for hegemony between the
westernized, educated, modernized intellectuals, and those they perceived as antiquated,
oriental, uneducated populace. In this report, opium smoking as a characteristic pastime
activity is used more as a factor that differentiates between the modern and westernized
leadership of Iran and the rest of the country than as a moral or a health concern.
This “division of labor” between the upper classes and the masses with regards to
recreational consumption of mood changing substances was reinforced by a report from
the American Legation in Tehran to Hamilton Wright in which the American Minister
differentiated between opium consumption that is rampant amongst the population as
opposed to intemperate consumption of alcohol among “those who call themselves the
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better class of people and is usually secret”.233 Of course, there is ample evidence to show
that opium-smoking was far more common among all classes in Iran than the government
was willing to admit in front of the whole world.234 The important point that the Iranian
government appears to press in this document is that the situation was under control and
that the sovereign government in Iran was fully capable in taking care of it.
Being merely an investigative commission without the authority to discuss and
compile binding documents, the Shanghai Commission concluded with merely a list of
recommendations. The Commission recognized that “the use of opium in any form
otherwise than for medical purposes is held by almost every participating country to be a
matter for prohibition or for careful regulation; and that each country in the
administration of its system of regulation purports to be aiming, as opportunity offers, at
progressively increasing stringency”. The Commission found that almost every country
represented had “strict laws which are aimed directly or indirectly to prevent the
smuggling of opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations into their respective
territories” and recommended the adoption of similar “reasonable measures to prevent at
ports of departure the shipment of opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and preparations, to
any country which prohibits the entry of any opium, its alkaloids, derivatives and
preparations.”235 Responding to the commission’ recommendations, several countries –
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including Iran – engaged in a legislation process to deal with the opium problem. Yet, the
most important outcome of the Commission was the unofficial resolution to begin work
towards a convention with binding authority with the intention to form a treaty.
Following the recommendations of the Opium Commission, the Iranian
government initiated what became the first opium legislation of Iran in 1911. The main
goal of the bill was to address the problem of opium smoking in Iran, and most of its
articles contained stipulations intended to regulate the opium “addicts” and their opium
consumption. However, the bill did not address production issues at all and set no limits
or new rules regarding the regulation of the opium market. The major stipulation of the
bill imposed a new state tax of 2 shahis per every misqal of prepared opium whether it
was for export or not. Since misqal equals 1/100 of a British pound (lb.) and a shahi is
5/1000 of a toman, this meant a tax of 1 toman per pound or 150 tomans per picul. At the
same time, all the previous customs on the export of opium were dropped. Compared
with the previous provincial tax rate of 5 tomans per picul, this was an enormous tax
increase on opium for local consumption, and even the exemption from the previous
custom rate of 40 tomans per picul, still meant a tax increase of over 200% (!) on
smoking opium for export.236
Other articles in the bill deal with the government’s plan to ban the consumption
of shireh-ye sokhte, a liquid preparations made from residue of smoked opium and in
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some cases from the refuse water of water-pipes that were used for smoking opium. The
preparation was sold to poor customers who were unable to afford opium for smoking,
and was considered in Iran to be particularly harmful and addictive. The Opium bill of
1911 ordered all refuse of opium smoking to be turned over to the Ministry of Interior for
destruction and promises to pay 3 shahis per every misqal turned in to the authorities.
The government is required by the bill to conduct a survey throughout the country and to
register every opium and shireh consumer for whom an opium maintenance program of
an “appropriate quantity” at a set price will be drafted, although the bill does not specify
the method in which the opium would be distributed to the registered addicts – whether
by government agencies or supervised private agencies. Following the approval of the
bill by the Majlis, the tax on opium is set to be raised annually by 3 shahis and the same
arrangement will apply to government remuneration for turned-in opium refuse. By the
8th year after the approval of the bill it is proclaimed that all consumption of shireh and
non-medical opium will become completely forbidden, although opium will continue to
be produced and traded for its medical purposes.237
By closely analyzing the text of the legislation we may arrive at several important
conclusions. First, the bill makes absolutely no attempt to prohibit or even limit the
production of opium in Iran. Raising the taxes on opium for export was merely an attempt
by the government to collect a bigger share of the opium revenues to its treasury.
Although, raising the tax level on opium for local consumption to equal the tax on opium
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for export may be seen as an act of prohibition-through-taxation, although it is more an
intentional boost for export at the expansion of local consumption than an actual act of
prohibition.
Two important suppositions guide this legislation and exist within the subtext of
the bill. First, that heavy taxation on luxury and vices is an efficient way to reduce the
consumption of these luxuries and vices. Second, that eliminating the demand is a more
efficient way to fight against the opium trade than trying to eliminate production. Both of
these assumptions have been tested many times in the last century and have been proven
wrong. The historical experience with heavy taxation on luxuries and vices shows that
they turn out to be either too low to make an impact on the consumption of the vice they
attempt to curb, or too high to the extent that they drive production, marketing and
consumption underground.238 It also turned out that the assumption that demand can be
simply handled, manipulated or forced by the state; that the state could simply legislate
and forbid the use of drugs and the citizens would simply obey; these assumptions were
simply wrong.
Beyond merely underestimating the power of the consumption habits, demandside legislation does not take into account the supply side of the equation, the vested
interests of the opium producers and merchants and their ability to subvert the
government’s efforts. The demand-side element of the early Iranian opium legislation had
a certain international aspect as well, since it could have been perceived and presented as
238

See Courtwright’s sharp discussion of drug and luxury taxation in the modern era in Courtwright,
Forces of Habit, 152-65. The pretense of raising taxes over cigarettes and alcohol in order to reduce their
consumption is still rampant around the world, though – as Courtwright suggests – it represents more the
Government’s addiction to taxes than an attempt to fight tobacco and alcohol addiction.

159

one unit within a chain of similar demand-side legislations in other countries. If demand
for opium around the world will diminish, the production of opium will diminish with it.
Moreover, presenting this legislation during the Opium Conference at The Hague was a
clear signal from the Iranian government that it takes no responsibility over the role of
Iranian opium production in the continuation of the opium problem in other countries.
The subtext of the legislation is that if every country will separately take control over the
demand for opium within its own borders and reduce it, the accumulating result will be
that the international production of opium will eventually diminish by itself.
Beyond taking care of exaggerated opium consumption, other topics were more
urgent on the agenda of the new post-revolutionary government, first and foremost
among them was to repair and reform the country’s financial system in order to resurrect
the government’s treasury from its abysmal situation. Resentful of both Britain and
Russia, the two Powers already entangled in a quarrel for control over Iran without much
concern for the desires of the Iranians themselves, the Iranian government turned for
assistance to the Unites States, considered at the time a neutral Power in Iranian affairs.
Following the recommendation of the American Legation in Tehran, the Iranian
government hired Morgan Shuster on May 1911, an American customs collector who
worked in the Colonial administration of the Philippines, which was then an American
colony. Wasting no time, Shuster made a quick survey of Iran’s finances and hired a team
of accountants and law enforcement agents to assist him in his financial actions.
However, Shuster’s vigorous actions were opposed by the British and Russians
who objected any interference in Iranian affairs by any other foreign Power, and were
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unwelcoming to the prospect of Iran becoming too independent in its financial affairs.
Under severe pressure by both the British and Russian ambassadors, including the
bombing of the Iranian Parliament by Russian troops, the Iranian government surrendered
and dismissed Shuster on December 1911, coincidently just as diplomatic representatives
from all over the world convened at The Hague for the first sessions of the Opium
Conference. Nevertheless, during his short stay in Iran, Shuster was quick to diagnose
that under-taxing was the main Achilles Heel of Iran’s finances and he suggested a
number of steps to increase the government’s revenue through taxes on a variety of
economic activities, first and foremost among them was the sale of opium. In accordance
with the new opium legislation Shuster remarks in his famous report about his time in
Iran, “The Strangling of Persia”:
“… It should be noted that in theory this tax [i.e. the tax on opium – RR] is
prohibitive in Persia, but, as a matter of fact, it is by no means prohibitive,
and by following out the ostensible intention of the law the tax could be
increased and, at the same time, additional revenue be derived therefrom.
This would justify to a greater extent the collection of such a tax by means of
the rather expensive organization which was necessary to control the opium
traffic.”239
Shuster unwittingly exposed here that the main goal and the real reason behind
the Iranian opium legislation was not a struggle to reduce the consumption of opium in
Iran, but an increase of the government’s revenues. But Shuster points out an important
issue in his short analysis, and that is that drug control requires an expensive bureaucratic
apparatus to perform the job of control. This apparatus in itself, suggests Shuster, may be
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used as the justification to raise the opium taxes and thus satisfy both the need for
additional revenue and the more noble cause of controlling the opium trade in order to
reduce consumption. Of course, Shuster may have mistakenly assumed that the antiopium cause had a larger public support in Iran than it actually had and thus
miscalculated the intense antagonism such a move would bring about in Iran, just as he
miscalculated the objections of the British and the Russians to his presence and his
mission in Iran. Still, Shuster highlighted the potential of opium taxation for the Iranian
treasury and the need for an extensive administration to control the production of opium
and collect the taxes themselves.
The above analysis of Iran’s first opium legislation as a diplomatic tool is not
mere speculation and it is well reflected in the Iranian strategy during the International
Opium Conference. The conference convened at The Hague on December 1911 and
maintained deliberations and negotiations for almost two months, at the end of which, the
first International Opium Convention was signed on 23 January 1912. Unlike the
unofficial Opium Commission, this time Iran was represented by a high-ranking
diplomatic delegation consisting of Mirza Mahmoud Khan, the secretary of The Hague
legation with full-powers who represented Iran’s interests vigorously throughout the
conference. William McAllister writes in his book Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth
Century, that in the years leading up to the Hague Opium Conference, “Producing states
such as Persia, Turkey, and India considered domestic drug use an internal matter, not
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subject to interference by other states. They also insisted on the right to export opium to
those states that did not prohibit the trade.”240
But the protocols of the conference reveal that in reality Iran’s position was more
complicated than that. Iran was readily inviting discussions about opium consumption not
only in other countries but in Iran itself. The Iranian delegation attempted again and again
to push the debate on the conference floor towards questions of consumption and the
means to eliminate it, while trying to almost forcibly push aside and play down any
attempt to discuss opium trade.
Already in the early stages of the conference Mahmoud Khan declared that:
“… as a large exporter, Persia had to show much self-sacrifice in its efforts to
deal with this matter. [Persia was] doing [its] best to restrict the use of opium,
and had taken steps to bring those whose constitutions were seriously
undermined by the opium habit, under the direct control of the government.
A law has been promulgated that in eight years time the smoking of opium
and shireh will be entirely prohibited. […] The promulgation of this law
shows that Persia has not waited for the Conference, but has taken action in
regard to this evil habit, which is rightly considered as shameful and
degrading. Persia will do its best to carry out the decisions arrived at by the
Conference.”241
In a conference that dealt mainly with international trade issues, Mahmoud Khan
chose to emphasize the steps Iran has taken in order to suppress consumption within its
borders, hinting that this is the limit of Iran’s willingness for self-sacrifice. In case the
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point of this presentation was not clear, he engaged in self-praise of Iran’s position in the
face of an “evil habit” that is both shameful and degrading. He also wasted no time to
emphasize that as opposed to Iran’s cooperation with the conference, “other countries” hinting to the Ottoman Empire - declined to even join the conference.242
The pinnacle of the Iranian strategy of gaining the moral high-ground came
during a meeting attended by representatives from several European Anti-Opium
societies. Mirza Mahmoud Khan gained permission to open the plenary session and
following a passionate speech about the moral duty of the participating countries to stamp
out opium-smoking once and for all, he proposed a resolution which read:
“It is agreed by all the governments represented in the Conference that
prepared opium in international transit is contraband, and that each
Government should make provisions for its immediate destruction wherever
found in such transit”243
Clearly, the radical phrasing of the proposal made it certain that it would be
rejected by the participating members, and several delegations indeed rejected it almost
off-handedly, but it certainly appealed to the attending members of the Anti-Opium
coalitions and to the Chinese delegation. The Chinese used this opportunity to attack the
governments of Holland and Japan for their policy of setting up opium monopolies with
the intention of increasing their profits making no effort at all at reducing the
consumption of opium within their territory.
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This was a risky move by Mahmoud Khan, for had his original proposal been
accepted it would have meant the end of the majority of all Iranian opium exports, but the
eventually unanimous rejection of the Iranian proposal meant that Iran gained credit for
its moral stand while effectively making no actual sacrifice of its opium trade. A rephrased proposal suggested by the American delegation and adopted unanimously
presented a much softer language about “gradual and effective suppression” of opium
manufacture and consumption “with due regard to the varying circumstances of each
country”. Over and over again the Iranian delegate made it clear that Iran believed the
focus of the conference should be the concern for the recreational or “pleasure-seeking”
opium consumers and not the commercial aspects of opium production and trade. As
opposed to the Iranian position, the Chinese delegation made it clear that it is their view
“… that effective suppression of the production and distribution of opium is the only
means of successfully eradicating the evils connected with the abuse of that drug”.244
But the Iranian delegation was in a more difficult position when the discussions
revolved around possible limitations on the international trade of opium. While Iran was
willing to accept non-committing language that discussed “efforts” to limit the export of
opium in general, it consistently opposed any resolution which included clear and direct
wording meant any kind of restriction on Iran’s exports of opium. The main point of
contention was the demand that the signatories of the Opium Convention would actively
prevent the export of opium to countries that had specifically prohibited its import. The
first draft of the convention included the following article 3:
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“The Contracting Powers shall take measures, by special Convention or
otherwise:
a.

To prevent the exportation of taw opium to countries which prohibit its
entry etc.

b.

To control the exportation of raw opium to countries which limit the
importation thereof.”245

This article was referred to by the conference as the “Chinese Proposal”, in
reference to the recently signed Ten-Year Agreement with Britain and the Chinese
unilateral prohibition of opium from Iran and the Ottoman Empire which began its
application on January 1st, 1912. No attempt was made to conceal the fact that this article
specifically addressed the recent Chinese interdiction of Iranian and Ottoman opium and
its expectation for universal compliance and cooperation with that decision, as it was
clearly expressed by the Mr. Guesde, the delegate from France.246 Since no other country
imposed a sweeping prohibition of opium imports besides China, and since China already
reached an agreement with British India to gradually reduce the export of India opium to
China, this article was practically focused on the export of Iranian and Ottoman opium.
Since the Ottoman Empire was not represented in the conference, the pressure was
clearly directed at the Iranian delegation. In response, Mahmoud Khan set out with a
fierce attack against what he defined as a misled focus on commercial affairs, which
unjustifiably singled out Iran and the Ottoman Empire, and not on the issue of restricting
the smoking of opium. He pointed out that Iranian merchants had already begun to take in
severe losses as a result of the Chinese ban of Persian Opium imports since January 1st
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1912, but this was an autonomous and legitimate act of the Chinese government. Yet, he
observed that if this policy were to be included in the Convention it would create the
impression in Iran that the Opium Convention is meant to impoverish Iranian merchants,
a move that will make the task of presenting the Convention to the people of Iran and its
approval very difficult.247
As shown in the previous chapter, by 1912 Iran had already begun diversifying
the destinations of its export and was less dependent upon the Chinese market. The
Iranian diplomatic battle against the Chinese proposal should therefore be understood
within a broader context of the opium trade, as Iranian merchants were already exploring
new trade routes for their opium. Accepting article 3(b) would mean that Iranian
Government will accept the responsibility to ensure that the opium exported from its
ports is being traded legitimately, a responsibility the Iranian government was reluctant to
accept not only because supervising the export information supplied by the merchants
was not a feasible task for the Iranian government to perform, but also because the
government did not really see itself as responsible to prevent the smuggling of Iranianproduced opium into other countries, especially opium for which all the duties and taxes
were already paid.
While battling the Chinese proposal, the Iranian delegation tried to pass alternative
resolutions that will not harm the commercial interests of Iran. Mahmoud Khan proposed
that the production of opium which contains less that 9% of morphine will be gradually
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suppressed. This was a very sophisticated proposal by the Iranian delegation.248 Asked to
explain the purpose of this proposal Mahmoud Khan replied:
“… as it is accepted that the medicinal opium is ‘opium containing not less
than 10% of morphia’ and as it is approved that opium should be used only
for medical purposes it is justifiable that there should be a gradual
suppression of opium containing less that the said percentage. Only opium of
lower grade is used for smoking.”249
It was a known fact that standard Iranian raw opium contained an average of 1113% of morphine and the process of preparing it as smoking opium actually included
mixing additives into the opium in order to downgrade its morphine content, since pure
Iranian opium was considered as too strong by experienced smokers in China. Indian
opium, by contrast, was lower-grade opium that only at its best rose above 7-8%
morphine content, which made it unusable for the pharmaceutical market of that period.
Since the extraction of morphine was still an expensive process at the time, the European
and American pharmaceutical industry was much more inclined to purchase higher-grade
opium for the production of opium-based medications, for the distribution of opium
directly to pharmacies and for the production of morphine itself. Indian opium had very
little success in those markets. The British delegation immediately objected to the
proposal arguing that Indian opium, despite its lower grade, was used for medical
purposes throughout India where no access to other medical treatment was available.
Though supported by the US delegation, the proposal was rejected by the
conference. No doubt this development justifiably increased the Iranian dissatisfaction
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with the fact that proposals that single out the commercial interests of a specific country
are rejected, unless that country is Iran.250 Eventually, though the Iranian effort was
unsuccessful, at the conclusion of the conference Mahmoud Khan signed the First Opium
Conventions but with several reservations, particularly regarding the article demanding a
state-action to stop the export of opium to countries who had had forbidden its import,
despite the slight changes in phrasing that were made to this paragraph during the
conference.251
Shuster’s forced departure, just as the Opium Conference at The Hague was about
to open, was a symbolic defeat for the Iranian government, exemplifying its inability to
act independently even in the administration of its own affairs. However, it did not deter
the government from trying to establish some form of control over the production and
trade of opium. The short study of the history of opium control submitted on 1928 to the
League of Nations’ Opium Committee, flatly remarks that after the First Opium
Conference of 1912 at The Hague, the Iranian delegate, Mirza Mahmoud Khan, merely
appeared at the Third Opium Conference at The Hague on June 1914 to promise that his
government would soon ratify the Opium Convention an move to enforce it.252
However, the report fails to mention that in 1913 the Iranian government had in
fact undertaken an initiative to enact a set of detailed regulations to compliment the
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application of its Opium Law from 1911.253 If the brief Opium Law of 1911 focused
mostly on the opium smoker, the proposed regulations of 1913 focus very intensely upon
the opium producers and merchants. The regulations begin with a sweeping declaration in
the first article that everything related to opium in Iran is the business of the government:
“The cultivation of the poppy, the manufacture, sale and use of opium shall
be placed under the control of the agents of the Government Board of
Finance. The Agent shall also be made responsible for the gathering of the
duties fixed by the law.”254
The regulations later define that “agent” in the Board of Finance as the Central
Opium Board. A meticulous set of instruction then follows which refer to every aspect of
the opium business. Specific chapters are devoted to poppy cultivation, manufacture,
import, export, collection of opium residue (shireh-ye sukhteh), penalties and special
provisions. The regulations themselves establish a system of close supervision on every
aspect of the opium production process, which would have provided the government a
host of rich and specific information, theoretically enabling the government to perfect
and maximize its ability to collect taxes from the opium sector: Cultivators are required
by the regulations to report at specific times during the period of cultivation on the
prospected amount of crude opium that might be collected in their fields; manufacture of
prepared opium is limited to approved locations and premises specifically defined to be
dedicated for the preparation of opium, cancelling de facto cottage production of
prepared opium; specific rules define the permissible forms of opium “sticks” to be
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produced for internal consumption; All prepared opium must be surrendered to and stored
in an approved Government storage facility; and some additional rules are applied for the
import and export of opium in and out of Iran.
Interestingly enough, the regulations stopped short of making opium effectively a
government monopoly. The proposed regulations established the government in a mere
supervising role, confined to gathering information that would assist the collection of
taxes and duties from the opium trade. The government settled with supervision and mere
quality assurance, but it took no position in the actual management and direction of the
opium market in Iran. Cultivators were required to report on their intention to grow
opium poppies, but there was no licensing system, and there were no restrictions with
regards to who was allowed or not allowed to cultivate poppies, no limits on acreage
allowed for poppy cultivation and no mention of specific qualifications required.
Manufacture was indeed limited to pre-approved factories which met certain criteria, but
there was no limit on the number of factories or a declaration about the establishment of
government facilities for the manufacture of opium. The only example of actual
government involvement was the obligatory storage of prepared opium in regional
government facilities, but even there the government merely took upon itself the role of
stock manager for the merchants, yet refrained from taking any responsibility over the
marketing of the drug. Although the opening article of the proposed regulations defined
the government’s function with regards to opium as “control”, the regulations themselves
established that control as mere supervision and information-collection.
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Even so, within the context of the internal dynamics in Iran the regulations were
perceived as highly intrusive and heavy-handed. J. G. Lorimer, the British Resident in the
Persian Gulf and the Consul-General for Fars, evaluated the chances of the Persian
Government to be able to enforce these regulations as very low. Based on conversations
he had with several opium merchants and other agents in the opium business, he
concluded that “… the introduction of so close a system of surveillance might be possible
in a country under complete control, but will surely be met by the greatest opposition,
and lead to disturbances in so unruly a district as Fars”. This appears to be a fairly
accurate prediction of the difficulties the Iranian government indeed encountered in the
1920s while trying to employ similar regulations and later even monopolize the opium
production at the center of Iran’s opium business in Isfahan. Later in his report, Lorimer
suggested that the regulations might be employed in the larger cities of Isfahan and
Shiraz, where apparently some governmental power existed, but might not be applied in
the more remote districts of the region, such as Fasa, Darab, Kazerun and Behbehan,
where the ability of the government to apply force was lacking.
Analyzing the regulations more closely, he suggested that the demand for accurate
information regarding crops and opium sap collection might not encounter opposition but
would surely raise many difficulties for the peasants from which the regulations appear to
expect too much. As for the demand to cease cottage production of prepared opium, to
present seals of approval or to store all prepared opium in government facilities, Lorimer
believed these might be impossible to apply. He predicted that as a result of these
regulations, much of the opium production would transfer into the more distant hinterland
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where the government’s power hardly ever reaches and that smuggling would increase
through the back roads of the country.255
Either way, the Iranian government did not get an opportunity to follow the
enactment of the regulations with enforcement. Whatever attempts took place to establish
an opium agency at the Finance ministry and begin the application of the government’s
control and supervision over the opium business, it all dissipated during the World War
that broke just a few months later on July 1914. At the onset of the war, Iran declared
neutrality but its neutrality was not respected and it was soon invaded by British, Russian
and Ottoman forces, who turned the country into a battleground and a supply base for the
occupying Powers who paid very little attention to the desires and needs of the Iranian
people. The oil found in the southern regions of Iran just a few years before the war
became a crucial strategic asset for the British Empire, as the British fleet was already in
a process of switching from coal to oil as fuel for its engines, a process that was
accelerated during the war, and the British Empire was determined to secure the Persian
Gulf’s oil-fields under its control.
Ridden by invaders, the country slipped into administrative chaos and disorder,
with the central government in Tehran – already weakened by years of foreign
intervention – losing almost all control over the internal affairs of the country. Under
these circumstances, the ability of the government to establish control over poppy
cultivation and opium production became even more improbable than it was before the
war. However, poppy cultivation and opium production continued with very little
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disturbance. The staggering numbers of wounded soldiers in the various theatres of the
war increased the demand for morphine and other narcotic medications. The existing
statistical data reveal no particular decline or spike in the production of opium in Iran
beyond the normal fluctuations due to weather conditions. Statistics that appear in the
report of the Commission of Enquiry sent by the LON to Iran in 1926 reveals that Iran
exported on average between 4800-5000 cases of opium annually, throughout the years
1913-1918.256 Even if we take into account that internal consumption, which was
normally estimated as 25-30% of the entire production, was lower than usual due the
conditions of the war, this was still within the range of normal production in Iran.
Nevertheless, the War intensified the shift of destinations for export of Iranian
opium. While the amount of opium exported to Europe and the US stood at 20-40% of
Iran’s annual production before the Chinese prohibition of 1912, the rate jumped to 5060% during the few years before the War.257 The war accelerated this process, and during
the years 1915-1918, the vast majority of Iran’s opium was shipped to the UK and the
US. An average of 4,100 cases of Iranian opium was sent annually to Europe and
America while only 1200 cases on average were sent annually to East Asia, which means
approximately 75% of Iran’s opium production became part of the War effort for the
Allied forces.258 Some disturbances to the export did occur from time to time, but the
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British military forces in the Gulf actually tried within the limits imposed by the war, to
maintain and protect the trade in southern Iran.259
The inability of the Iranian government to assert its power to establish control
over the opium business was only one example of the near-total collapse of the central
government’s authority by the end of the 1910s, to the point that many believed that Iran
as a unified kingdom would not survive for too long. However, the rise of Reza Khan to
power in the aftermath of WWI completely changed the doomed course of disintegration
predicted for Iran. The re-structuring of the Iranian state in 1920s and the 1930s under the
leadership of Reza Khan and the Pahlavi dynasty he founded, and the re-assertion of the
Central Government’s control over all the country’s regions, meant also the successful
application of government control over the opium business and the end of uncontrolled
production and trade that had characterized this sector for so many years.
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SECTION 3
EPILOGUE
In many respects, the world was a different place by the end of the Great War and
a new era of political change, social reform and cultural experimentations began. With
the intention to prevent future wars, the victorious Allied Powers established the League
of Nations (LON) to supervise the fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and
to serve as an ongoing platform of cooperation between the nations not only as a platform
for solving conflicts through diplomacy, but also as a tool to promote cultural, scientific,
commercial and social cooperation between the nations of the world. The LON was
entrusted with the task to solve, regulate and supervise social and cultural problems that
were specifically international by nature, such as the problem of refugees, the spread of
plagues, child labor, slave trade and the opium trade. Signing and ratifying the Opium
Convention of 1912 was made one of the dictates of the Treaty of Versailles and a de
facto condition for joining the LON and earning the right to participate in its advisory
committees.
The Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium was appointed by the League’s
council, and it took the role of supervision over the application of the Opium Convention,
collection of statistical data regarding the global opium trade and the development of new
methods to fight against the ongoing spread of drug abuse and addiction in the world.
Though Iran signed the Opium Convention of 1912, it did not ratify it and therefore could
not have a participating representative on the Advisory Committee. However, other
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Iranian delegates in the League’s assembly and other committees were able to represent
Iran’s interests on matters of opium.
The chaos and disorder in Iran during WWI stripped the government almost
entirely from its ability to rule the country and to assert its sovereignty outside the capital
Tehran. Rebellions against the government broke out in various parts of the country and
local leaders raised the banner of rebellion for ethnic, tribal or even ideological causes.
Autonomous areas were declared by local leaders in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, tribal
leaders in Southern Iran refused to accept the government’s authority, and even in regions
that were nominally loyal to the monarchy and to the government, it was nearly
impossible to assert government control, to maintain the security and collect taxes. One
of the first acts of the new Soviet Government of Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution
of 1917 was the unilateral cancelation of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 and the
withdrawal of all Russian troops from Iran. Yet, foreign military presence in Iran
continued as White Russian forces remained in Iran and used it as a base to attack the
Red Army and they were assisted by several military expeditions sent by Britain. The
British were also supportive of the autonomous aspirations of Shaykh Khaz’al al-Ka’bi of
Khuzestan as long as they believed he was capable to maintain security in the region
were most of oil-drilling facilities of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) resided.
However, in late 1920, a guerrilla force of Iranian socialists aided by the Red
Army was preparing to march on Tehran while the current government appeared to be
completely incapable of blocking this force. Desperate from their failure to block Soviet
advent into Iran, the British came to believe that only a strong unified Iran will be able to
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do that and thus protect the British interests in Khuzestan and thus switched their support
to a young officer in the recently disbanded Cossack Brigade named Reza Khan who
planned a coup d’état and the establishment of a more capable government in Tehran. In
February 1921 Reza Khan’s forces took control of the capital, dissolved the government
and appointed Zia al-Din Tabataba’i as Prime Minister, while Reza Khan himself settled
for the position of Minister of War, although the real power in Iran remained in his hands.
In the next few years Reza Khan’s newly created army defeated all the local rebellions
and insurrections and either killed, arrested or deported all the autonomous strongmen
and independent leaders who challenged Reza Khan’s power, and re-affirmed the
government’s control over all parts of the country. By the end of 1925 the last Qajar Shah
was deposed and Reza Khan was crowned as Reza Shah, the first of the Pahlavi dynasty.
Immediately following Reza Khan’s rise to power, he put the state’s financial
system under an extensive reform, a task entrusted once again in the hands of an
American adviser, Dr. Arthur Millspaugh, a foreign trade adviser in the State
Department. Millspaugh reformed and expanded the collection of taxes that until then
were merely dead letter. He established an annual budget, kept it balanced and decreased
the deficit, while resisting the demands of Reza Shah to increase the military expenditure.
This resistance apparently cost him eventually with his position, as he was dismissed in
1927. His reforms, however, paved the way for a more comprehensive and ambitious
plan to re-structure the Iranian society, which the Shah’s regime initiated by the end of
the 1920s and applied throughout the 1930s.
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The plan’s major elements can be characterized broadly as centralization,
secularization and militarization. Fascinated by the rising power of fascism in Europe,
Reza Khan initiated a process of concentrating every political, social and economic
aspect of the society in the hands of the government, a path that was nothing short of
revolutionary in a country so decentralized as Iran. Schools, banks and hospitals were
nationalized and pressure was exerted upon private institutions to become embedded
within the state system. The system of concessions was mostly abandoned and the
government took upon itself big infrastructural projects. The government attempted to
nationalize the religious establishment, limited the rights of clerics, confiscated property
that belonged to religious establishments and in some cases clerics were publicly unrobed
and forced to shave their beards. Other measures were made in an attempt to install
secularism within Iran and to weaken the power of the religious establishment.
Within this context, Iran’s opium policy reflected the priorities of the regime, but
also exposed its limitations. Just like Shuster before him, Millspaugh quickly recognized
the importance of opium for Iran’s economy and the potential for revenues to be accrued
by the government from this sector. One of the most crucial tests of his tenure was the
enforcement of the regulation for opium control in the heart of the opium trade center of
Isfahan, where even the Shah’s forces encountered strong resistance in carrying out the
opium regulations. The arrival of Millspaugh’s task force at Isfahan in 1923 provoked an
outcry throughout the province that threatened to become a violent eruption. Finally, and
only with the assistance of the army, the task force was able to calm the volatile
atmosphere and reach some compromises with the major opium merchants of the city.
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The most lasting result of the opium regulation reform was the collection of opium sap in
government warehouses, since this method was the best way to ensure that the
government would be able to exact taxes from the maximum amount of opium produced
during that year. The amount of opium stored in the government warehouse in Isfahan
during 1923 doubled the amount collected in previous years and that number continued to
grow. Millspaugh’s approach to opium and his recognition of opium’s significance to
Iran’s economy were unmistakably practical. This was particularly telling, since his
incumbency took place during the Prohibition era in the United States and while the
opium trade -- particularly that of Iran -- was globally condemned.
In 1928, more than a year after Millspaugh was dismissed from his position, the
government of Iran declared the opium sector a state monopoly. The system presented by
the government was not unlike the British opium monopoly in the north-eastern regions
of India during the 19th century. A licensing system for cultivating opium poppies was
established and the peasants were required to sell all the opium sap they collected to
government agents. Government facilities were the only facilities permitted to process
raw opium into various forms and sizes and merchants were allowed to purchase large
stocks of opium from the government for the purpose of export alone. Opium was sold to
the public for consumption in special government stores, but also through small private
retail businesses. Just like in the early 1920s, violent riots broke out in the opiumproducing areas of Southern Iran in which the army had to get involved in order to pacify
the resistance. But the state regained control over the situation and the reform went under

180

way with very mild compromises. Even so, it is clear from many sources that internal
smuggling within Iran increased significantly during that period.
In the early 1930s the government attempted to take another step further and
declared the export of opium a state monopoly in which a chosen merchant will commit
to export a large amount of opium in return for an agreed fee. The concession was
granted to Habibulla Amin, a member of the majlis and a large landowner himself, who
established a syndicate with several partners in order to assemble the necessary funds for
this initiative. However, the concession was cancelled after mere two years, mainly since
the conditions dictated by the government were unfeasible to fulfill and the merchants
involved in this initiative barely managed not to lose money over their investment. After
this episode the government did not attempt to monopolize the foreign trade of opium.
Production itself remained stable throughout the Interwar period. Although the
official statistics shows fluctuations in the amounts of opium produced and exported, it is
safe to assume that any fluctuation in the production of opium that went beyond
unexpected weather conditions may be attributed to corruption or smuggling, as the
statistics relied on either taxes and duties collected by the government in the 1920s, or the
data of the opium monopoly after 1928. By almost all accounts, production throughout
this period remained between 8000-10000 chests of opium (580-720 metric tons) and any
unaccounted opium was distributed illegally. Despite Iran’s official policy that opium
control was the first step necessary before the country could move to a regime of
limitation. Occasional declarations by the Iranian government about a reduction in the
acreage devoted for opium cultivation were met with skepticism by foreign observers,
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and particularly by the Opium Advisory Committee of the LON, who pointed out the
continued flow of Iranian opium into the global illegal market. Despite the tight control
of the country by the new regime, many areas of the country remained outside the reach
of the government organs and illegal opium production and trade went on almost
uninterrupted.
The state of opium-smoking in Iran during the interwar period went through
several interesting developments. Re-fashioning the Iranian society according to the
modern-western model became a priority for the new government, influenced with
similar projects in Turkey but also in Europe. The new regime planned to recreate the
Iranian society anew, body and soul. The modernization of the Iranian society was not
limited to ideological and spiritual readjustment in the form of secularization, but also
intended to create a new Iranian that was physically fit, healthy and clean. Opium
smoking was viewed as a particular problem in the new Iran since the intellectual elite of
the Pahlavi era perceived the smoking of opium as synonym to dysfunction, physical
debilitation, laziness and backwardness.
There was a clear aspect of social classification when it came to recreational
consumption habits. While the upper classes and the westernized intelligentsia smoked
tobacco and drank alcohol, opium was considered the drug of the poor and uneducated,
despite the fact that many reports from that period point that opium smoking was not
particularly less common among the educated higher classes. The government supported
research that studied the damage of opium consumption and various aspects of addiction;
students were advised not to smoke opium and were warned of the dangers of consuming
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it; and politicians made some carefully phrased public expressions of their resentment of
opium and the culture it was part of. Various foreign observers continued to point out the
enormous number of opium-smokers in Iran and complained that the government is not
really making any effort to live up to the standard of its anti-opium rhetoric. One observer
explained that opium is not only openly sold to the public but it is also wrapped with an
official government banderole, which make people believe that the government approves
the smoking of opium and therefore there is no harm in it. Some analysts explained that
the opium revenues were simply too important for the government, particularly since
opium was one of the only sources of foreign currency the government so desperately
needed in order to accomplish its plans for military build-up and infrastructure
construction.
Despite all that, several changes that occurred during this period are proof that the
government did not completely ignore this issue. Serious attention was given to the
question of how many opium smokers there really were in Iran. As mentioned before, as
late as 1926, a League of Nation report by a special inquiry commission sent to Iran to
examine the state of opium production and trade made it a point to mention the lack of
any reliable data about the number of opium smokers in Iran and the enormous gaps
between the various estimates brought to the attention of the committee, going as far as
50% of the population. However, studies made Iran during the 1930s placed the number
of habitual users at the more reasonable area of 500,000-700,000. In addition, many more
Iranians smoked opium more rarely during special occasions, like weddings, or religious
festivals. Even though this was a much smaller percentage than the estimation that spoke
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of half of the population or even third of it, this was still a very large and alarming
percentage of the population (and it continued to grow). Yet, the mere focus on finding
out the number of opium smokers reveals that the government was not oblivious to the
social impact of opium smoking on the Iranian society, even if eventually the government
preferred the opium revenues over strict regulation of the consumption of opium.
In addition, it is also possible to point out a change in the perception of opium
smoking in Iran, as it became more and more negative. If before, opium smoking was
perceived as a tolerated vice, as long as it was not consumed in excess, then during the
interwar period the compass of public morality tilted towards negating opium
consumption altogether. Doctors and public health personnel frequently commented
negatively about opium consumption, and an image of the opium-smoking villain made
some appearances in the literature of that era. However, this was still not translated into
political activism that would lead to prohibition or even serious limitations on the
consumption and trade of opium.
The most important development of the interwar period was the increased
interaction of Iran with the international community with regards to its opium business,
particularly with the League of Nations and the US, who did not join the League of
Nations. Iran maintained tense relations with the Opium Advisory Committee throughout
the interwar period as its compliance with the principles of the 1912 Opium Convention
and the 1925 Geneva Convention – both signed, but not ratified by Iran – was partial at
best. While India and official China gave up, or significantly reduced, their production of
smoking opium, Turkey, who did not participate in the 1912 Opium Conference and did
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not sign the Opium Convention, did not join the LON and thus remained outside the
supervision of the Opium Advisory Committee. Turkey continued its opium production
almost uninterruptedly, and even established factories for the production of heroin, while
Iran who did sign the Convention and joined the LON, was left alone to bear the grunt of
the international community for its continued opium production.
Many scholars pointed out that the anti-opium activism of the US which pushed
for the Shanghai Opium Commission and later the Opium Conference at The Hague, was
motivated not only by a principled objection to opium smoking but also to gain through
the moral principled position against opium more access for American companied to the
Chinese markets and resources, which at the time was almost completely monopolized by
British Trade. British India was reluctantly dragged into the international campaign
against opium, specifically to respond to the public pressure against opium back in
England but also as not to appear supportive of the opium trade, so despised in China.
Although determined to defend the economic interests of the India opium trade, the
Government of India already realized several years earlier that the opium market was
dwindling and acted in the decade and a half before the Great War to gradually do away
with this industry. The protocols of the Opium Conference at The Hague in 1912 reveal
how calculated was the British delegation in its attempt to protect the opium trade and its
revenues as much as possible, while keeping up a mere façade of rejection to opiumsmoking.
However, after the Great War the atmosphere changed dramatically, as the
economic and political interests –although did not disappear – turned secondary to the
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humane mission of eradicating opium smoking around the world. Documents of the
British Indian government from the first two decades of the 20th century bear a distinct
tone of frustration at the extremely negative public atmosphere towards the opium trade,
forcing them to act with caution with anything that has to do with the colony’s opium
policy. A significant shift is observable in documents from the interwar period where the
principles of the fight against the opium trade appear as the hegemonic conviction of
bureaucrats and politicians; and the economic and political interests became merely
constrains from a time passed and only secondary in their importance.
In the early part of the 1920s, the very loose governmental control over the
various regions of the country was hardly conducive to any ambition for control of the
production and the prevention of smuggling. With the regime change in Iran and the
restoration of control over the land by a government that appeared to be determined to
modernize Iran along Western lines, the Opium Advisory Committee was hopeful that
the new government will ratify the Opium Conventions and soon begin implementing a
plan to control and limit the production and trade of opium. However, despite the tight
system of monopoly established by the Iranian Government, the Opium Advisor
Committee found no evidence that the government was seriously intending to either
reduce the production of opium or seriously act to reduce the consumption of opium in
the country. Even worse, more and more illegal opium that came for Iran was seized in
various raids in Asia, Europe and the US and evidence was mounting that the smuggling
of Iranian opium took place not only as a result of the government’s negligence but also
with indirect and maybe even direct encouragement of the government.
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Intelligence reports since the late 1920s describe recurring cases of opium
smuggling from Bushehr with the assistance of Japanese ships that appear to enjoy
official assistance. The ships would anchor outside the port and then in the late hours of
the night, the ships approached the port’s external edge, where under the cover of
darkness they were loaded with hundreds and maybe even thousands of opium chests.
Another smuggling method was the export of opium to Vladivostok, the pacific port town
at the south-eastern edge of the Soviet Union. Since the Iranian authorities demanded no
evidence from the exporters that the opium they exported was legitimately ordered in
Vladivostok, the opium shipments were allowed. Of course, the Soviet Union did not
legally import any opium from Iran during the period. The shipments of opium never
arrived at Vladivostok since the ships unloaded the opium they were carrying while they
passed through the China Sea. A fleet of light junks would approach the ships as they
were sailing close to shore and transfer the opium from the ship into land for further
processing.
The protests of the Opium Advisory Committee made a very small impact on
Iran’s policy, and the smuggling of opium continued. The impact of the global economic
crisis on Iran and its dire need for foreign currency were the motivations behind Iran’s
decision to impose no limits on opium production in the country and continue its passive
agreement for opium smuggling. The government felt even further pushed for this policy
in light of its very mild success in the early 1930s to re-negotiate the terms of the oil
concession held by APOC in order to increase the royalties paid to Iran and improve the
government’s control over the financial activities of the company. That is not to say that
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Iran was not willing to give up the opium trade under any circumstances, quite the
opposite. The importance of the opium revenues for Iran was understood by the LON
Opium Advisory Committee, and the question of how to substitute the opium business
was an important part of the Committee’s investigative visit to Iran 1926. Various
agricultural options were examined; however, the conclusion was that, despite the great
potential, given the current state of infrastructure, the lack of railway and the scarcity of
good roads, and especially the insufficient amount of water due to the devastating state of
the old qanat and the absence of modern irrigation facilities.
The 1930s saw some advancement in Iran in terms of transportation as the transIranian railway was completed, connecting Tehran with the Persian Gulf, and some
additional cross-country roads were paved. Negotiating with the LON during the late
1930s Iran expressed its agreement to liquidate its opium business in return for
international support in the construction of an irrigation system in Southern Iran that will
include several large dams, hydro-electric facilities for the production of energy and
technical assistance with the integration of substitute crops and industries into the Iranian
market. However, the political events in Europe and the still-existing impact of the Great
Economic Depression, kept the European members of the LON preoccupied with their
own problems, and supporting a massive development and training program during that
period just seemed unfeasible.
A more aggressive approach towards Iran was demonstrated by the United States.
The Harrison Act of 1914 was the first piece of legislation to limit the opium trade in the
US that imposed a special tax on all the aspects of the production and trade of opiates.
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Despite being a tax act, the Harrison Act was established as a prohibitive act which
served as the legal basis to prohibit opium in the US for many years. The mission to
implement the provisions of the Harrison Act was entrusted in the hands of several small
organizations established in the early 1920s within the Treasury Department. All of them
were later united in 1930 under the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), which was
headed by the legendary “Drug Czar”, Harry J. Anslinger. Loyal to the legacy of
Hamilton Wright, the FBN devoted much attention to international developments in the
field of drugs, assuming correctly that illegal opiates produced anywhere in the world
might end up being smuggled into the US. Closely cooperating with embassies, the FBN
kept deeply informed files on the production, consumption and trade (both legal and
illegal). FBN agents were occasionally attached to embassies in order to improve the
FBN’s supervision and FBN officials negotiated directly with representatives from other
countries regarding questions of opium policy. The FBN position on the trade of opiates
was no doubt more aggressive and less permitting than that of the LON Opium Advisory
Committee, however, limited by the interwar American isolationism that kept the US
outside the LON, the FBN could not have direct influence on the LON opium policy.
Unlike the LON, the FBN presented a more severe challenge to Iran’s lax
approach towards the smuggling of Iranian opium. FBN files reveal that this organization
kept a very close eye on the opium trade in Iran, and its analysis of the situation in Iran
displayed cynicism and disbelief in the sincere intentions of the Iranian government to
limit the consumption of opium within Iran or its intention to act against smuggling. In
1937, Iranians who asked for opium export licenses to the US were refused a license.
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Diplomatic inquiries revealed that the FBN unilaterally applied an unofficial ‘embargo’
on the import of Iranian opium into the US. FBN Documents reveal that already in 1936,
pharmaceutical companies who applied for opium import licenses were specifically
informed not to purchase opium of Iranian origins. The FBN later voluntarily informed
the American Drug Manufacturers’ Association (ADMA) that no licenses will be issued
to pharmaceutical companies for the import of Iranian raw opium. Iranian diplomats who
tried to negotiate the removal of this policy were answered that until Iran changes its
conduct with regards to the smuggling of Iranian opium there will be no legal import of
Iranian opium into the US. In a letter sent to the Iranian embassy, the Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury explained that the US sees itself as a main sufferer of opium smuggled
from Iran and pointed out recent data exposed by the LON about the scale of Iranian
opium smuggling. The American embargo over Iranian opium imports was kept in place
until the occupation of Iran by the Allied Forces during WWII, when Iranian opium was
allowed into the US in order to assist Iran with its wartime financial problems.
When WWII broke out in 1939 Iran declared once again its neutrality, however,
for various reasons despite this declaration Iran clearly favored the side of the Axis
Powers. The long-time animosity and suspicion towards the imperialist actions of Britain
and the Soviet Union were the motivations behind the general sense of sympathy for
Germany in Iran. The Shah’s admiration for the European fascist movements, and the
identification of many in the Iranian intellectual elite - who received their European
education in Germany - with the German culture and the German people, were also
important factors. Alarmed by the presence of German spies in Iran and worried about
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the security of the oil facilities in Khuzestan, the British embassy followed closely the
situation in Iran. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the
latter joined the Allied Forces. Searching for supply routes to assist the Soviets, Iran was
seen as the best possible route. The demands if the British and Soviet governments from
Iran to assist the Allied Forces and to remove of all Axis citizens from Iran were ignored
by the government. As a result, British and Soviet forces invaded Iran in August of 1941,
quickly crushing all resistance by the Iranian army. In September the forces marched in
Tehran, arrested Reza Shah, forced him to abdicate and sent him to exile in South Africa,
appointing his 18-year old son, Mohammad Reza, in his place. Iran remained occupied
throughout WWII serving as a main supply route to the Soviet Union. Foreign troops
finally evacuated Iran in 1946.
Iran was thrown into an exciting period of political freedoms but also turbulent
internal skirmishes. The total defeat and the dispersal of the Iranian military forces
resulted in lawlessness that quickly ensued in the provinces. The immediate result was
that opium cultivators refused to hand over their opium sap to the mostly powerless
collectors of the opium monopoly. In the spring of 1942 the collection of opium sap by
the opium monopoly dropped by almost 80%. The enormous purchases of foodstuff by
the Allied forces almost depleted the country’s resources and brought about a price
increase that brought many Iranian to the brinks of hunger. Under these conditions the
illegal trade in opium – often the only secured source of income for many peasants –
flourished in Iran. Although the Allied Command in Iran was preoccupied with the
mission of supplying the Soviet Union, it did not refrain from supervising the actions of
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the new government in Iran. Still, the actual involvement of the Allied Forces in the
internal affairs of Iran was kept to a minimum level. Arthur Millspaugh was called back
to manage the finances of Iran, only this time with more vigor and authority, since he was
a representative of the Allied Forces, not a employee of the government. For the Iranian
government this situation was practically impossible. On the one hand, the Allied
Command demanded the government to keep the country in order and assist the war
effort of the Allied Forces, but on the other hand refused to assist the government in
policing tasks. The main concerns of the Allied Command regarding the opium situation
in Iran were preventing large-scale addiction among the soldiers stationed in Iran and
fighting against opium smuggling.
Like in many preceding wars and in many other wars that followed it, the various
theatres of WWII were areas in which soldiers were introduced to drugs. This was
particularly true in WWII Iran, where a large amount of non-combating troops were
stationed in an area that produced an enormous amount of opium. Many soldiers,
stationed in one of the various camps established to secure the “Persian Corridor” from
the Persian Gulf to the northern border of Iran, became acquainted with opium during
their leaves of absence which they used to hang out in the Iranian towns near their camps.
Countless ships carrying important equipment and supply arrived from the US at the
Persian Gulf ports in the northern part of the Gulf, from where their shipment was sent
north through the Trans-Iranian railway or by convoys of trucks. The empty ships
returned to the US to be reloaded with more supply. The authorities soon discovered that
those empty ships were used to smuggle opium into the US. In an attempt to control the
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situation, FBN agents were conscripted in order to join the Allied Command in Iran to
provide assistance for the control of the opium situation in the country.
Demanded by the Allied Command to take control of the cultivation and
production of opium and act against opium smuggling, Iranian government
representatives replied that with the lack of armed escort – which the American forces in
Southern Iran refused to provide – opium collectors were driven away by the peasants.
But although this reply appeared to be in line with the regular Iranian feet-dragging from
the interwar period, the abdication of the Shah was in fact the beginning of the final
episode of legal large-scale opium production in Iran. The disappearance of the previous
regime surprisingly brought to the forefront of the political system politicians who were
not only opposed to opium smoking, recognized it as a major problem facing Iran, but
were also willing to act in order to bring about a change in Iran’s opium policy, although
the path to prohibition was far from being a smooth road.
Already during WWII the government initiated a new program aimed at checking
and curbing opium consumption based on a few simple principles: Distribution of opium
was limited to registered addicts who received special coupons for this purpose. After a
certain date, new users would not be allowed to join the program. The registered addicts
received psychological evaluation and they were also exposed to an aggressive campaign
aimed to convince them to abandon their evil habit. The government also announced the
prohibition of opium cultivation in certain regions of Iran and promised that more regions
will be added to the prohibition in the future. By 1945 the government reported that
125,000 Iranian already registered as addicts out of the estimated 500,000 opium addicts
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in the country, but observers were quite skeptical about how serious the government
really was in its attempt to take on opium-smoking. The government’s approach towards
limiting opium consumption appeared naïve and failed to take into account the possibility
of smuggling as an alternative source for the supply of opium. In addition, the regions
announced as no longer available for opium-poppy cultivation were those where very
little opium was produced in any case, thus ceasing the cultivation of opium there made
very little impact on the total annual production.
In 1944, an organization dedicated to fight against the opium trade and
criminalize opium-smoking was established in Iran for the first time. Unlike its parallel
European grass-root anti-opium movements, the Iranian Anti-Opium Society was formed
members of the majlis, wives of leading politicians, doctors and businessmen. The
Society’s activities focused mostly on information collection and political pressure on
decision-makers in the government. Despite the close affinity between members of the
group to the government, the Society’s activities were surprisingly oppositional. While
the Ministry of Finance supplied data about the annual opium production and trade of
Iran, members of the Anti-Opium Society conducted private meetings with the American
embassy in which they argued that the real numbers were significantly higher, although
the American diplomats tended to favor the government’s reports. The Society lobbied
members of the majlis and government officials in order to push legislation that will limit
the production of opium in Iran, and they initiated several lecture campaigns to promote
abstinence from opium smoking. The Society was prestigious enough to host the Minister
of Finance to speak publicly about Iran’s plans to end opium production and fight opium
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addiction in Iran in 1945, but the impact of the society should not be exaggerated. It did
not break the existing class division within Iran with regards to the social place of opium
smoking.
While the majority of Iranians, from the urban middle class to the lower class
peasants, continued to hold a relaxed approach to opium smoking as a legitimate social
pastime activity, the westernized upper class viewed opium smoking with contempt. In
fact, its importance lies in the fact that despite the vibrant burst of democracy in Iran after
the abdication of the Shah in 1941, politics in Iran continued to be a closed game of elites
that concentrated in the main urban centers, particularly that of the capital Tehran. Even
during the most democratic period with the least constrains on the political discourse in
the country, political power was carried out along mainly top-down patterns, with very
little influential feedback from below.
During the second half of the 1940s the pressure on the government of Iran
increased both from the outside and from inside to act further to act more vigorously to
solve Iran’s problem of opium addiction and promote a policy to would bring Iran closer
to the international standards of anti-drug legislation. In 1945 the majlis passed
legislation that prohibited production and consumption of opium in Iran, yet this bill was
rejected by the government who was not bound according to the constitution by such
measures of the majlis. The UN assembly recommended that all countries that still did
not discourage the consumption of opium within their territory to do so as early as
possible. American legislation presented in the congress suggested that special measures
for checking all shipment from countries who had not yet adopted a drug policy along the
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line of the UN recommendations. By 1946, responding to the pressures exerted upon Iran,
the government of Iran announced that opium will be completely prohibited in Iran, but
once again even this announcement did not materialize into actual prohibition. In fact,
this pattern repeated itself several times in the next decade, and even in 1953 the
government of Prime Minister Mosaddegh announced the prohibition of opium
cultivation and production, only to have these announcements fade into oblivion.
Reports prepared by the FBN and for the FBN reveal the skepticism towards
Iran’s intentions and its actual ability to prohibit the production and trade of opium. The
consumption of opium was too much and acceptable social trait and the production of
opium was too engrained within the Iranian economic system. The ongoing financial
troubles of Iran who, particularly under the government of Mosaddegh as a result the
British-American oil embargo imposed as a response to Iran’s nationalization of the
APOC. This Skepticism guided the FBN to try and negotiate with Iran to significantly
reduce its opium production in return for the US support for an allocation of a quota of
the annual licit production of opiates to Iran. However, these efforts were of no avail as
the Iranians governments of the period, all eventually preferred unrestricted production of
opium over limited production for the licit market of narcotics.
The end of the licit large-scale production of opium in Iran finally came in 1955,
following the fall of Mosaddegh’s government in the coup d’état of August 1953. The renegotiation of Iran’s oil concession and the establishment of the new National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) raised Iran’s share of the oil revenues to 50%. In addition to this
enormous addition to Iran’s treasury, the post coup d’état period made Iran a close ally of
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the US and one of the major world recipients of American military and civilian aid funds.
The economic boost to Iran’s treasury removed the constant shortage of foreign currency
that the opium trade helped to relieve throughout the first half of the 20th century. Driven
by the ideology of Development, American policy-makers came to believe that it is
possible to accelerate Iran’s development along the lines of a liberal free-market and
bring prosperity to the country that will prevent it from falling prey to subversive
communist forces that will deliver Iran to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.
Determined to keep Iran and its enormous oil reserves on the side of the Western World,
American funds began pouring into Pahlavi Iran used to construct transportation
infrastructure and large project of dams used to revolutionize irrigation in Southern Iran.
In fact, all the demands Iran presented to the international community during the 1930s,
were now fulfilled by the US AID plan. Thus, the economic factor, which prevented the
governments of the 1940s and the early 1950s to prohibit the opium production and trade,
was no longer relevant.
Despite the American agreement to support and Iranian request for a quota in the
licit global production of opiates, Iran chose to pass on this option and instead liquidate
its entire opium production. It was later explained by Iranian officials that at the time they
believed that the problem of opium addiction in Iran was closely connected to the local
production of opium, a connection that was somewhat similar to the relation of the spread
of malaria to the existence of large swamps. Drying the swamps destroys the living
environment of the malaria-spreading mosquitoes, and thus in the same manner it was the
common belief among the policy-makers that liquidating the opium production in Iran
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will solve the problem of opium-addiction in the same manner. Those officials later
admitted that at the time they did not estimate correctly the possibility of opium
smuggling into Iran and the determination of the opium addicts to carry on their habit.
Thus, a century of large scale opium production, a glorious industry that turned
deplorable, came to an end.
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CONCLUSION
When commercial production of opium began in Iran sometime in the mid-19th
century, opium was a legitimate product of commerce around the world. Daring to enter a
market so vigorously controlled by the most powerful nation in the world at the time, the
Iranian merchants’ initiative was as brave as it was successful. Within a few short
decades Iran produced opium that was at least equal in quality to popular Patna opium,
and fetched equally high prices. When the government of Iran declared in 1955 a
complete prohibition regime on the production, trade and consumption of opium, it was
no longer a legitimate item of unrestricted trade in almost every country in the world.
Though its production did not grow significantly for several decades, Iran became
one of the biggest producers of opium in the world, as India and China, the former
leading producers, significantly reduced their own opium production. The majority of
Iran’s production during that period was destined, one way or another, for the illegal
markets. The world has changed. This dissertation examined the entire period of
commercial opium production and presented the development of this sector in Iran’s
economy, with the intention to understand opium within an internal and external context,
the local and the international at the same time, and their interaction. It focused mainly on
the first two phases of this period, from 1850 till a little after the end of World War I in
1918, whereas the subsequent period, only briefly surveyed in this dissertation, awaits
further processing of the research.
Opium was a familiar product in Iran, but it only became subjected to large-scale
commercial production in Iran after the 1850s, when Iran gradually was assimilated into
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the global capitalist market. Cheap manufactured goods flooded the markets, creating a
crisis in the traditional manual industries. To balance the growing deficit vis-à-vis the
influx of European finished goods into the country, the agricultural sector underwent a
gradual process of transition from a previous focus on subsistence crops to an emphasis
on cash crop production. Opium was the ideal product for the Iranian merchants, who
could hardly had found another product that was possible to produce in Iran during that
period that was equally high-value, small-bulk and easily preserved. Iranian merchants
tried to export opium to China, the largest opium market in the world, even before the
1850s, but these attempts were successfully blocked by the East India Company who
maintained a tight grip over the Chinese markets.
Only during the second half of the 19th century, conditions were created to enable
the export of Iranian opium to China. The legalization of opium in China was followed
by a rapid expansion of the opium market there which opened up new opportunities for
new brands of opium, like that of Iran, to occupy an important place in the expanding
market. The improvement of steamboat navigation and the opening up of the Suez Canal
created new possibilities of transportation to China that gave Iranian opium merchants
not only quicker and cheaper options to export opium to China, but also enabled them to
bypass the British protectionist customs in the Bombay port. Effectively preventing the
export of non-British opium to China in a period when ships practically could not cross
the Indian Ocean on the way to China without stopping at Bombay, British protectionist
customs were no longer able to keep off competitors from the Chinese markets.
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Other fortuitous incidental developments, like the crisis of opium prices of 1860
in China and India, assisted the initial introduction of Iranian opium in China, but once it
arrived there it became a lasting success. The quality of Iranian opium was constantly
improved and the product was continuously re-adjusted to better fit the demands of the
Chinese consumer. The feedback process was optimal since the line separating between
landowners who encouraged the cultivation of opium in their lands and merchants who
used their revenues to buy land for opium cultivation, was blurry. The short-line between
the production and trade of opium in Iran constituted a strong incentive for the producers
to improve their products. Extensive adulteration, so common in the early days of Iranian
commercial opium production, was significantly diminished by merchants who could not
sell in China their over-adulterated shipments of opium. Specialization in the cultivation
process tripled the average morphine content in Iranian opium within less than 30 years
of production, making it higher than that of Indian opium and eligible for the lucrative
pharmaceutical-oriented markets in Europe and the US who needed morphine-rich opium
as opposed to the Chinese market orientation for smoking-opium, demanding opium with
a more moderate morphine-content.
A significant school among the historians of Qajar Iran argues that the transition
to cash-crop during the second-half of the 19th century impeded the long-run
development of Iran’s economy, as it discouraged the advancement of industrial
production and strengthened traditional elements of trade instead of creating a middleclass necessary for political development. The development of opium itself as a product
and the investment of capital and knowledge that this development necessitated, suggest
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that this evaluation may not be entirely justified, because (a) In at least one sector of the
agricultural production, and clearly one of the most financially successful one, the
success of trade was both the result of investment in knowledge and manufacturing
infrastructure and the cause of more of it. (b) The opium sector grew to become an
enormous economic echelon that provided for tens of thousands of people, including not
only peasants and day-laborers, but also cultivation specialists, production masters and a
host of mid-range traders. The opium trade was certainly not an exclusive benefactor of
the small layer of export merchants.
The rising availability of opium in Iran cannot explain the rise of opium
consumption during that period, certainly not by itself. Increased drug consumption is not
connected directly to its mere physical availability. Consumption of specific drugs went
up and down in many places around the world without any connection to the availability
or its absence of those drugs. Economic and cultural factors are more important in
explaining fluctuations of consumption. That said, Iran indeed experienced a significant
rise of opium consumption just as the political power of anti-opium groups around the
world was at its peak. Despite the developing inconvenience in Iran regarding opium
consumption and the growing awareness of the western-oriented intelligentsia to the
negative perception of opium consumption in the West, all the governments in Iran until
after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 did not treat the consumption of opium as a
particular concern of the government. Iran did not have a grass-root anti-opium
movement until the 1940s and even then the anti-opium cause was remarkably
characterized by members of the ruling elite. Though Iran vigorously joined the

202

international anti-opium effort and was among the original signatories of the first Opium
Convention signed in 1912 at The Hague, this was done due to complex economic and
diplomatic considerations. Opium in Iran was not a mono-culture, but its revenues were a
significant part of the state’s income and there were no foreseeable substitutes that could
take its place.
Realizing the changing mood in the world towards opium, Iran participated in the
anti-opium diplomatic effort in order to minimize the economic problems it predicted will
be the result of this effort. Iran also used the anti-opium conference as a stage to promote
the status of Iran as a legitimate member of the family of civilized nations, a crucial
element for the survival of Iran in the eyes of many Constitutional Revolution-era
intellectuals. During the interwar period, the regime of Reza Shah was no doubt
concerned about the high-levels of opium consumption in the country, but despite its
dictatorial nature, it did not prohibit the consumption of opium. This is a significant for a
regime that did not hesitate to dictate a dress code for its citizens and did not shy away
from publicly unrobing clerics and forcibly remove the hijab, the traditional head garb,
off women. The absence of public demands to ban opium and the precedence of financial
considerations defined this policy. Only a major restructuring of Iran’s economy and the
sizable rise in its share of the opium revenues in the post-Mosaddegh era enabled the
government to forego its opium sector and to set in place a regime of drug prohibition.
Future research into the history of opium during this era may shed light on the social and
cultural aspects of opium consumption in Iran. A significant body of research by drug
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scholars discusses the close connection between cultural background and the drug
experience.
The impact of Iran’s turn to commercial opium production is still felt today.
Social and economic problems related to drugs, and particularly to opium and its
derivatives, haunt present- day Iran. The country still has one of the largest communities
of opiates consumers in the world. Neighboring Afghanistan produces almost all the
illegal opium of the world and uses Iran en route to the lucrative markets of Europe.
Understanding Iran’s current drug problems requires knowledge of the long history of
opium in that country, which I hope this dissertation has provided.
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